THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN

A POLITICAL STUDY OF JAPAN
AND OF HER RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA, GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES, THE BRITISH COLONIES AND THE NETHERLANDS
AND OF THE WORLD POLITICS OF THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC

BY

AN EX-COUNSELLOR OF LEGATION
IN THE FAR EAST

IN ONE VOLUME

PUBLISHED BY C. L. VAN LANGENHUYSEN
AMSTERDAM 1918 ROTTERDAM

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INTRODUCTION.

The volume herewith submitted is a political study of Japan's relations towards the world war and of the results that may be expected to flow from her participation therein.

The plan of the book is to trace from its original sources the development of Japan's present political tendencies and to make clear the aims and policies of Japan in the Far East and the region of the Pacific. Accordingly, separate chapters are devoted to the consideration of Japanese relations with each one of the Powers with which it comes in contact in the region referred to—with Russia, China, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, the British Colonies, and the Netherlands. The problem of Japan is one that intimately concerns each one of the countries named, and it is the author's purpose to indicate the nature of the problem in each separate instance and to draw therefrom certain conclusions with respect to the manner in which all these interrelated questions will affect the future destinies of Japan.

Japan's attitude as a belligerent in the world war is the result of a foreign policy that was established by her real rulers, the small coterie of clan statesmen that stand behind the Throne, during the very first years of her 'Restoration' era that began in 1868. It is a policy that already in the sixteenth century occupied the minds of her great leaders, Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, who were at the same time great military chieftains and great statesmen. After their death, Japanese progress along the lines these men would have

followed, was held in abeyance. For two hundred and fifty years the idea of the hegemony of the Far East slumbered in the bosom of Japan. With the coming of the Americans and Europeans soon after the middle of the last century, and the abandonment of her seclusion policy, Japan awoke to new life, and again took up the threads of policy that had been spun by Hideyoshi centuries before. In 1894 Japan went to war with China, in 1904 with Russia, and in 1914 with Germany. Each of these wars, equi-distant from each other in lapse of time, are like links in a chain in their relation to one another. Each of them in succession tends to bind firmer and firmer, Japan's grasp upon the East. What the future fate of Japan is to be will depend to a very great extent on the outcome of the present war. As the author indicates in the following pages, signs are not wanting of a complete change in the attitude of Japan towards the Powers with whom she is at present allied.

As the reader will perceive, it is the writer's opinion that the problem of Japan will be solved in one of two ways—by a new combination composed of England, Germany, and the United States, or by a new combination composed of Japan, Germany and Russia. One of these two combinations must inevitably arise out of the present war. The problems in the East that await solution are too complicated and too far-reaching to permit of any half-measures. Attention to these questions cannot be postponed. Moreover, Japan is fully awake to her danger, and her astute statesmen may be depended upon to anticipate events and, by strengthening her own position in the Far East, endeavor to hold in check the forces opposed to her while she works to establish for herself a condition of economic and financial independence, free from the dangers of isolation that would threaten her under certain conditions.

The writer believes himself fortunate in being able to take

an entirely independent attitude with respect to the questions discussed, and absolutely to free himself from any partisanship or bias for or against any nation or group of nations, by reason of the fact that having lived, traveled, studied and worked in various parts of the world, on widely separated continents, it has become a habit to examine all political questions, not from a national, but from an international point of view.

The writer does not presume to judge, either to approve or to disapprove the motives of any of the belligerents. Centuries will pass before the verdict of history shall have been uttered upon these questions, and even then the verdict is bound to be a Scotch one—Not Proven. All that we contemporaries can hope to do, is to attempt to throw a little light here and there, and in doing so, to preserve an impartial and unbiassed spirit. We may permit ourselves to point out perceived dangers, and we may indicate the direction in which certain policies lead, but in doing so, let us beware of treading the paths of falsehood, hatred, and prejudice.

THE HAGUE, October 5, 1918.

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I.

THE EUROPEAN WAR, JAPAN'S OPPORTUNITY.

CHAPTER ONE.

The European War, Japan's Opportunity.

It is popularly supposed just at present, that Germany is the best hated nation in the world to-day. This popular impression, it is believed, would receive some modification if the student of affairs were to leave the Occident behind him and gather his new impressions in the Orient—in the continents and islands washed by the waves of the Pacific.

It is a common-place among Australians, and almost a matter of their regular school education, to look upon the Japanese as their future enemy, and one with whom the islanders will sooner or later have to try conclusions. Hatred of the Japanese runs high in the Pacific coast states of America, particularly in California, a hatred that was first directed against a different Asiatic race, the forerunners of the Japanese on the Pacific slopes, to wit, the Chinese. Reference to a little bit of Japanese history may, perhaps, assist to give some inkling into the reasons for the general dislike of the Japanese in the Far East.

During a period of forty-four years (1573—1616) three great men controlled the destinies of old Japan. They succeeded one another in power, and form one of the rare instances in the world's history of a succession of powerful rulers, all of them possessing great constructive statesmanship, and attaining to the supreme power in the state one after the other with no intervals of mediocrity between. In Nobunaga, Hideyoshi,

and Iyeyasu, Japan possessed rulers, the extent of whose influence on their country's history would be hard to parallel anywhere else in the world. It is no exaggeration to say that the foundation of all Japan's future greatness was laid by these three men.

During this period, these men, one after the other, were engaged in crushing the great feudal barons, and militant Buddhist monks, whose independence of attitude, and unpatriotic self-centredness threatened to be stumbling blocks in the great work these men had undertaken—the creation of a unified nation. European methods of warfare were adopted in their campaigns, and even their fortifications were constructed upon the European model of the middle ages. Christian influence and teachings had begun to make themselves felt in Japan, and it was deemed necessary to take steps to oppose their spread. As we shall see, Japan's rulers, during this period, succeeded eventually by a series of persecutions, in entirely exterminating Christian influence from the land.

The successor of Nobunaga, was Hideyoshi, ex-sandal bearer to Nobunaga, and a man with the mind and ambition of a Napoleon. He succeeded to the supreme power in the state at the age of forty-six, and at once began to put into effect some of the great schemes of empire that had been brewing in his mind since the day, when in 1577, he is reported to have declared to Nobunaga that it was his intention to conquer Kiushiu (the southernmost island of the Japanese archipelago), next Korea, and finally China. 'When that is effected', said he, 'the three countries China, Korea, and Japan will be one. I shall do it all as easily as a man rolls up a piece of matting and carries it under his arm.'

Besides methods of warfare, Hideyoshi borrowed metallurgical methods from Europe, and greatly increasing the production of Japan's gold and silver mines, provided himself with the

means for carrying on civil and foreign wars. Japan was minutely surveyed and a detailed map of the islands prepared. Art and letters were not neglected. He encouraged trade with Macao, Cambodia and Annam.

Following out his forecast of 1577, Hideyoshi accomplished the reduction of Kiushiu, the head quarters of Roman Catholicism in Japan. Up to then, for political reasons, not wishing to antagonize a powerful influence while he was carrying on a civil war, Hideyoshi had protected the Jesuit missionaries in Japan and acted in open hostility to the Buddhist monks. After the reduction of Kiushiu, however, and the submission of the Buddhist monks, Hideyoshi became the protector of Buddhism.

As may be imagined, this opportunism in religion in a man of Hideyoshi's calibre, was by no means the outcome of any religious convictions of his own. Political reasons were the controlling factor. The Portuguese Jesuits, led by Francis Xavier, who had hitherto practically unaided spread the faith in Japan, had now by reason of the annexation of Portugal by Philip II, of Spain, in 1580, become Spanish subjects. Macao, in the bay of Canton, with which Japan had been carrying on a lively trade, was now a Spanish port. The Philippines and the whole of the west coast of America were Spanish territory.

About this time, one of Hideyoshi's agents innocently asked the pilot of a Spanish galleon which had run aground on the coast and been taken over by the Japanese, how it was that so small a country as Spain had acquired dominions so huge in extent. 'Our Kings', naively replied the seaman, 'begin by sending into the countries which they wish to conquer, a number of missionaries who induce the people to embrace our religion, and when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our

Kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest.'

The pilot's answer was reported to Hideyoshi. It confirmed his worst suspicions. He arrested the Christian monks, and applied to them the methods of the Spanish Inquisition. Twenty-six Christians were killed; one hundred thirty-seven churches in Kiushiu were destroyed and the Jesuits were expelled.

Hideyoshi now devoted his attention to the final pacification of the islands and the overthrow of the last remaining recalcitrant feudal barons. By 1590, all this had been accomplished and Hideyoshi was at last free to carry out his schemes for the conquest of Korea and China.

Hideyoshi made two attempts for the conquest of Korea, the first of which was unsuccessful owing to the inferiority of his navy to the Korean fleet, which succeeded in cutting the Japanese lines of communication in the Korean peninsula after his armies had made their landing. In 1597 he tried again after building a powerful navy. He invaded the peninsula with 141,000 men. On October 30, 1598, thanks to the valor of the Satsuma samurai, the Japanese won a great victory.

Hideyoshi's great schemes for the reduction and dismemberment of China seemed now to offer a bright outlook of success. He had turned the flank, so to speak, of the Chinese Empire, by overcoming the Koreans, and the way to Pekin was open to him. But fate willed otherwise. On September 18, 1598, Hideyoshi died at the age of 62. His death brought the war to an end, an armistice was concluded and the Japanese forces were withdrawn.

Had Hideyoshi lived to complete his conquests, he might have conquered not only Korea and China, but likewise the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and California.

But Japanese history from henceforth, under Iyeyasu and his successors, took on an entirely new course. Imperialistic and expansionist aims were abandoned. Japan became self-centred.

For two and a half centuries intercourse with the foreigner was almost null, and Japan was closed to Europeans until the coming of Commodore Perry in 1853, with a squadron of the American naval fleet. This date is the turning point in Japanese history separating the old from the new Japan. Step by step Japan now entered upon her new course, abandoning old customs, habits, methods of education, giving up her policy of seclusion from the outside world, surrendering her feudalism, her Shogunate form of government, her caste system involving particularly the exercise of special rights and privileges on the part of the Samurai, or military caste; all these time-hallowed institutions, she gave up, and turned for her new knowledge, and her new ideas of progress and development, to the Western World. This is known as the era of the "Restoration," or recovery by the Mikado of his full sovereign rights, theretofore usurped by the Shoguns.

Under Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu, Japan developed the great qualities which have become the heritage of a race of conquerors. The soul of Japan to-day, insofar as her adoption of western capitalism has not materialized it, is still the soul that possessed her during the days of her three greatest heroes. The Far East believes that Japan is once again dreaming the dreams of Hideyoshi—and those visions include the conquest of Australia, China, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and a settlement of outstanding differences with America. Fear of a people that can dream such dreams, and who have already shown such aptitude for realizing them is the basis of the hatred held of Japan, in Korea, in China, in Siberia, in Australia, in the Dutch East Indies, in the Philippines, and in America. It is fear of the ancient sword of Hideyoshi.

Japan when she casts up the accounts of her ledger with the view to the adoption of her future policy, must place

upon the debit side the following: she has aroused the unfriendliness of other nations; she has less wealth, less industrial capacity and commercial ability than some of her chief competitors; she has a scarcity of essential raw materials such as coal and iron, and in a conflict with England, or America, if that should ever come, Japan stands in danger of such isolation as would soon determine the conflict against her because of her inability to maintain contact with the outside world.

To the commercial eye, Japan is no land of promise; only the eighth of it, has been or can be redeemed from the unprofitable hills. In only one way can a national competence be acquired and that by means of the development of a large oversea trade, or as a substitute therefor the hegemony of the Asiatic continent and the control of its markets. Japan's future, like England's, depends on manufacture. To success in that, peace is vital, a peace that permits unrestricted import of raw materials, a peace which alone enables the exporters to develop markets and create demands for their products.

In the face of such serious handicaps to national life and growth, the Japanese are asking themselves, what is the wisest course to pursue in the midst of this world war, and this question admits of but one answer in the minds of the Mikado's leading statesmen. Japan must keep her ships and foster her growing industries. She must increase and utilize her growing hold on the commerce of China, taking advantage of the absence of her competitors to consolidate her gains there before they return to the field. In China, Japan sees illimitable possibilities. Japanese commercial circles believe that in open competiton with the West,—thanks to their twin advantages of position and cheap production—they can hold their own, or more, in that vast field of activity. Thus, they believe, can be remedied the chief weakness of their national economy. Accordingly, taking advantage of the temporary absence of her competitors

from the field, Japan is bending all her energies to the exploitation of China. Indeed, control of the Chinese markets alone is a dream, the fulfillment of which would be sufficient to slake the thirsty avarice of the most covetous of nations.

But we do not mean to charge Japan with having only sordid motives in connection with China. Japan, it is fair to say, is no more sordid in her motives when it comes to a matter of trade, than are her competitors. She has simply learned and adopted their ways. Nor are her motives altruistic. She cannot afford to be. If the Chinese market—the greatest and hitherto the freest of the world's markets—were closed to her, Japan would suffer irreparable loss.

And so it is that Japan is patiently applying her energies to the accomplishment of her greatest task—the creation of a new way of life in the East. China has had to fight for security against external enemies; she has likewise to be saved from herself. The China of to-day has inherited her burden of corruption, weakness, and lack of patriotism from a long line of forefathers, and unless she can emerge from these trammels by participating in the awakening of the East, she is in danger of disintegration and decay. That tendency, Japan is assisting China to resist and overcome.

The Western nations are interested in watching what is to be the outcome of China's struggle for regeneration. In what ways may Japan assist her? It is for Japan to provide an answer, and already she has shown that the efforts to be pursued for the regeneration of China are to be conducted along various lines. To predict that Japan will follow the somewhat discredited lines of "peaceful penetration", absorption or territorial expansion which have secured for the Western nations all of North and South America, Africa, the East and West Indies, Australia, Siberia, the Philippines, India and prospectively, Persia and Mesopotamia,—would be to attribute too

great a lack of inventiveness to the Japanese. But we may be sure that whatever her goal in China may be, Japan will always keep in mind that the bed-rock of her policy is and forever will be the hegemony of the East, in which is primarily involved the extension of her moral and economic influence over China. Military and commercial bases, she already has acquired there. Her grip is firmly fastened on Manchuria.

The story of how Manchuria, that apple of discord in the Far East, has come to fall a prey to Japanese ambition, deserves a word of mention. Before the present war, Manchuria, that province of China, in which China has so little authority, was under a sort of dual protection. At the end of the Russo-Japanese war, the Russians administered the Chinese Eastern Railway zone from Harbin south to Changchun. There, Japanese administration began, and ran down the railway to Mukden, then south to Port Arthur and Dairen, as well as eastward to Antung, on the road to Korea. The Japanese made the district productive by the cultivation of the soya bean, an industry which grew to great dimensions. The most fertile lands in the province to the north, watered by the river Sungari, were left untouched by the Russians. Accordingly Japan began negotations with Russia to extend her sphere of influence to Harbin, and take over administration of the railway zone from Harbin south. The right of navigation on the upper reaches of the Sungari, theretofore exclusively Russian, was also to go to Japan. These concessions Japan had wrung from Russia in 1916, while Russia was still in the throes of her life and death struggle with her western enemies, and we may be sure that Japan has let no grass grow under her feet to consolidate and preserve these new acquisitions. The road to Harbin will be hers irrevocably. Truly the European war is Japan's opportunity.

The importance of Japan's possession of the road to Harbin

may be likened to the position the Canadian Pacific Railway occupies in Canada. Both are great controlling influences on the entire dominions which they traverse. Japan exercises what is practically absolute authority, not only within the leased railway zone, as she is entitled to do by treaty, but in large areas which she has occupied outside the zone, notwithstanding all efforts of China to bar actions so fatal to her sovereignty. There are few Japanese settlers—not more than 100,000 in all Manchuria—but 40,000 troops in addition to police are quartered there for their protection. Japanese refuse to pay likin(octroi) a tax that is universal in China. An American journalist, Frederic Coleman, who recently made studies in the Far East, writes:—"China must ask Japanese permission before she can build a railway or allow one to be built in Manchuria, before she can effect a loan for administrative purposes, before she can grant permission to work a mine, to put down a factory, or lease a piece of land. American capitalists had an agricultural farm scheme in Manchuria and experts did a lot of ground work towards it. Japan did not take any overt or public action, but she put pressure upon the Chinese and the thing had to be dropped. Meanwhile a Japanese syndicate raised 10,000,000 yen to start growing sugar beet near Mukden."

And now a word as to the future of the Shantung peninsula and the towns of Tsingtau and Kiaochao which were appropriated by the Japanese when they succeeded in overcoming German resistance in 1914.

At the close of the campaign, Japan made it known that she had no intention of permanently retaining control of Tsingtau. Some day it should revert to China. The assurance given is open to many interpretations, and would seem to be one of the class of promises made by nations, only to be broken. Already, Japanese statesmen are reported to view the transaction in a different light. The declaration of war

by China against Germany and the cancellation of all the treaties and agreements with that country, has put Germany 'out of court', so to speak, and China and Japan may now settle Germany's former rights, disembarassed of any obligation to her about the matter at the final peace conference. In other words, China, being now at war with Germany, cannot consistently ask that Shantung be restored to Germany; nor ought she to ask to have it restored to herself, in view of the fact that she took no part in its recovery. *The European war is Japan's opportunity*, and she will retain Shantung.

In the Yangtsze valley, which good people in England used to think an exclusively British sphere of influence in China, Japan has acquired the Han-yeh-ping Iron and Coal Company in the very heart of the valley, a company whose gains are already great and are in the future almost beyond the dreams of avarice. English interests here gave way to the Japanese without offering the slightest opposition.

In still another part of China, far away from Treaty Ports and all acknowledged spheres of influence of foreign Powers, an American syndicate proposed to construct railways 1500 miles in length, the principal being from Feng Chen in Mongolia to Kansu on the remote western borders. It promised great economic results. It had no connexion whatever with politics. It was solely a work of development. The Japanese Press raised a clamor, and the realization of the project has proceeded no further than the preliminary surveys.

The Japanese are well aware that one of the chief proofs of industrial expansion and commerce is supplied by maintaining friendly relations with the peoples with whom intercourse is exchanged. They have this to bear in mind in their intercourse with China. In the face of Chinese enmity, trade and commerce would lanquish and perhaps die out entirely. "Peaceful penetration," absorption, and territorial expansion being, as

before stated, principles which are slightly out of credit, a new principle was necessary to be discovered as an index to future relations with the Chinese.

An inventive race like the Japanese were not long in discovering the new principle. They call it "friendly cooperation." The concessions which Japan asked of China in February 1915 were designed to fit in with the new principle. They were to be based on the following premises: (1) the encouragement of commercial intercourse in general; (2) the introduction of the principle of joint Chino-Japanese enterprise; (3) the prevention of future causes of dispute.

The demands were arranged in five groups, officially designated 'articles'. The first four related, in order, to Shantung, South Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia, and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, the railway and mining concern already refered to. They had for their objects, respectively, the adjustment of the new conditions arising out of the expulsion of Germany from Kiaochao; the extension of the leasehold privileges already enjoyed by Japan in her specially recognized sphere; trading and other facilities requisite for the opening of Eastern Inner Mongolia; and the confirmation of the joint status already in existence at Han-Yeh-Ping. Next followed a proviso that China should not 'cede or lease to any foreign country any harbor, bay, or island' on her sea coast. The fifth group, or article embraced all the three principles enumerated above. Concessions for railway construction were asked for in Southern China, subject to the assent of other powers; China was urged to agree to the establishment of a joint Chino-Japanese arsenal, to the propagation of religion by Japanese missionaries, and to the formation of a joint Chino-Japanese police force; and finally, the Peking government was requested (*a*) to engage Japanese advisers 'in case of need'; (*b*) to pledge itself not to permit the establishment of a naval or military base

on the coast of Fukien, opposite the Japanese island of Formosa.

The promptness with which Japan placed these demands, so soon after the outbreak of the European war, made it clear to the Western Powers, that they had allied themselves with a country that was awake to its opportunities. The assumption that Japan was taking advantage of the pre-occupation of the Western Powers to set up what amounted to a hegemony of the Chinese Republic, became general. A long period of negotiation ensued between China and Japan over these demands, and the Peking government showed itself remarkably clever in pushing its resistance to the uttermost. No less than twenty-five meetings of the plenipotentiaries took place with no practical result. Political opinion ran high in China, some favoring surrender to the Japanese demands before an ultimatum could be sent; others were for yielding to the threat of force alone. China stood alone in her isolation. No Western Power held itself ready to aid her in her dilemma; at any rate no help was to be expected from any source in the only form that would count for anything—armed resistance. Finally on May 6, Mr. Hioki, the Japanese minister, presented his country's ultimatum. To make its acceptance less difficult, in the interests of Far Eastern peace and in deference 'to the wishes of a certain Power', Groupe 5 comprising, in the main, questions not directly concerned with the situation in Manchuria or Shantung was separated from the main body of demands, to be held over for future discussion. As to the remainder, a reply was requested within forty-eight hours. China yielded and thus averted coming to conclusions with the Government of the Mikado.

In thus substituting the principle of "friendly cooperation", (of which the results obtained under the "Five Groups" are an illustration) for the old, discredited principles known as

'peaceful penetration', absorption and territorial expansion, Japan believes she has discovered a new means for attaining the old ends. It is true that Japan has bound herself over and over again to help in the preservation of China's territorial integrity and of her national independence, and in the maintenance of the principles of the 'open door' and equal opportunity. But all treaties may be construed with freedom in keeping with the opinions and interests of the negotiators. Furthermore, as many influential Japanese argue, the open door is attained so long as any trade at all is permitted, and the principle in no way inhibits very special privileges to their own manufacturers which render competition with them impossible. They argue further, that neither the territorial integrity nor the national independence of China is violated by long leasehold concessions or by the definition of certain regions as the closed preserves of specific nations.

Since the time, about the middle of the last century, when Japan broke with her former policy of seclusion and disinterestedness in external affairs, the Mikado's Government has made great and rapid progress toward the realization of its ambition to attain to the hegemony of the Far East. Formosa, Korea, the railway zone in Manchuria, the German islands in the Pacific, Kiaochao and other spheres of influence in China have already been plucked from the tree, and swallowed by Japan's capacious maw, and she is not yet through. There remains the Siberian expedition, and the fruits that will be gathered as a reward for her intervention there. True she goes in there after giving the solemn assurance that her purpose is an entirely disinterested one, and that she will withdraw her troops so soon as the object of the expedition has been attained. But the Japanese know that conditions change. Promises are made on the basis of conditions as they exist to-day; and these conditions may, and in the light of all

experience, probably *will* change—and then what? Verily, the European war is Japan's opportunity.

Always, in the consideration of what Japan may or may not do, it must be remembered that Japan is a militaristic nation. The Junkerdom of Japan is just as militaristic, and even more powerful than the Junkerdom of Germany. The Mikado is an absolute monarch. He is the executive and legislative head of the nation. He possesses within himself the complete sovereignty of the state. He chooses his own ministers, and may remove them at will. He, or his ministers, instruct the Diet what legislation it shall enact. He is irremovable, and is not accountable to the law of the land; he rules by divine right, and receives his powers by heritage from a line of ancestors that go back 2600 years. The constitution of Japan, wich confirms him in his powers and rights, was graciously granted to the people by the Mikado himself. It is his handiwork, or so purports to be, and not a word or syllable of it can ever be changed without his consent.

A country that is ruled on such lines as these, will never retreat from the program which its rulers have devised, nor cease from its efforts until its full attainment. What that program is only the Mikado and his most intimate advisers know, and it is possible in view of the supreme powers possessed by the head of the state, that the disclosure of the Imperial mind will not be made, even to his ministers, except as events warrant, and in due course as necessity demands some new turn to the wheel of state.

These are facts that have to be reckoned with by the Western Powers. It will not do for them to gamble with the future by hazarding the present. It may be their fond belief that they can settle the Japanese question later—once the European war is over. But Japan's strength is growing by leaps and bounds, and the Western Powers may one day

awake to the fact that they have waited too long. The danger is a real one, and if the West permits itself to be lulled asleep by the wide-spread and well organized pro-Japanese propaganda which Japan's western allies are now only too eager to publish, partly it is believed, in justification of their own doubtful attitude, and partly to soothe Japanese susceptibilities; or if the nations of the West allow themselves to be misled by the utterances of Japanese statesmen—then nothing can save them from a very rude awakening in the not very distant future. Not that Japanese statesmen are not as honest and open-minded as the statesmen of any other great Power. On the contrary their assurances are entitled to be received with the same amount of confidence and respect. But the fact is that these assurances must be received with an eye to the ultimate fact, that under Japan's present form of government, they have no binding force upon the nation. This argument will be developed more fully in a later chapter on the Constitution of Japan.

II.

THE AWAKENING OF THE EAST.

CHAPTER TWO.

The Awakening of the East.

The relations between Europe and Asia have been changing for the last thirty years. The Western Powers are now weakening themselves in a great struggle among themselves, and the relative power of Asia is naturally, by so much increased, assuring her an increase of influence in world politics which she would otherwise have been slow to secure. China, Japan, and India may no longer be treated by the white races in the future as they have been in the past.

Whatever career of brutality against the people of Asia (as witnessed by such acts as the forced sale of opium on China, the seizing of Hong Kong, the sacking of the Winter Palace, and the kidnapping of Chinamen in the great cities) Europeans have been guilty of, we may be sure that the new movement in Asia has permanently put and end to such tactics—for the East has awakened. The nations and peoples of the East have become instructed in the white men's methods, and realizing that resistance to aggression and encroachment is only possible by adopting these self-same methods, the East is going in for it whole heartedly. The Japanese put the case as follows:—"We have been sending you our works of arts, our silks, our joinery, our decorations for generations, and you still regarded us as mere barbarians. We show ourselves at least your equals in scientific butchery, and at once we are admitted to your council tables as civilized men." *The use of force.* That is

the lesson that the peoples of the East learned from the peoples of the West. But they learned still another lesson which has been tersely put by Baron Kentaro Kaneko, a former Cabinet Minister, in the following words:—"While I was studying in America, Mr. Holmes, now Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, told me a story which, I think, aptly demonstrates the difference in the economic point of view between the Western countries and Japan. His story runs as follows: 'Several hundred years ago there arose in Europe a movement called the Crusades. In these, many sovereigns of Europe took part, or sent their Princes to hold the positions in their place. These crusades were the outcome of a joint resolution of Christendom to preserve Christ's tomb at Jerusalem from the Mohammedans. They accomplished their purpose. But the matter was not yet settled, as a discussion arose among the Sovereigns of Christendom as to the further protection of the place against the return of the Mohammedans, and also about the repairing of the sacred tomb. The English representatives having by this time returned home, the other Sovereigns of the European countries demanded that the English should help them to settle the difficulty, to which England replied: 'You are welcome to Jerusalem; I want the money I can get out of it' and began to trade with the natives. So England did not shed as much blood in the fight for Jerusalem as the other nations did, but followed up the results of the Crusade by opening commercial transactions. This was the economic spirit of the Englishmen, from whom the Americans have sprung.'" Baron Kaneko then adds the following comment:—"The more I study the politics of the English and the American Governments, the more deeply I am impressed with the truth underlying this story, though the point of view is foreign to Japan. If Japan were a Christian country, and had fought for the cause, they would have—if only for the maintenance

of their dignity—to strive to permanently keep the land from its foes. Such is not the case with England. They would bring out their manufactured articles and return with heavy pockets." (From "Japan by the Japanese", edited by Alfred Stead, p. 97).

The new movement in Asia had its inception in the island empire of Japan. By means of their great political revolution culminating on the 14th of October 1867 in the resignation, of Shogun Keiki, began the inauguration of the new era, known as the 'Restoration', by which is meant the recovery of the full rights of sovereignty by the Emperor hitherto for centuries usurped or partially usurped by the Shoguns. This act was soon followed by the sacrifice of their rights by the Samurai or military caste, and by the complete overthrow of the feudal system by Imperial decree in 1871 which put an end to the distinction of the military class over all others at the same time. Thus a new epoch began for the Japanese, which has scarcely even yet been understood by the whole world. In forty years, an almost unknown country, outside the sphere of international affairs, has passed from a belated feudalism to a highly developed capitalism—a transition which it took England four centuries to accomplish.

This sudden transformation and the establishment of Japan in so short a time as a Great Power by her marvelous genius for the assimilation of European methods, came as a great surprise to the Western nations. The first token of the far reaching character of the new changes, and the first clear sign that there was "another Richmond in the field," who was holding forth for nothing less than the hegemony of the East and the mastery of the Pacific, came, when in her war with China, Japan crushed that huge empire with a rapidity and completeness that left nothing to chance. Japan's adoption of European methods and instruments, new shipping and other weapons, had placed

her in a position to overthrow her antagonist as completely as any European nation could have done it. The acquisition of the island of Formosa, the claim of large "spheres of influence" on the adjacent mainland, and the securing of a heavy money indemnity at the peace of Shimonoseki (1895), demonstrated how greatly Japan had profited by her European discipleship. Indeed three of the great Western nations thought Japan's demands on China too far-reaching and interfered to moderate them. But Japan emerged with the substantial rewards already stated.

Even when the war was over and the victors had gathered in their spoils, Europe still failed to appreciate the significance of what had occurred. From old habit and use, Europe still continued to look down on the Japanese. But the Japanese cared little for this. They had their policy, and they proceeded to carry it out without haste and without rest. As they became more closely intimate with Europeans, they decided that they were a people whose cleverness was somewhat overrated, and that they themselves were as efficient in the field of industry and commerce as their western competitors. The Japanese bought, and built, and studied in Europe and America, but all with one object—to learn all that the Westerns knew, and then to dispense with their aid, and to compete with them in their own chosen fields.

The next great move made by the Japanese in furtherance of their policy, was the war with Russia. In the Emperor's edict of February 1904 formally declaring war on Russia, he gives the following reasons for the step:—"The integrity of Korea is a matter of constant concern to this Empire, not only because of our traditional relations with that country, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm. Nevertheless, Russia, in disregard of her solemn treaty pledges to China and her repeated assurances to other Powers, is still in occupation of Manchuria, has consolidated

and strengthened her hold upon those provinces, and is bent upon their final annexation. And since the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the integrity of Korea, and would in addition compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in the extreme East, we determined in those circumstances to settle the question by negotiation, and to secure thereby permanent peace." Negotiation however failed, as the Emperor points out, and war was the result.

Here again the chances of success seemed to many of the western statesmen and students of affairs to be against the Japanese in a struggle with a nation of the boundless resources and almost inexhaustible supply of good fighting material such as Russia possessed. But the unexpected again happened, and the Russian Empire, long the dread of Western Europe, was thoroughly beaten by a comparatively small Asiatic state, and Japan became still more formidable upon the mainland as well as upon the ocean. Thus at a bound Japan took her place in the forefront of civilization with a population, inclusive of Korea of over 60,000,000, with a growing army and navy kept up to the highest point of efficiency; with a rapidly expanding commerce and fine lines of steamers; with a future for her manufactures not confined to Asia, and holding an international position which enabled her statemen to conclude treaties with Great Britain.

The two treaties with England just referred to, are a remarkable testimonial of Japan's growing power, when we consider that England, herself a great Asiatic Power, holding sway over 315,000,000 Asiatics binds herself to Japan in the two agreements of 1905 and 1911, both based on the agreements of 1902. These, within certain limits, constitute an offensive and defensive alliance up to the year 1921. The objects of this alliance are set forth in the preamble as: (*a*) The consolidation and

maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India. (*b*) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of nations in China. (*c*) The maintenance of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions.

The probability that the foregoing articles of agreement have been supplemented by other secret ones, is made more positive when one considers that Japan, though it has no interest in maintaining English control in India, nevertheless binds herself to do so, in return for which it is natural to suspect that England has bound herself to Japan in some manner which she is not willing to make public, and which may lead her into a difficult situation in the not distant future. For Japan, the immediate gain has been to place her on a footing of equality with England in the Far East, and from a footing of equality, as the Japanese reckon it, it is but a step to a position of superiority. For England, the immediate gain was that she no longer needed to maintain a large fleet in Eastern waters, and could concentrate her fighting squadrons in the North Sea, necessitated by the rapidly growing strength of the German navy. Moreover by this one stroke England signified that she supported Japanese as against Russian, German, and American interests in the Far East, and relied upon Japan to provide an effectual check to the participation of these Powers in the affairs of Asia.

It is important to remember in this connection, that the same transformation which has gone on and been completed in Japan within a period of fifty years, is going on now in the vast domains of the Chinese—less rapidly it is true, but not the less surely and uninterruptedly. Significant of the new spirit

in China, is the discarding of the pigtail, the sign of subservience to the Tartars. Western science and other branches of knowledge are being pursued in place of Chinese philosophy and literary studies. Railway lines have been built, with foreign capital, connecting the sea-coast with many of the great cities in the interior; and where as before the present European war, these lines were for the most part being conducted and operated by Europeans, the exigencies of the great conflict have made it necessary to withdraw these foreign managers and operators, and in their place have stepped Chinese engineers and managers, and even new lines are now being constructed under the sole direction of Chinese engineers. Mines and other industries are being developed. Armies are being recruited, trained, and equipped in accordance with European models.

How real the Chinese determination is to advance along these progressive lines, is made clear by their willingness even to swallow their hatred of the Japanese in order to learn from them, and accordingly thousands of Chinese students have flocked to Japan for that purpose. Thus 400,000,000 of people, a people whom some of the closest observers in Asia have placed upon a pinnacle above the Japanese for innate qualities of worth, character and capacity, are now following the same course which Japan followed with the results we have seen.

The problems and trials that will assuredly confront the western nations in the near future by reason of the new and awakening spirit of the East, are such as will tax the powers of the highest leadership, if they are to be met and parried without danger of new world conflicts ensuing. Such troublesome questions as that of Chinese and Japanese emigration to the British Colonies and to the United States, must, if evil is to be avoided, be taken up and settled by the countries involved, in a way that will answer to the new dignity and importance

acquired by these nations in the world's councils. The anti-Japanese sentiment embodied in the Aliens Exclusion Act of California has in reality an economic basis. As the difficulty was settled with Canada in 1906 when the Japanese Government undertook voluntarily to restrict immigration to that country, so might it have been settled with California. But in the California legislature tact and good will were lacking. The entire question was obscured by appeal to race prejudice, and by periodically engineered invasion "scares". In theory objection is taken to Asiatics. In practice, it is the Japanese who are objected to.

A second problem that remains to be solved is the question of what part Europeans and Americans are to be allowed to take in the development of Asiatic, and in particular, Chinese resources. Western nations insist that no country shall be allowed to obtain a monopoly of the trade of the East, nor an exclusive share in the development of industries there. The Japanese, on the other hand, are preparing to place themselves in a position to declare a Monroe Doctrine, as applied to the Asiatic continent—Asia for the Asiatics. The declaration of such a doctrine will, of course, in part depend on whether the United States will still persist in asserting the Monroe Doctrine for North and South America, after the close of the European war; for Japan's statesmen have all along sought a convenient pretext for disregarding that doctrine, and are unable to understand how America can consistently continue to adhere to that policy in the face of her own interference in the affairs of Europe, and her participation in an expedition into Siberia, acts which America's future adversaries may have the right to characterise as interference in the internal affairs of nations foreign to the American continent. The further fact that President Wilson permitted himself to base America's entry into the European struggle upon the necessity of reforming

the internal governments of such old time nations as Germany and Austria, will, say the Japanese, not particularly add to the strength of his future position with respect to the hegemony of the American continent.

Japan is the England of the East. Just as England would brook no rivalry in the Atlantic, and had acquired the lion's share of the carrying trade in Atlantic waters, so Japan regards it as her own destiny to accomplish the same results in the Pacific, and her strategical position as an island power, no less than England's, together with the strength of her navy, seems to her a guarantee of her ability to accomplish these designs. This is, of course, a question that primarily concerns the United States, and we may therefore have to look to American statesmen to exert their abilities in the effort to remove this further cause for conflict with the island Empire of the East.

Returning once more to Japan's Asiatic policy, and her doctrine of Asia for the Asiatics, we do not wish to be understood as saying that the Japanese are opposed to every sort of participation by Westerns in the affairs of Asia, with special reference to China. This would be going too far, and the Japanese are not an unreasonable people.

What is to be understood by this doctrine is this:—The fundamental basis of Japan's national policy is the hegemony of the Far East. She will welcome the investment of western capital in the development of Eastern countries, but she will not permit those investments to serve as excuses for establishing spheres of influence. She herself will undertake that all such investments are duly protected. That is the Japanese view of the meaning of the 'open door', and equal opportunities. How she applies these doctrines, when she has a chance to do so, has already been pointed out in our first chapter in connection with the story of happenings in Manchuria.

III.

JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

CHAPTER THREE.

Japan's Relations with Russia.

Japan awoke in the middle of the last century from her dream of security and seclusion under an exclusion policy, and was astonished to find that one of the great European Powers had intruded upon her as a neighbor whose proximity already brought with it questions of frontier to discuss. For upwards of a generation previously, both countries had been exploring the island of Saghalien from opposite directions. It was necessary to settle their boundary lines. In 1866 the Shogunate dispatched Iwami-no-Kami Matsudaira to St. Petersburg with the proposal to fix the fiftieth parallel as the boundary line between the two countries. The negotiations, however, proved abortive. Another effort was made in 1868 to arrive at a satisfactory settlement, but the stubbornness of the Russian Government, coupled with Japan's own internal troubles, resulted in nothing further being done.

After the "Restoration", in the year 1872, the Japanese Government offered to buy the 'Russian portion' of the island for 2,000,000 yen. Nothing came of this offer, and three years later Japan surrendered the whole island, receiving in return the Kurile islands. Russia's aggressive tactics employed toward Japan in the matter of Saghalien were continued by her in various other ways. Japanese susceptibilities were wounded by reason of Russia's interference in 1895 at the conclusion of the Japanese-Chinese war to prevent Japan from reaping

the full benefits of her successful campaigns. Russia, as the Japanese viewed it, obtaining the cooperation of France and Germany, formally requested Japan to give up her claim to the mainland, the Liaotung peninsula, which Japan regarded as one of the spoils of the war, and Japan felt herself compelled to yield.

Russia now began her policy of expansion and aggression in Manchuria, always looked upon and watched with a jealous eye by Japan. By the "Cassini" Treaty with China in 1896, Russia brought her railway concessions through North Manchuria, an extension of which was to carry the Siberian railway in a straight line to Vladivostok. By the "Pavloff" Treaty with China in 1898, Russia similarly extended her franchises for railway construction from Harbin through South Manchuria to Dairen (Dalny) and Port Arthur, this being the successful outcome of the leasing arrangements entered into during the previous year (1897) whereby the entire Liaotung Peninsula was placed under Russian control for twenty-five years. These successive moves taken so quickly after Japan had been induced, chiefly at Russian instance, to give up her claims on the Liaotung Peninsula, angered the Japanese exceedingly. She saw herself duped and cheated.

The Russian ruling classes wanted the railway speedily constructed. To do so was, on the one hand, to further Count Witte's avowed policy of "peaceful penetration;" and, on the other hand, the Imperial clique (Abaza, Bezobrazoff etc.) about the Czar, wished the railway built for the exploitation of the wealth of Manchuria in their own interests. Accordingly in three years' time, these railways were completed, and along their entire front of 1600 miles, Russian troops in strong force guarded the lines under the ostensible plea of expected trouble from a Boxer outbreak.

But Russia did not limit her attentions in the Far East to

Manchuria. Control of the kingdom of Korea was looked upon as necessary for consolidating Russia's position in those regions. The King of Korea was induced to employ Russian officers to train the Korean army, and in other ways Russian ascendancy over the king began to manifest itself. The Japanese who had already in the sixteenth century, under the Shogunate of the great Hideyoshi, resisted Chinese aggression in Korea, and had only recently succeeded in finally freeing the kingdom from Chinese suzerainty, found much to their disgust that they now had a much worse foe to deal with.

Russia attempted to establish herself in an impregnable position on the Korean coast at Masampo, from which she would as completely have controlled the southern entrance to the Japan sea, as Gibraltar does the Mediterranean. What with Port Arthur and Dalny already in her possesion, this new naval base at Masampo, with its fine natural harbor, would have completely bridled the strength of Japan's army and navy. What Japan had fought for in 1894-5 was the very question of the independence of Korea, and the creation out of it of a buffer state as a protection, on her most vulnerable flank, against encroachments by neighboring powers. This was now threatened to be lost to her by Russia's new move. For Japan it became a matter of supreme importance, a matter of life and death. In spite of her enemy's superiority in physical strength and resources, Japan decided to fight and the whole nation responded as one man to the call. It was a struggle in which everything was cast on the hazard of success or failure. If she lost, Japan's independence was at stake.

With the defeat of Russia, the Japanese attitude after the war took an "about face," and whereas former relations with Russia had been marked by fear, suspicion and hatred, an attempt was now made to have these evil passions give way to sympathy, trust and friendship. Accordingly, as a first

move, the Japanese, who, as one of the first fruits of the war, had come into possession of the South Manchurian Railway, now sought to bring this line into harmonious working arrangements with the Russian lines. Conferences were arranged between the Japanese and Russian railway authorities. Conferences between cabinet ministers of the two countries were also being held, and it was while in attendance at one of these that Prince Ito, Japan's greatest statesman, lost his life so tragically at Harbin whither he had gone to meet M. Kokovtsov, M. Witte's successor. Both countries seemingly desired to introduce an era of peace and friendship between them. Indeed the progress of the accord arrangements was very rapid. A series of conventions or agreements were entered into. By the convention of 1907, the independence and territorial integrity of China was recognized, together with the principle of equal opportunity for all nations in commerce and industry; by the convention of 1910 the maintenance of the *status quo* in Manchuria was guaranteed and between either of the contracting parties and China, and by the agreements of 1911 and 1912 a settlement was brought about of outstanding questions between the two empires, i. e. their respective spheres of interest in Inner Mongolia coupled with an understanding for the joint defence of those spheres in case of attack by other Powers.

Briefly, this was the situation of affairs when the present war broke out. The two nations had buried their differences and were acting along the lines of apparent complete harmony. Eastern projects were forgotten by the Russian in the face of greater menace to Russian interests in the Balkans. The European school of Expansionists in Russia had gained the ascendancy over the Asiatic school. When, therefore, the present war began, Japan was friendly to Russia and during the course of the war and up to the period of the recent moves in the direction of intervention in Siberia, had continued to be friendly.

Japan had stood protector of Russian possessions in the East, had supplied her with cruisers, guns, and ammunition.

The Russian revolution, however, supplied Japan with a new point of view. A defeated Russia, a Russia split up in an inextricable mass of splintered states was a new phase of the situation for Japan. She saw the plans of herself and her Allies thereby threatened with defeat. Her commercial position was not yet strong enough so that she could free herself from the fear of isolation which would ensue in case of a break with England and America. Japanese policy required a strong and united Russia as a buffer against German penetration into China and the Far East. Moreover Japan fears that a disunited and broken Russia will fall an easy prey to a strong Germany, and Germany might thereby succeed to Russia's interests in the Far East. Continued anarchy and disunion in Russia might even drive that despairing country to accept a German protectorate as a relief from "all the ills that flesh is heir to."

Because of these considerations, Japan has been led to consider the project of intervention. What she hopes to accomplish for herself and her Allies is stated, from Japanese sources, to be as follows: Intervention is to provide the Allies "with a broad platform and a centre of power around which all patriots, whatever their party connexions in the past, might join hands for the re-establishment of a new united fatherland." The Bolsheviki are, according to this program, to be excluded from power, because their objects are avowedly to war against wealth and private capital, and their only source of existence is spoliation and confiscation. In other words, Russia is a sick man, and the Allies must furnish the physician and the physic to cure the patient, regardless of whether the patient calls for either the one or the other. Other reasons for intervention are to be found in the need for Russian military aid, and the desire for her "co-operation as a nation in the *post-*

bellum settlement of the world." The new Russia is to serve as a support for an independent Poland, for Roumania, for the new Yugo-Slav and the new Czech-Slovak states. Only Russia, as a great Power, may check the growth of German influence and strength, and protect these new small states against her imperialistic tendencies. The expansion of Germany in the East must be checked before it overflows the Caucasus and the Urals and reaches the confines of India and China. The possibility of the growth of German influence, and the resultant consequence thereof, in Persia and Afghanistan, in Kulja and other north-western provinces of China, in Northern Manchuria and Eastern Siberia, must be prevented, say the Japanese. Russia and Japan have contiguous frontiers, and a distintegrated Russia is a menace to Japan's peace, safety, and development.

Perhaps the decisive factor in the matter of Japan's intervention and one that is not openly avowed by her, nor in any way alluded to by the Western Powers, is the fact of the new treaty entered into between Japan and Russia, in the year 1916. The terms of this agreement provide that neither Japan nor Russia will be a party to any arrangement or political combination directed against the other. The two powers pledge themselves, in case the territorial rights or special interests in the Far East of either, which are recognized by the other, should be threatened, they will take counsel together with regard to the adoption of measures for safeguarding and defending those rights and interests. To some extent the agreement runs on lines similar to those of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

This agreement strengthens to an extraordinary degree the position of Japan in the Far East, and rendered the exploitation by her of China easier as doing away with Russian opposition. Nor does it take a prophet to foresee to what a degree this agreement will curtail the extent of British and

American influence in China. For Japan, this agreement is of such paramount importance that she is willing to risk all the dangers of an intervention, in order that she may restore to Russia such a government as will recognize and carry out its terms. There may be other reasons for the step, likewise of a material nature, but that this is one of the controlling reasons in the minds of the Mikado's ministers, there can be no doubt. But that England and America should both join in lending their aid and sanction to the measure is surely a subject for astonishment.

IV.

GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN. JAPAN'S EXPANSION.

CHAPTER FOUR.

Great Britain and Japan. Japan's Expansion.

The first diplomatic negotiations entered into with Great Britain, under Japan's new era which started with the arrival of Commodore Perry's fleet in 1853, was in 1854 when an agreement was entered into for the opening of the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate. But foreigners did not actually secure the right to trade in Japan till 1858. The makers of the new era in Japan had not as yet won over the Mikado to adopt their plans of progress and it was not until ten years later that real relations were established, internal dissensions having ensued over the carrying out of the new policies so as to delay for that period of time the unification of the empire and the restoration to the Mikado of the sovereign rights heretofore exercised by the Shoguns. In the beginning of the year 1868, the Mikado ordered a cabinet to be formed under the premiership of Prince Arisugawa, and in January of the following year he sent a notification to the foreign envoys to the effect that henceforth the administration of the country would be conducted by him, but that the provisions of the treaties concluded by the Shogunate with their governments would be carried out to the letter. In July 1869 the form of the Imperial Government was definitely fixed, and a regular Foreign Office instituted as one of the six departments of the Government. Within six years thereafter feudalism had

been finally abolished, the nobles and their samurai pensioned or their interests liquidated.

In the meantime the Japanese Government had already begun to take the necessary steps which were to form the groundwork of her future progress. Military instructors had been imported by the Japanese from Holland, a naval college organized at Yedo, and an iron foundry erected at Nagasaki. In 1854 Holland had presented Japan with her first steamship, the Kanko Maru, and soon thereafter the Japanese made their first attempts at building vessels on western models. The central government was organized in seven departments—Religion, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Army and Navy, Finance, Justice, and Law. The local governments were entrusted to prefects. In 1873, an edict of the Mikado disestablishing the Samurai, instituted universal military service. The year before, in 1872, the foundations of universal compulsory education were laid, and about the same time the anti-Christian edicts were removed from the public bulletin boards, and the Gregorian calendar introduced. A little later, each Sunday was set aside as a day of rest. The budgets were made public in 1873. In 1875 the senate and the Court of Cassation were established, thus drawing a definite line between the legislative and judicial functions of the state. In 1878, prefectural, town, and village assemblies were inaugurated for the purpose of self-government. In 1880 the Board of Audit was opened to deal with the auditing of the State accounts. In 1888 an Imperial rescript promising to convoke the first session of the Imperial Diet ten years afterwards was promulgated. In 1889, the Constitution, the Imperial House Law, the Law of the House of the Imperial Diet, the Law of Election, and the Law of Finance were made public. In 1890 the Constitution was put into operation for the first time.

Coincident with these changes, Japanese economic life was

revolutionized. In 1872 an American system of banking was adopted after a careful but rapid investigation of methods in the United States, and the following year saw the establishment of the First National Bank. In 1882 the Bank of Japan was founded, and thenceforth it alone was permitted to issue notes. Joint-stock companies dealing with every phase of industry were incorporated, and by the time Japan had received its Constitution, her progress in the adoption of western ways and means had become fairly complete.

This short sketch of the successive steps taken by Japan in her upward progress is necessary for the sake of a clearer understanding of the diplomatic developments and political acts that accompanied them *pari passu.*

Of the Great Powers possessing important interests in the Far East, England was the first to realize that by the opening of Japan, and the abandonment of her policy of seclusion, a new factor had been injected into the diplomacy and politics of Asia. The Russians had begun to make their appearance in this part of the world in the early years of the eighteenth century, and had taken possession of most of the Kurile Islands northeastward of the Japanese archipelago, and within easy cruising distance of its coast. Not content with this, they went a step further and made several attempts to seize the island of Saghalien, that sizable island that reaches out in the shape of a lobster with outstretched claws to the northward of Japan. These acts of aggression led to frequent conflicts between Russian troops and Japanese guards stationed in various parts of the islands.

Thus matters stood down to the year 1854 when the Russians renewed their attempts to effect the practical exclusion of the Japanese from Saghalien, and five years later, in 1859, Count Muravieff acting for Russia, having first taken possession of the valley of the Amur, which success had been consummated

by the signing of the treaty of Aigun with China, entered the Bay of Yedo in a man of war and demanded the recognition of the whole of Saghalien as Russian territory, making the straits of Perouse the boundary between Japan and Russia. His argument was that by the treaty of Aigun, 1858, Russia had obtained from China the cession of the whole territory along the Amur and the Pacific coast, and Saghalien formed a part of the territory ceded. Japan's claims to the island were based upon explorations and settlements there begun as early as 1780.

On Japan's refusal to enter into negotiations, the Russians sent numerous emigrants to Saghalien with the intention of asserting rights for the purpose of future negotiations. Roused to action by these aggressive steps, the Shogunate despatched Iwani-no-Kami Matsudaira to St. Petersburg, with new proposals, the result of which has already been referred to in a prior chapter.

And now we come upon England's first entrance upon this theatre of events. In 1861, Russia, following up her acts of aggression, seized the Japanese Island of Tsushima, in the Korean straits, a most important strategic point for Japan, situated as it is in the mouth of the Japan sea. This was done without any cause or reason, without any prior notice or diplomatic negotations, and in spite of the fact that Japan and Russia had but recently negotiated a treaty for the establishment of friendly relations and commercial intercourse. A strong protest was made by the government of the Mikado, but the Russians took no heed. It was then that the English fleet made its appearance on the scene, and the first momentous step was taken which showed that already British foresight had decided upon the policy to be pursued, to make of the Mikado's Empire, a friend and an ally. The British fleet cleared for action, demanding the instant retirement of the Russians, which

was obeyed, and thus the island of Tsushima was saved to Japan.

From this time forward English diplomacy in the Far East, strove to foster the friendship of the Japanese. In the early days of the new era, England's representatives assisted the islanders with financial advice. For some years prior to the establishment of the new regime of the Imperial Government in 1868, Japan had been divided into two great factions—one for the Imperial cause, the other for the Shogunate cause. At that time England was represented in Japan by Sir Harry Parkes, who earned the reputation of an energetic and sagacious Envoy. There were also other representative Englishmen there, and all espoused the Imperial cause, led by Sir Harry Parkes, in opposition to the strenuous support of the Shogunate cause by the government of France, under the lead of the French Envoy. Sir Harry Parkes was struck by the mistaken policy of the Powers in concluding treaties with the Shogun, whose powers were in derogation of the sovereign rights which prior to the institution of the Shogunate in the twelfth century, had belonged to the Emperor. Nominally, the Shoguns received their appointments from the Emperor, but in reality the Shogunate had become a fixed institution, held by hereditary descent in the families of the leading chieftains of Japan, who continued to govern as Vice-regents of the Emperor, either directly or through regents until 1868, with the exception of the period 1573—1600, during which time the sovereign powers of government had been conducted by the great military chieftains Nobunaga and Hideyoshi.

To the student of Japanese history, it had become manifest that since about the middle of the century the power of the Shogunate was on the decline and the power of the Mikado reviving. The most advanced of Japanese writers had been paving the way for Commodore Perry's visit in 1853. Already many of these leaders had foreseen the trend of events and

no longer believed either in the possibility or the feasibility of the Japanese seclusion policy. Some of the most powerful nobles had organized themselves into a faction in support of a new policy of progress, and the throwing open of Japan to the world; moreover the Shogunate had come to see that resistance to the demands of the Powers clamoring for an entrance within the gates, was not within their physical powers, and when as a result of certain outrages committed against their subjects, Great Britain in 1863, and the allied squadrons of England, America, France and Holland in 1864, took part in a bombardment of two Japanese sea-ports (Kagoshima and Shimonoseki) it was seen that further resistance to Powers which were armed with modern engines of war, would be worse than futile.

It was at this juncture of affairs that Sir Harry Parkes acted in urging upon his diplomatic colleagues to request the Shogun to obtain the Imperial signature to the treaties in order to make them binding. This was done, and an Imperial decree sanctioning the treaties was issued on the 23d of October 1865. Nothing could have done more to allay the anti-foreign sentiment in Japan, than this act of placing the Emperor in direct contact with the foreign envoys. It was the first great forward step toward the revolutionizing of Japan.

In order that we may further understand the growing relations of amity and concordance that developed between Japan and England inaugurated by the foresight of Sir Harry Parkes, a word of explanation must now be made about these treaties, and the diplomatic developments that ensued out of the agitation in Japan for their revision.

The Treaties of Commerce and Navigation concluded with the Western Powers provided for the residence of foreign subjects at the 'Treaty Ports', and for their separate jurisdiction therein. In general terms, the treaties provided the following conditions:

1. The opening of the ports of Yokohama, Kobé, Osaka, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hakodaté, together with Tokio, the capital, to commerce and residence.

2. The granting of extra-territorial jurisdiction, that is to say, exemption of foreigners from the jurisdiction of the Japanese law courts.

3. The maintenance of a very low scale of import duties.

Of these provisions the last two were naturally very objectionable to Japan, and so long as they remained in force the nation felt itself forced into the position of an inferior, without any claim to enter the family of Christian Powers on terms of equality. From the very outset the Japanese realized that to have foreign law courts sitting within their dominions and to be prevented from fixing their own tariff, was prejudicial to the dignity of an independent and self-governing state. Eighteen Powers had signed the treaties and had pledged themselves to act only in concert with respect to any demand for revision.

The efforts of Japan to procure a revision of the treaties were not successful for upwards of a quarter of a century. Actuated by different motives and interests, it seemed difficult for the Powers to find a common basis upon which to proceed. They objected to the abolition of Consular jurisdiction, urging that submission of their subjects to the laws of Japan would render them amenable to law administered by Japanese judges who had not yet attained the judicial attitude of mind possessed by European judges, and their courts would be lacking in the precedents and traditions such as made the administration of the law in Europe a complete guarantee of the meting out of justice. Agitation for revision was not allowed to rest, however, and after various abortive steps had been taken leading to no result and causing the fall of several ministries, the great object was attained through the initiative of Great Britain, by the signing of the new treaty at London, between

Lord Rosebery and Viscount Aoki, on July 16, 1894. This act of the British Government opened the way for the conclusion of new treaties on a footing of equality with the other Powers of Europe and America, and thus settled the question which had called for solution ever since the 'Restoration.'

Not to overlook anything in the history of Japan's foreign relations that contributed to the promotion of friendship between Japan and England, mention is to be made of the following incidents, which are of the greater significance in that they exhibit a striking proof of the opposing interests of Russia and England in the Far East.

In 1885 occurred the so called Port Lazareff-Port Hamilton affair arising ont of the attempt of Russia to seize Port Lazareff from Korea. England having objected to this Russian action, occupied Port Hamilton as a counter check, and thus succeeded in compelling Russia to abandon her project. The object effected, England soon after gave up the occupation of Port Hamilton. Although, this affair did not directly concern Japan, it was nevertheless an act which Japan looked upon as highly beneficial to her, owing to her predominating economic interest in the future of Korea, and her desire to prevent the encroachments of any foreign Powers upon the mainland so near to her own coast.

In the Chino-Japanese war, 1894-95, Great Britain maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward Japan. On April 17, 1895, the treaty of Shimonoseki ended the war. By its terms the independence of Korea was recognized. The Liaotung peninsula, together with Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan, and an indemnity of £ 25,000,000 was to be paid to Japan, besides permitting her to hold Wei-hai-wei in pledge until it was paid.

But the treaty of Shimonoseki gave rise to a new incident

from an unexpected quarter. Even before the treaty was signed Russia had begun to busy herself in conversation with the European Powers and the United States on the question of the terms which Japan should be allowed to impose on China. In March, before the signing of the treaty, the German Government sent Japan a friendly intimation that France and Russia would intervene in case Japan secured any portion of Manchuria. The situation was this—France and Russia were allies, and both countries had participated in financing the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and hoped to acquire some Manchurian or Korean ice-free port as the terminus of the line. Russia's expansion in the direction of Turkey, India, and Persia had been blocked by other Powers, and she therefore felt herself compelled to look for more fresh air and light in the direction of the Pacific. French interests, on the other hand, in Tonking and Annam, required that France should look with a jealous eye to the development of any Power whose growth and strength in Asia might conceivably conflict with her own influence and interests there.

In view of these considerations it was to be expected that Russia and France should see in the rising power of Japan a stumbling block to their plans in the Far East. Accordingly, Russia, perceiving the necessity for decisive action before Japan could occupy and fortify the Liaotung peninsula, promptly sent out her most powerful battle ships to the Far Eastern waters, and her fleet began to assemble there already in March 1895. This action was followed a month later, six days after the signing of the Shimonoseki treaty, by the presentation of the following protest:—

"The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, in examining the conditions of peace which Japan has imposed on China, finds that the possession of the peninsula of Liaotung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace

to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East. Consequently, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor would give a new proof of their sincere friendship for the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan by advising them to renounce the definitive possession of the peninsula of Liaotung."

This remonstrance was presented with the approval of both Germany and France. What Gemarny's interest in the matter was, has never been explained, and by many Japanese authorities her participation is regarded to have been purely *pro forma*, or, at the most, an effort to strengthen her friendship with China in view of the rapid increase of her trade in Manchuria and Mongolia. Be that as it may, the effect of this joint remonstrance was to compel Japan to yield to the pressure thus exerted by the three great Western Powers.

Accordingly on May 6, Japan abandoned her claims to Port Arthur, to Ta-lien-wan and to the rest of the ceded mainland. But why, it may be asked, did not the Japanese diplomats obtain from the intervening Powers assurance that they, too, would never attempt to annex the peninsula under any form or pretext whatever? That Japanese diplomacy was at fault here was soon to be made clear, for, not long after the retrocession of the Liaotung peninsula by Japan, Russia concluded a secret treaty with China, granting her the right to construct the eastern portion of the Siberian railway through Manchuria and to extend it to the southern part of that country. France, in her turn, as recompense for her services in restoring the peninsula to China, received concessions from China in Yunnan and along the Yangtse. To Germany was leased a portion of the city of Tientsin. By these acts the three Powers secured benefits at China's expense, identical with those they had denied to Japan.

On March 6, 1898, Germany obtained from China a lease of Kiaochao on the Shantung peninsula for a period of ninety-nine years. A month later the Russian Pacific squadron entered the naval harbour of Port Arthur and forced the helpless Chinese to consent to a lease of the Liaotung peninsula and its littoral for twenty-five years. France about the same time secured a lease of Kwang-chow-wan between Tonking and Canton, and Great Britain procured a lease for ninety-nine years of territory on the mainland adjacent to Hong-Kong and a lease of Wei-hai-wei with rights and conditions similar to those of Russia in Port Arthur. This lease was made terminable at whatever time the Russians evacuated Port Arthur, or, in other words, it was to be coexistent with Russian occupation. This move of England's, intended as it was to stand as a counter-check to Russian aggression in this region, greatly pleased the Japanese, who perceived in this fact, and in the further fact that England had not joined in the protest against Japanese occupation of of the Liaotung peninsula, that England was always to be relied upon in support of Japanese as against Russian interests in the Far East, and the possibility of an Anglo-Japanese alliance began for the first time to be spoken of. Indeed already in March 1898, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain had mentioned to Baron Kato, then Japanese Ambassador in London, that an Anglo-Japanese alliance was desirable. In the face of persistent Russian aggression in Manchuria and in Korea, England perceived the identity of her interests in the Far East, with those of Japan. Not only had England great political interests, but she had likewise great commercial interests, that demanded her protection in this sphere of action, and Japan's growth as a naval and military power was at once recognized by England as affording her an opportunity to secure for herself a partner who, by reason of her proximity to the scene of action, and the possession of a powerful army and navy, could be relied

upon to act effectively on England's behalf whenever the occasion demanded it, both for the protection of British interests and for resisting England's adversaries and competitors in Asia, if at any time their position there should be regarded as constituting a menace.

In the face of numerous pledges that she gave to other Powers promising to terminate her occupation of Manchuria, Russia continued to exact from China humiliating concessions. These aggressions stimulated still further the rapidly growing sentiment in England for an Alliance with Japan, and accordingly on the 30th of January 1902, a Treaty of Alliance was signed by Baron Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne. The preamble of the treaty was sufficient to have shown Russia what she would have to reckon with if the persisted in her encroachments on the integrity of China and Korea. It runs thus:—

"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree etc."

Furthermore, by Articles II and III it was in effect provided that neither Great Britain nor Japan should, in the event of a Far Eastern war, be obliged to fight alone and unaided against a combination of Powers. In the event of two or more Powers attacking either Great Britain or Japan, both Powers pledged themselves to unite for repelling such an attack.

The Czar's Empire seems to have well understood the grounds for the new alliance, and not to leave her adversaries in doubt as to her own position, promptly countered by notifying the Governments at London and Tokio (in which notification France likewise joined) that thenceforth the provisions of the Franco-

Russian Alliance would be equally applicable to the Far East.

The situation in the Far East at this time was one of constantly growing tension. The successive occupations of territory in China at the close of the nineteenth century, and the diplomatic strife that had ensued thereover, had made it appear as if the Powers had determined upon the partition of the Chinese Empire, and that it had resolved itself into a question simply, of who should come off 'first best' in the grab for territory. It had come to be a sort of proverb in China that she was to have to endure three various plagues. The first was the revolutionary uprising known as the Taiping rebellion, the second was the Mohammedan movement, and the third was the "foreign devils." The first two had been successfully overcome and it now seemed to them that the time was ripe to get rid of the "foreign devils." This sentiment was at the bottom of the so-called "Boxer" movement in 1900, an anti-foreign sentiment that had been fanned into a flame by the territorial aggressions inaugurated by the Powers in 1897 and 1898.

In this connection it is only necessary to quote from one of the proclamations issued by a rebel leader, one Yu Tung Ch'en, who wrote: "These foreigners, under pretext of trading and teaching Christianity, are in reality taking away the land, food, and clothing of the people; besides overturning the teachings of the sages, they are poisoning us with opium and ruining us with debauchery. Since the time of Tao Kuang, they have intimidated our Court and coerced our officials; they have seized our territory and cheated us out of our money; they have eaten our children as food and piled up the public debt as high as the hills, they have burnt our palaces and overthrown our tributary states, occupied Shanghai, devastated Formosa, forcibly opened Kiaochao, and now wish to divide up China like a melon."

The uprising was easily suppressed by a combination of

European, American and Japanese troops. For Japan, the matter was of great significance, firstly, because the Western Powers at once showed their recognition of her new position in the family of nations by calling upon her to lead an expedition into China, thus receiving a most striking proof of the purpose of the Powers to treat her as an equal that stood upon the same footing as a Great Power as any of the white nations of the Occident; and secondly, because this recognition marked a distinction made by the white nations between two branches of the yellow race—a distinction humiliating to China, and exalting to Japan. And so by this act the Western Powers established, unwittingly it is believed, the justice of Japan's claim to the hegemony of the yellow race.

Indirectly, the Boxer uprising was of assistance to Russia in solidifying her hold on Manchuria; for, on the pretext that a Boxer rising was imminent, and that the Russian railway was threatened, she poured large bodies of troops into Manchuria and soon was in full military occupation of the entire region comprising three provinces. But not a move was made by the Moscovite Empire that was not met by a counter-move on the part of England. An agreement was now concluded between Great Britain and Germany, an agreement which stated in unmistakable terms that, should any Power utilize the complications in China for the purpose of seeking advantages prejudical to the interests of China and the other Powers, the signatory Powers would take the necessary steps to protect their own interests. The other great Powers, including Japan also agreed to adhere to the principles of this agreement, which was calculated to preserve the integrity of China, and it looked for a time as though Russia had met with a decisive check. Nevertheless, in the face of the opposition of Great Britain, Japan and the United States, Russia continued her secret negotiations with China—negotiations which consisted, for the most

part, of extravagant bribes paid to the weak and corrupt Chinese statesmen then in power. Efforts on the part of the three Powers to foil Russia in her object were at last successful to the extent that Russia was induced to make many important concessions, with the result that the Czar's government entered into an agreement on the 2d of April 1902 under which Russia engaged herself to withdraw a portion of her troops, from Manchuria within six months, a second portion within a year, and the remainder within eighteen months. The first six months passed; a few companies of infantry were withdrawn and the railways outside the Great Wall were returned to China. Suddenly however an announcement was made which startled the whole civilized world. Russia had made seven new demands on China as conditions for the evacuation of Manchuria.

As an exhibition of cynical diplomacy that would be hard to match elsewhere, a perusal of these demands is well worth the reader's time. They run as follows:—

1. That China should not open any free port in the evacuated district.

2. That China should not employ foreigners, other than Russians, in her service in the north.

3. That Newchwang should be under Russian administration.

4. That the Russo-Chinese Bank should collect the Customs dues as heretofore.

5. That the sanitary affairs of Manchuria should be controlled by Russia.

6. That Chinese telegraph poles in Manchuria should be used by Russians.

7. That no part of Manchuria should ever be alienated to any foreign power.

Again the Powers protested, but Russia was undeterred, and far from withdrawing from the step she had now taken

which was tantamount to a positive declaration of her intention to hold Manchuria, Russia went ahead with her preparations and sought to tighten her grasp by taking aggressive measures in Korea.

Seeing herself about to be robbed of the fruits of her sacrifices made in the Chino-Japanese war by a rival who had taken the leading part in demanding her withdrawal from the Liaotung peninsula, a much smaller part of Manchuria than Russia herself was now occupying, Japan took immediate steps to find out where she stood in these matters. Accordingly negotiations were entered into with the Russian Government and proposals made which were to define the respective interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea. Whereas Japan was willing to agree to declare Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest, the negotiations broke down upon Russia's refusal to make a similar unconditional declaration with regard to Korea. Accordingly negotiations were broken off and on the 10th of February 1904, war was formally declared in Tokio.

After a campaign lasting a little over fourteen months, Japan compelled Russia to acknowledge, by the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 5, 1905) that Japan possessed in Korea paramount political, military and economic interests, and engaged neither to obstruct nor to interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and control which Japan might find it neccessary to take.

Japan now assumed a protectorate over Korea, assuming control of its foreign relations, and administering its home affairs through a Resident-General at Seoul. In 1907, Japan took over the administrative authority, and in 1910 formally annexed Korea, and a Japanese Governor-General was now installed in the Korean capital who had authority to exercise, under the direction of the Emperor of Japan, command of the

Army and Navy as well as general control over all administrative functions in Korea.

In the meantime the Katsura ministry had concluded negotiations, on August 12, 1905, which resulted in the extension of the scope of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The new alliance was tor ten years, and under it Great Britain and Japan pledged themselves, not only to maintain peace in India and the Far East, but to preserve the independence and integrity of China. The alliance was again renewed in 1911 for a term of ten years.

The terms of the alliance between Great Britain and Japan had become radically modified upon its renewal in 1911. The newly signed Treaty contains the following provision—"Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of General Arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force." This provison was inserted in the Treaty at England's request, and was intended to preclude all possibility of complications between Great Britain and the United States in the event of a breach in the relations between America and Japan, for in the regular course of events such a General Arbitration Treaty (1915) was duly entered into by the two English speaking countries.

Perceiving the weak spot in her Treaty of Alliance with England, Japan now turned to Russia and reached an understanding with that country that guaranteed mutual support to one another in their further designs on the territorial integrity of China. Such understanding was in due course of time embodied in two agreements, the first of which (1911) provided for the settlement of all outstanding questions, and the second (July 1912) contained provisions with regard to their respective spheres of interest in Mongolia, and an undertaking for the joint defence of those spheres in case af attack by other Powers.

Thus by the signing of this Treaty Japan received a powerful reinforcement to her policy of aggrandizement in the Far East, and the new Russo-Japanese *Entente* established for the purpose of anticipating any interference with their plans for the partitioning of China's northern dependancies, virtually took the place of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and made Japan more than ever the master of her own fate.

Japan and Russia, in this manner serving each other's interests, secured at a stroke the complete direction of affairs in the Far East and freedom from interference on the part of the Powers, who now had to look on while Russia and Japan violated the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty in which they had reciprocally undertaken "not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China might take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria, and not to exploit their railways in Manchuria for strategic purposes." Both countries treated the Portsmouth Treaty as a 'scrap of paper', disregarding their expressly given guarantees that Chinese sovereignty was to be restored in Manchuria and her territory to be completely evacuated by both belligerents. Indeed the Powers in thus tamely submitting to these breaches of faith having for their object expansion of Russia and Japan at China's expense seem to have been faced by a choice of evils. In the face of the fact that Japan's expansion had become inevitable, England France and the United States, the three nations with the largest interests at stake, assumed that it was preferable that it should take place at the expense of China's undeveloped estates rather than at any cost or loss to themselves.

The political chessboard has known some queer changes in the last two decades, among which the alteration in the attitude of the Powers towards China is especially noteworthy. In 1901, Russia's Manchurian convention was considered a possible

ground of menace to the world's peace, and a determinant cause of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) because as Lord Landsdowne informed the Russian Ambassador, "it limited China's right to dispose of her own military forces and to construct railway extensions within her own territory." Yet ten years later England and America acquiesced in the Russo-Japanese vetoing of Chinese railway agreements with British and American capitalists for the development of Manchuria, and recognized the Russo-Japanese *Entente* which, among other things, proclaimed that "China must not be permitted to create a formidable army, if she should recover her balance sufficiently to turn her attention to national defence."

V.

THE RUSSIAN-JAPANESE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AFTER 1905.

CHAPTER FIVE.

The Russian-Japanese Situation in the Far East After 1905.

From the time of the close of the Russo-Japanese war down to the time of the opening of the great European war, political events in the Far East arose which brought into prominence the dangers of the situation there, and added greatly to Japan's desire to remain on terms of amity with England, with the result that the Alliance was once more renewed on practically the same terms in 1911.

Japan went to war with China in 1894 for the purpose of eliminating Chinese influence in Korea, and to replace it by her own. Later, when Russia, in her steady expansion Eastward, appeared on the scene and took up the role in Korea that China, had been forced to abandon, Japan again had to arouse herself, and when Russia obtained the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula from China, the Japanese decided that these steady encroachments of the Muscovite Empire had to be resisted at whatever cost, and the Russo-Japanese war followed with the results which we have had described in a former chapter.

But these events had by no means solved all of Japan's problems in the Far East. She found that she still had to reckon with her northern neighbor who in spite of a military defeat had forced a diplomatic defeat on Japan in the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, under which Japan received not a rood of Russian territory, nor a kopeck by way of indemnity from the Russian State.

A glance at the map shows that on the extreme eastern limit of Russia's Asiatic possessions lies a vast tract of land bordering on the sea of Japan, the Gulf of Tartary and the sea of Okhotsk. Flowing through it in a northerly direction and emptying into the Gulf of Amur runs the great navigable river—the Amur. Vladivostock lies at the furthest southern extremity of the Maritime Province. In this district Russia set to work to regenerate her policy in the Far East by means of a colossal railway undertaking. Apparently, much to Japan's misgiving, Russia's faith in her Far Eastern destiny remained unshaken. Crowded back from the ports of exit which she had acquired in the Liaotung Peninsula by her intrigues in China, forced back on Northern Manchuria by the strength of the Japanese sword, restless Russia began planning the way of her advance to the Pacific through new channels, before the ink was dry on the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth.

During the past three hundred years Russian enterprise in in the Far East has met with many checks, but she has gone irresistably onward, and she was now going to prove once more that no temporary check such as that she had received in Manchuria could hold back the waves of Russian movement seeking an outlet to the Pacific.

It may be well to review, at the outset, the present railway situation in the Far East. Russia has the Siberian Railway in her own indisputable possession as far as the town of Manchuria, a town situated on the western border of the great territory from which it takes its name. From this point the line merges into the Chinese Eastern Railway which crosses Manchuria, and, joining the Russian system at the Manchu-Primarskaya frontier, finds its terminus at Vladivostock. From Harbin the Chinese Eastern Railway continues south to Port Arthur and Dairen. A branch line connects Vladivostock with the town of Khabarovsk and is, of course, as indisputably Rus-

sian as the Siberian Railway which terminates at the town of Manchuria. Work was actually begun on the Amur Railway, and some sections of it have been completed. At Khabarovsk it will link up to the Ussuri Railway, connecting Khabarovsk with Vladivostock, completing communication through all-Russian territory, with Vladivostock as the terminus. For strategical reasons, the route was carried as far north of the Amur as practicable. The railway's total length will be 1300 miles and will cross four rivers—the Zea, the Burea, the Arhara and the great Amur itself. Its importance lies in the fact that it provides a link necessary to create an all-Russian route, over 6000 miles long, from St. Petersburg and Moscow to the extreme East. A number of branch lines will connect the main line with the Chinese Eastern Railway, and ultimately it is proposed to build an extension to Nicolaievsk, a port of considerable commercial value, situated at the mouth of the Amur.

In the contest for supremacy in the Far East, the Amur Railway will, it is believed, some day play a great part. Under the Portsmouth Treaty, neither Japan nor Russia may use the Manchurian lines for the movement of troops and munitions of war. While this provision would probably not be of much value when hostilities actually break out, nevertheless conditions may arise which would make any use of the Manchurian lines impossible for Russia, and she would then have the Amur Railway connecting with her Siberian lines and all of them entirely in Russian territory.

The situation for Russia is therefore about as follows:—The Russo-Japanese war deprived her of her rights in Southern Manchuria, but she still possesses rights in Northern Manchuria, by virtue of which she has retained the direct railway route to Vladivostock, a port on the open seas granting an outlet into the Pacific, and one, too, that can be kept open all the year round by means of ice-breakers. This line of railway,

moreover, passes through an immense area of Chinese territory where Russia's right of entry was formerly in some doubt, but where she now stays, as far as the line and its environs are concerned with the full accord of Japan and all the Powers. In other words, Russia, even after a defeat in a great war, retained a cherished route to the sea with increased authority, whereas Japan's Manchurian lines lead direct northward to the Russian section, and their only outlet is by way of the Russian lines through Russian territory.

From this sketch of the railway situation in the Far East it must be clear that Russia still stands squarely athwart the path of Japan. Russia's position in the Far East, assuming of course the return of a strong government to power and the re-constitution of the Russian State, is in many respects stronger than ever before. What she has there is now her own, and not to be wrested from her except by conquest of Russia on Russian territory. She has ceased to encroach on her neighbors, and with the uses she can make of her new railway extensions when completed, Russia will be more formidable in the Far East than ever. Japan is well aware of these facts, and if a reason is wanted for Japan's intervention in Siberia, the real truth of the situation can not escape the observer who has studied the strategical value of the new Russian lines to the Far East, and who realizes the strong objections that Japan has to the development of so powerful and pushing a neighbor so near to her own frontiers. That Japan, if she once gets control of the Southern portion of the Maritime Province, together with the port of Vladivostock and the railway line to Khabarovsk, will ever give them up except under the strongest pressure, no one can believe who has followed closely the association of events in the Far East since Japan became a world power.

What we have stated above with respect to Japan's reason

for intervention in Siberia is in no way inconsistent with the theory advanced in Chapter Three to the effect that Japanese intervention is inspired by the desire to restore stability of government in Russia, a government upon which she can rely to assist in carrying out the terms of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1916 which has for its object nothing less than the partition of China between the two Powers and united action on the part of both against any other Power who should dare to interfere.

To reconcile these two apparently conflicting attitudes of Japan toward Russia, namely, Japanese opposition to Russian expansion in the direction of the Pacific, and Japanese willingness to share with Russia in the spoils of China, it must be remembered that the shores of the Russian Maritime Province in the Far East, are directly opposite to the northern portion of the Japanese islands, and the island of Saghalien, the southern half of which belongs to Japan. The Russian mainland separated therefore from the Japanese islands by a distance across the Japan Sea no greater than that which separates Antwerp or Rotterdam from the City of London, occupies a position of the same strategical importance with reference to Japan that the mouths of the Scheldt and the Rhine do to England. The Japan Sea in the East like the North Sea in the West must be defended, in each case by an Island Empire, at whatever cost, against the encroachment of a rival naval and military power on the mainland. Just as England may not brook Germany as a neighbor in Belgium and Holland, so Japan may not brook Russia as a neighbor in the Maritime Province. On the other hand, Japan has no objection to the expansion of Russia in China. On the contrary she favors it, and would offer it to Russia as compensation for the loss of the Maritime Province. Moreover Japan has the strong conviction that outside Russia and herself, none of the other Powers has any

rights in China. Russia is looked upon by Japan as an Asiatic Power; the other Powers in spite of their retention of possessions in Asia, are not Asiatic Powers at all and do not belong there. And it is no less a fixed and unalterable policy of Japanese statecraft to resist at whatever cost the interference of non-Asiatic Powers in the affairs of China, as it is to banish Russia from the Japan Sea.

Strange as it may seem to the peoples of the West, the peoples of the East look at the world with other eyes. For the Orientals there exists a "White Peril," in precisely the same sense as the Occidentals speak of a "Yellow Peril," Let us imagine for example what would happen if the Japanese or the Chinese at some later day should suddenly develop the notion of developing spheres of influence in France, or in Spain and Portugal—would not all Europe and America rise up against them? Well, Japan and China are proud nations, too. They possess civilizations older than those of the nations of Europe and America, and it has been only their lack of physical power that has prevented them hitherto from insisting on their right not to be interfered with. This physical power the Orientals are fast winning for themselves and when they possess it in sufficient measure, then woe to the Western nation that continues to reach out for spheres of influence in Asia!

The American youth are taught to believe in their school histories that Japan, at the time of Commodore Perry's visit to her in 1853, was a down-trodden and benighted race of barbarians, and that Perry's coming was haled as a joyful event and one that opened up to the ignorant islanders the prospect of all the beatific advantages of intercourse, trade and commerce with the cultured nations of the West.

It is true that some of Japan's advanced thinkers had already, at this time, favored the opening of Japan to Europeans, but it was because they foresaw that resistance would only result

in the exercise of superior physical force by the western nations with the possible consequence that the Japanese would have to pass beneath the yoke of some European Power and become a subject race. But they had no illusions about the joys of the new adventure upon which the Japanese were urged to enter. They were entirely satisfied with life as it was, nor were they the ignorant and benighted barbarians that we hear about so much in these school histories. If we wish to know what the Japanese really were at this period of their history let us turn to the following picture of Japan as described by Lord Elgin at the moment when she was beginning to be Occidentalized (1858):—

"On the whole, I consider it the most interesting expedition I ever made. The total absence of anything like want among the people; their joyous though polite and respectful demeanor; the combination of that sort of neatness and finish which we attain in England by the expenditure of great wealth, with tropical luxuriance, made me feel that at last I had found something which entirely surpassed all the expectations I had formed. And I am bound to say, that the social and moral condition of Japan has astonished me quite as much as its material beauty. Every man, from the Emperor (who never leaves his palace) to the humblest labourer, lives under a rigid rule, prescribed by law and custom combined; and the Government, through its numerous agents, among whom are hosts of spies, or more properly inspectors (for there is no secrecy or concealment about this proceeding), exercises a close surveillance over the acts of each individual; but, in so far as one can judge, this system is not felt to be burdensome by any. All seem to think it the most natural thing in the world, that they should move in the orbit in which they are placed. The agents of authority wear their two swords; but, as they never use them except for the purpose of ripping themselves up,

the privilege does not seem to be invidious. My interpreter, a Dutchman, lent to me by the United States Consul-General, has been two years in the country, and he assures me he never saw a Japanese in a passion, and never saw a parent beat a child. An inexhaustible fund of good temper seems to prevail in the community. Whenever in our discussions on business we get on rough ground, I always find that a joke brings us at once upon the level again. Yesterday, at a formal audience with the Foreign Ministers (to settle about the handing over the yacht), they began to propose that, in addition to the Commissioners, I should allow some other officers (probably spies or inspectors) to be present at our discussions of the clauses of the Treaty. After treating this seriously for some moments, without settling it to their satisfaction, I at once carried the day by saying laughingly, that as they were six to one already, they ought not to desire to have more chances in their favour. This provoked a counter-laugh and a compliment, and no more was said about the spies. When the commissioners came yesterday afternoon to go through the clauses of the Treaty with me, I was much pleased with the manner in which they took to their work, raising questions and objections in the most business-like manner, but without the slightest appearanee of captiousness or a desire to make difficulties... There is no luxury or extravagance in any class. No jewels or gold ornaments even at court; but the nobles have handsome palaces, and large bodies of retainers. A perfectly paternal government, a perfectly filial people; a community entirely self-supporting; peace within and without; no want, no ill-will between classes. This is what I find in Japan in the year 1858, after two hundred years' exclusion of foreign trade and foreigners. Twenty years hence what will be the contrast? I feel a sort of terror when I contemplate my return to China. My trip to Japan has been a green spot in the

desert of my mission to the East... We are again plunging into the China Sea, and quitting the only place which I have left with any feeling of regret since I have reached this abominable East... The exceeding external beauty of Japan, and its singular moral and social picturesqueness, cannot but leave a pleasing impression upon the mind. One feels as if the position of a Daimyo in Japan might not be a bad one, with two or three millions of vassals; submissive, but not servile, because there is no contradiction between their sense of fitness and their position."

To return once more to the Amur Railway project, it is to be noted that its construction is frankly stated to be necessitated by strategical reasons, as the following sentences, addressed to the Duma by the reporter of the Committee of National Defences, M. Savitch, show:—"We came to the unanimous decision that this line must be built without delay, and that we must complete it by or in 1912. We must also lay down the second track within the same time... For we note that the strategic and political situation in the Far East has changed somewhat since the war—that our neighbors are sparing neither efforts nor means to increase their armed strength. Against whom those forces are aimed we do not, of course, know. But at all events we perceive that China is arming... Japan is arming, and, as we gather, the programme of Japan's military preparations will have been carried out precisely in 1912."

To comprehend Russia's anxiety it is necessary to understand that Vladivostock remains her only outlet in the Far East. In the event of another war in that region, Vladivostock would occupy a position of strategic importance similar to that held by Port Arthur in 1904-5. Vladivostock would be Russia's naval base—one that can be easily blockaded by Japan and is with difficulty kept open by ice-breakers in winter. Without efficient land communication Vladivostock would fall an easy

prey to the enemy, and its surrender would mean the loss of the hinterland, an admittedly richly cultivated province.

There are other elements of danger in the situation for Russia. Fishery rights granted to the Japanese by the Portsmouth Treaty along the coast of the Russian possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Behring seas, have increased Japanese influence in this region. Through her possession of Korea, Japan has obtained a frontier over which she may step into Russian territory, and she may have naval bases on the coast of Korea within a few hours' steaming distance from Vladivostock. Moreover, the close proximity of the Japanese portion of the island of Saghalien, running closely parallel with the north-eastern coast line of the Maritime Province affords Japan further splendid bases from which to launch an attack.

One further consideration in justification of Russia's attitude must be referred to. The Japanese public were roused to the highest pitch of indignation in 1905 by reason of the concessions which the Japanese plenipotentiary, Baron Komura, felt himself compelled to make during the Peace negotiations. Not only did Japan fail to receive payment of an indemnity, but her loudest demand—for the cession of the Maritime Province, or, as an alternative, the disarmament of Vladivostock, likewise fell on deaf ears and she was obliged to content herself with the settlement of the Manchurian and Korean questions in her favor. What Baron Komura and the Government of Japan knew at that time, the Japanese public did *not* know, namely, that Japan was financially exhausted, and that the western nations refused to loan her more money to carry on the war for purposes of pure territorial aggrandizement. The Russian Ambassador, M. Witte, carried his point, and the Japanese representatives went home from the conference deeply chagrined and angered. Necessity compelled them to make peace, for the time being; but the idea of being permanently foiled of

their object, we may be sure has never entered the Japanese head. No, history will repeat itself. Similarly thwarted by the Powers, Russia, France and Germany, in 1895 when Japan actually received the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula from China and was made to surrender it by the Powers in question, Japan acquiesced and bided her time. It came soon enough and with it the complete acquisition of all and more than she had formerly been forced to abandon. In the Manchurian case Japan had to fight another war to obtain what she wanted, whereas in the Vladivostock-Maritime Province matter, present appearances would almost warrant the assumption that the prize will be handed over to Japan on a silver platter with the compliments of President Wilson, Lloyd George and Poincaré.

VI.

CHINA AND JAPAN. THE HEGEMONY OF THE YELLOW RACE.

CHAPTER SIX.

China and Japan. The Hegemony of the Yellow Race.

It is related that until Western nations broke in upon their seclusion the Chinese knew the world merely as China, fringed around by a few semi-barbarous States, all of which paid not unwilling homage to the Son of Heaven, and that in the Middle Ages the Japanese were merely looked upon by them as a race of pirates, who, from time to time, ravaged their coasts. Less than a quarter of a century ago, when China was at war with Japan, the southern provinces regarded the conflict as an affair solely belonging to the northern provinces, and the authorities at Canton even went the length of demanding from the Japanese the return of some revenue cutters on the ground that they had been captured by mistake. Indeed the Chinese nation have from time out of memory regarded the Japanese as inferiors, and this feeling was not in any great degree modified by the war of 1894-5, for the vast size of the Empire left all but a narrow region bordering on the Gulf of Pechili entirely unaffected by the war, and entirely oblivious to its significance. Not until Japan had played the leading role in the suppression of the Boxer troubles was any change of sentiment to be observed. In the occupation of the Forbidden City and the flight of the Court, the Chinese Empire suffered the deepest humilation in its history, and besides, the Chinese felt that insult was added to injury in the fact that the hated and despised Japanese were there as conquering

assailants, and standing on an equal footing with Europeans. What a humiliation for China! What an exaltation for Japan! What a change from the role Japan had been compelled to play five years before, when, at the dictation of three western Powers, she was obliged to yield up the richest part of her spoils of war, with her pride humbled by those who still regarded her only as an inferior. And now these same Powers marched at her side and treated her as an equal, while still reminding China of her inferiority. Thus, by the action of the white nations of the western world, Japan had been elevated to a position of supremacy over the Yellow race, and she felt herself from that moment to be the nation chosen by destiny to be the spokesman of a continent. In that proud position, Japan was further supported by the three following events:— The war with and victory over Russia, the annexation of the Kingdom of Korea formerly under the suzerainty of China, and the treaty of alliance with Great Britain.

Then came the great war and Japan's opportunity. In normal times Japan had recognized the necessity of veiling her designs against China, and of exercising a certain amount of restraint in the face of European and American opposition. But the great Powers were now directing every bit of their attention to the life and death struggle with which they were then engaged among themselves; their attention was distracted from the Far East, and besides Japan was their ally and rendering them valuable services. Interference with her plans was therefore out of the question.

As a first move Germany must be driven from the Shantung peninsula. Having been invited to the task by her ally Great Britain, Japan was placed in the favorable position of accomplishing as a duty that which she was most eager to do in the furtherance of her own designs. Nevertheless it was not without some misgivings that the Allies saw Japan placed in

a position to profit by the German loss. But Japan quickly smoothed their rising susceptibilities by delivering an assurance through the Japanese Premier, Count Okuma, to the effect that "Japan has no territorial ambitions, her warlike operations will not extend beyond the defense of her own legitimate interests. Japan has no ulterior motive, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess." If we may be allowed to anticipate subsequent events, it may not be inopportune to remind the world that a similar assurance was given to the Powers by Japan at the time of her recent intervention in Siberia.

Now see what happened. Immediately after the expulsion of the Germans from Tsingtau and the Shantung Peninsula, the Chinese Government prepared to resume the administration of that region. From doing so it was prevented by the Japanese who appointed their own custom-house and other local authorities, took possession of the Shantung railroad and other properties which really belonged to a private Chino-German company, and generally treated the province as spoils of war. Baron Sakatani, formerly Finance Minister and now Mayor of Tokio, publicly and with much approval urged that a Japanese civil government should be established at Tsingtau "to manage and develop Shantung." Other representative and influential men made similar utterances, and it became apparent that the Germans had been ousted only to let the Japanese take their place.

This was explicitly declared on January 18, 1915, when Japan made upon China her notorious demands contained in the "Five Groups," which were to be kept secret until granted, under penalty of having other and harsher ones added to them. Those demands have, as we have seen, been modified in some respects, but the chief of them remained unchanged, and have now been granted by China under pressure.

In this connection it is necessary to examine the conceded demands a little more closely. The chief of them has reference to Shantung, and by virtue of it, Japan succeeds to all the rights, privileges and power which Germany had in the province. In other words, Shantung, one of the richest districts of all China, becomes in effect a Japanese province.

The exceptional significance of Japan's possession of Shantung may be seen on the map. Japan already possesses the Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur and Dairen, so that the acquisition of Shantung gives her control of both sides of the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili, practically of the gulf itself, and of the approaches by sea to Tien Tsin and to Peking itself. She has the capital of China completely within her grasp.

Other advantages accrued under the conceded demands, as follows:—Japan exercises undisputed sway in Southern Manchuria, including control of the police, the option of all foreign loans and of all railroad concessions. In Eastern or Inner Mongolia, another Japanese protectorate is established under which Japan is to control all foreign railroad loans and all foreign loans of any kind which are to be met by taxation, and is also to designate the treaty ports which are to be opened. If China needs foreign advisers in governmental affairs, she is to get them from Japan. She is to purchase most of her military arms and other supplies from Japan, or is to let Japan build arsenals in China for their manufacture. In Fukien province, facing Formosa, China is to grant to no other power than Japan any concession for a shipyard, coaling station, or similar establishment, and is to permit no private establishment of the kind to be created with foreign capital.

As has already been stated, the demands were set up in "Five Groups," of which the first four embodied the demands which were ultimately conceded. It now remains to say a word about Group Five. In the face of China's strenuous

objections, the fifth Group was not insisted upon by Japan. But it is of great importance, in this connection, to bear in mind that the objectionable Group was not withdrawn but was only postponed for future consideration, 'Group Five' may therefore rightfully be regarded, as still *in esse*, in the light of 'contingent demands' whose resurrection will depend on a 'condition subsequent.'

These 'contingent demands' differ materially from the Manchurian and Mongolian demands we have just been considering, in that they "arise not from imperative economic necessity, not from pressure of population upon food supply, but from political ambitions and the nation's cherished dreams of a Far Eastern Empire that shall in time rival that of Great Britain and dominate all the regions of the Pacific." That the contingent demands cleverly veil Japan's intention to ultimately assume a protectorate over China there can be no doubt. Concessions were asked for railway construction in Southern China; China was to agree to the establishment of a joint Chino-Japanese arsenal, to the propagation of religion by Japanese missionaries, and to the formation of a joint Chino-Japanese police force; and, finally, the Peking Government was requested (*a*) to engage Japanese advisers 'in case of need;' (*b*) to pledge itself not to permit the establishment of a naval or military base on the coast of Fukien, opposite the Japanese island of Formosa.

The submission of these contingent demands follows an exactly parallel line of procedure to that adopted by Japan toward Korea leading up to the annexation of the Hermit Kingdom in 1910. If we examine the sequence of events in the Korean case we find that, less than two years after Japan had guaranteed the independence and integrity of that country "in a spirit of firm friendship," she was able to 'persuade' the Korean Government to sign a Protocol which gave her full control of foreign and financial affairs at Seoul. The pretence of sovereign rights

was retained by the Korean Kingdom for four years longer, and in 1910 gave way entirely to annexation by Japan. A similar fate awaited China had she accepted the terms laid down in the 'contingent demands.' And that fate still waits upon her, for the 'contingent demands' may be revived at a later and more favorable opportunity, unless China's attempts at internal reform attain the success that is hoped for by the new school of statesmen that has arisen in China since the establishment of the Republic in 1911.

It will now be pertinent and instructive to compare the foregoing stipulations and 'contingent demands' with the terms of some previous agreements to which Japan and China have been parties. In 1899, John Hay, American Secretary of State, secured the adherence of Japan, along with other nations, to his principle of an "open door and equality of opportunity" for all nations in China. In 1907, Japan and Russia agreed to "recognize the independence and the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in the said empire," and they engaged "to uphold and defend the respect of that principle by all the peaceful means possible to them." In 1908 Japan and the United States agreed "to preserve the common interests of the Powers in China, by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire." In 1911, Japan and Great Britain agreed upon "the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." Finally, there is the "most favored nation" clause in all the treaties between China and other Powers, which declares that the country making each treaty shall have "free and

equal participation in all privileges, immunities, and advantages which may have been or may hereafter be granted by the Chinese Government to any other nation."

What is the present situation of China? That question is best answered by two quotations. The first is from the lips of the late Chinese President Yuan-Shih-Kai:—"Our rights and privileges in Manchuria have suffered enormously. We are ashamed and humiliated, but our weakness invited insult. Let all people unite and work harmoniously for the supreme object of saving the country."

The second quotation was uttered in 1915 by a brilliant Chinese, who was educated in the United States and who was appointed China's Minister at Washington in 1915:—

"The Republic of China was founded only four years ago, and yet in that brief period we have seen peace and order restored and many great reforms instituted. Wide as is the domain of China, the mandates of the Government are faithfully carried out in every part of the land. There has been developed a sense of security and a sense of nationalism never known under the old regime. Under the old regime very often there were viceroys in some of the far corners of the country who would sometimes send rosy reports of conditions to Peking when all was not as it should have been in the provinces under their administration. That sort of maladministration is no longer possible. Offices are carefully filled and reports properly verified, and the result is that the central government is looked up to with a degree of confidence and respect, and with a feeling of seriousness which in itself is a sign of a nation that is united. The Central Government is close to the hearts of all the Chinese people.

"In the year 1912, the most serious problem confronting the Chinese people was the financial problem. Finance was the stumbling block, because much money was needed for the

carrying into effect of important administrative reforms, and the Government was firmly determined not to live on loans forever. The loans which were made for administrative purposes had roused so much opposition among the people that partly in deference to this very natural and proper public feeling, but more particularly because it was the only sound financial plan, the Government resolved that the necessary funds for its administration must be got internally—direct from the people themselves. To this end efforts were made to ascertain exactly what were the sources and amounts of old revenue, and then new methods were devised to make certain that every cent collected from the people for the Government should be received by the Government."

The foregoing extracts furnish a better inkling of the new spirit that is animating an awakened China than any account of detailed events could give. The efforts of the military caste surrounding Yuan-Shih-Kai for the restoration of monarchical institutions in 1917, failed and Yuan-Shih-Kai dying soon thereafter, the republican and constitutional vehicle of State was lifted back to the track, after its temporary derailment, and is once more running along within the rails. What is going on now in China includes the rapid diffusion of knowledge, a reformation of the national services, the adoption of Western sciences and industrial processes, and an all around jettisoning of the crude, out of date, and ignoble concepts which have multiplied to keep the nation without the pale of the great family constituting the civilized world.

During all this process of awakening in China, the attitude of Japan and Russia is a subject that now requires consideration. The two Powers had so frequently in the past professed a desire to see the integrity of China maintained, only to be followed by acts of aggression, that it had come to be looked upon as a declaration made *pro forma*, but behind which other aspi-

rations were veiled. Japan and Russia were acting in such a manner as to lay their real sentiments open to some suspicion. The new movement in China had no enthusiastic admirers in Japan. On the contrary the Japanese had always shown an inclination to ridicule the Chinese reform movement. Assuming a condescending attitude, the Japanese people entirely forgot how much they themselves owed to Chinese civilization from which in the past they had borrowed so abundantly, and failing to remind themselves how swift had been their own recent rise to power, they taught themselves to believe that without their patronage all hope of regeneration within the Chinese Empire would be sought for in vain. Japanese writers were never tired of preaching that the neighboring Empire had only one hope of salvation, and that one—through the agency of Japan. But it was not alone injured vanity that caused the Japanese to reject any suggestion that they alone were not to be the arbiters of China's destinies; there was also the motive of fear—fear that a strong and united China, free from foreign guardianship, would put an end to her dreams of attaining to the hegemony of the Yellow Race and of securing a continental empire at the expense of China. It was hard for Japan to think of having to deal with a China free from the evils of corruption and maladministration, and newly baptized in the waters of advanced Radicalism, and even of Socialism, doctrines that might be so easily transplanted to her own shores to poison the wells of her heaven-descended autocratic institutions.

With these considerations in mind, Japanese statesmen set themselves the task of damming the new revolutionary stream in China, and of keeping the current within the old beds. The Japanese Minister in Peking declared that in no circumstances would his country recognize a Republic. Subsequently, of course, it had to be explained that the Minister was giving

expression merely to his own personal opinions, for, as was soon to become apparent, there was nothing that Japan could do to overcome the movement calling for the abdication of the dynasty and the creation of the Republic. The Republic, once established, meant the beginning of a new era.

The attitude of Russia was identical in motive and method to that of Japan. In this instance, the clash of interest in Mongolia constituted the principal bone of contention. Mongolia, but insecurely attached to the Chinese Empire, when the revolution broke out in China, proclaimed her autonomy. The Mongolians, as well as the dignitary Kueifang appointed by the Chinese Government to negotiate with them, requested Russian mediation. In the Russian communication to the Chinese Government it was stated that the Russian Government had no wish to interfere in Chinese affairs and cherished no aggressive designs in Mongolia, but it could not but be concerned in the restoration of order in Mongolia, which was adjacent to Siberia, and in which Russian trade had important interests. Russia, it was asserted did not desire a conflict between Mongolian and Chinese interests, as such a conflict could not fail to unfavorably prejudice Russian interests in Siberia whose extensive frontier ran for so great a distance contiguous with that of Mongolia. Accordingly Russia hoped for a settlement of the differences between the two countries, but reserved the right, in view of her own important interests, to recognize any *de facto* Government established in Mongolia, and to enter into business relations with Mongolia in the event of its ultimate separation from China. At the same time Russia requested a concession for the construction of a branch of the Siberian Railway across Mongolia to Kiakta and Urga.

Much criticism was passed on Russia, because of her demands on China at a time when the revolutionary movement was at its full height, and stability of government had not as yet

been restored to the nation. The Russian demand, however, was based solely on care for her own interests which imperatively required the protection of a sparsely settled Siberia against a possible invasion of emigrating multitudes of Chinese across Mongolia and into the Russian regions beyond. The St. Petersburg Government was therefore most ready to welcome a change that would set up a new domain as a buffer state between her own territory and that of China whose dense population was forever bursting its bounds and spilling itself over the frontiers of her neighbors.

Russian action in Outer Mongolia had caused Japan to consider the situation in Inner Mongolia, which borders on her sphere of interest in Manchuria. Accordingly negotiations were conducted in which the rights demanded were of a far-reaching character, to some of which China was unwilling to accede, and in the end Japan consented to accept, in the treaty (May 1915) already referred to, China's undertaking to open in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners certain suitable places in eastern Inner Mongolia. With the acceptance by China of these encroachments upon her sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia, the time is quickly approaching when the last vestige of her authority in these regions will disappear.

When that object has been attained, or even before, Japan will be ready for her next forward step in the direction of the complete domination of China. What has thus far happened is but the assertion and establishment of her paramount interests in Shantung, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia, in obedience to a popular demand that insists on Japan's priority of rights and paramount position in China, and the creation there of new spheres of interest as an outlet for the economic pressure, unintermitting and insupportable, that rests upon a people so burdened by taxation and so restricted in opportunity by expanding population.

But the voice of economic pressure is not the only voice to be heard in Japan. There exists likewise the voice of racial pride and ambition. This second voice of Japan is a voice reaching out into the wide spaces of the world, and would follow in England's path to the fulfillment of an ambition as great as any that ever inspired the adventurous builders of an Empire greater than that of ancient Rome. Indeed the example and history of England, as well as the striking similarity in the geographical situation of the two island empires—the one commanding the approaches to the European mainland, the other to the Asiatic—have unquestionably greatly influenced the imperial ambitions of Japan.

We have intimated that, having attained the recognition of her paramount interests in China, as already manifested by her action in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shantung, Japan will be ready for the next forward step which shall lead to the complete triumph of her policies. What that next step will be is already foreshadowed in the contingent demands? The acceptance of them by China would anticipate but a short time the total loss of her sovereign rights as a nation. To achieve that end, Japan will now devote all her industry and untiring perseverance. The reform spirit in China will be resisted and opposed by all the means at her command; corruption, intrigue, and bribery will play their part; all the methods of peaceful penetration and 'friendly cooperation' will be utilized—the financial control over mines and railways, loans to the Government and to Government officials, the acquirement of trade monopolies and other special privileges, extension of the privilege of giving advice to the Government and to the Governors of provinces—all these measures and presumably others of new device will be employed for the achievement of the Japanese ends, and China's subjection.

With the justice of Japan's designs for world dominion, with

the necessities of her requirements, we have nothing to do. We are here treating of consequences only. Japan pursues certain aims which produce certain effects. Even those who sympathize with her ends need not be blind to their consequences. We may believe in Japan's good intentions without closing our eyes to the realities. Some of her acts may seem worthy of the severest condemnation, but who among the nations is to throw the first stone? Would not English history seem exceedingly repulsive to the seeker after knowledge if, by some chance, he were restricted to reading about Warren Hastings and Clive in India, Kitchener's concentration camps in South Africa, Cromwell's and General Lake's oppressions in Ireland, the forcing of the opium trade on China and the destruction of the Winter Palace, the Asiento Contract with Spain in 1713 which granted to England the right to conduct a slave trade with Spanish America, the banishment of the Arcadians from Nova Scotia, the burning of the capitol at Washington in the war of 1812? Or, coming down to recent times, suppose our gentle reader were to judge England by the speeches of Devlin, Sir Edward Carson, and Roger Casement, and the writings of Bernard Shaw?

Such a method of reading English history would undoubtedly repel and disgust but it would be an unfair way of judging English history as a whole, and similarly we may hope for some brighter outcome from the black acts committed in the name of Japanese Imperialism than will be apparent in the darker pages of her unwritten history.

NOTE.

Extract from "Contemporary Politics of the Far East," by Stanley K. Hornbeck, B. A. Ph. D., Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, U. S. A.

Referring to the "Five Groups" agreement between China and

Japan, concluded May 9, 1915. Professor Hornbeck says, page 342.

"After the Japanese and Chinese had reached their agreement of May 9, the United States Government sent identical notes on May 11 to the two governments, of which that to China reads as follows:—

> In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy.

"Among publicists who have followed the recent negotiations (Japanese-Chinese) perhaps none has made a more searching analysis of the treaties and agreements than has George Bronson Rea (formerly editor and now publisher of the *Far Eastern Review*.)

"In a recent brochure (*Analysis of the China-Japanese Treaties*) in which he discusses the treaties, Mr. Rea, having quoted the American note just referred to, says:—'The thought at once arises: if Japan's demands did not impair American rights under the existing treaties, why should the pacific and friendly American Government feel constrained to issue such an unmistakable warning to both governments?' He then quotes from the *communiqué* issued by the Chinese government on May 7 for the purpose of explaining China's position to the world. The Chinese *communiqué* concludes:—

> It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded to the fullest extent possible to make concessions. In considering the nature of the course they should take in reference to the ultimatum the Chinese Government was influenced by its desire to preserve the Chinese people, as well as a large number of foreign

residents in China from unnecessary suffering, and also to prevent the interests of other friendly Powers from being imperiled.

For these reasons the Chinese Government was constrained to comply in full with the ultimatum, but in complying, the Chinese Government disclaims any desire to associate itself with any revision which may thus be effected in the various conventions and agreements concluded between other Powers, with respect to the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the *status quo*, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

Mr. Rea comments as follows:—

> .... America notified China and Japan of her determination to retain all her rights under these treaties, and China has announced that if these or other rights are impaired, Japan is solely responsible.
>
> If there is no impairment of previous treaties in the new arrangements between China and Japan, there can be no just reason for criticism, or future interference of other Powers.

"Taking up then the substance and the effect of the Japanese policy and the treaties and agreements which were concluded, Mr. Rea presents evidence to show that Germany's policy in Shantung has in recent years become more and more liberal, tending to nullify the effects of the doctrine of exclusive privilege and to encourage respect for China's sovereign rights. He continues:—

> Japan's succession to Germany's rights destroys the last hope that China will ever be liberated from those provisions, for in the present treaties this principle [of exclusive privileges] has been expanded and perpetuated in Manchuria, and the attempt made to extend them to Fukien and apply to the iron and steel industry in the Yangtse Valley.
>
> The revival of the "Spheres of Influence" policy by Japan, which undermine and subvert the authority of the Chinese

> Government, and tend to close the door to others, sounds the death knell to the Open Door doctrine. The American Note to China and Japan states, in no uncertain terms, that our Government cannot recognize any impairment of this policy. The issue is created. It exists to day as an actual force, and sooner or later must be faced.

"Whatever her intentions, Japan has accomplished in regard to China at least five things: she has consolidated her own position in her northern sphere of influence, Manchuria; she has driven the Germans out of their former sphere of influence, Shantung, and has constituted herself successor to Germany's rights; she has given warning that she considers Fukien province an exclusive sphere for Japanese influence; she has undertaken to invade the British sphere of influence; and she stands in a position to menace and to dictate to the Peking government.

.... "The Japanese statesmen, official spokesmen, and publicists affirm that Japan is bent on commercial conquest only. But can a commercial conquest be prosecuted as Japan has been prosecuting hers without injury to the rights of other nations?

"Granting for the moment that the conquest may be commercial only, if it succeeds one result must be that European nations along with the United States will suffer, relatively, in their trade with China. This will inevitably drive them to seek other markets. The first alternative markets to be sought will be, logically, in South America. This will increase the competition for the South American trade. The increased competition will tend to produce increased complications—and those complications will be very likely to involve the Monroe Doctrine.

"Thus, inevitably, the two leading principles in the foreign policy of the United States, that of the Monroe Doctrine in application to the American continents, and that of the open door in application to China, must be taken into consideration in any attempt to estimate the possible or probable effects of Japan's policy.

"In an article entitled *Economic Effect of the Extension of Japan's Spheres of Influence in China*, the editor of the *Far Eastern Review* says:—

Experience has shown that in regions in China in which political control is exercised by the Japanese the tendency is for foreign trade other than Japanese to diminish....

It can be seen from the figures.... that Japanese goods, even when there was some limitation to the control exercised by Japan over South Manchuria, succeeded in displacing those from other countries. When we turn to Korea.... it is found that the trade of countries other than Japan is steadily diminishing....

When it is found that in one region in China in which the Japanese exercise political control or influence, the trade of European and American nations succumbs to Japanese state-aided attacks, it is fair to assume that similar results will follow the acquisition of special interests by Japan in other localities. Japan desires to extend her political influence over Eastern Inner Mongolia, Shantung and Fukien. Her avowed ambitions are confined for the moment to the regions named, but there is no guarantee that she will not seek, if opportunity offers, still further extension. As she claims to have acquired as one of the spoils of war the right secured by Germany to extend the railway from Tsinanfu to a point on the Peking-Hankow line, this brings her into Chili, the metropolitan province. If, eventually, she succeeds in obtaining the right to construct the railways connecting Wuchang and Kiukiang and Nanchang, between Nanchang and Hangchow, and between Nangchang and Chaochow, her influence will be extended over Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung [three of the most important provinces of China]....

Japan has the advantage of proximity; of cheap labor in factory and steamer; of state aid in the shape of reduced freight charges on the Imperial Railways of Japan, of subsidies to steamship companies, of cheap financial accomodation.

.... Japan's trade with China increased from ninety-six million Haikwan taels in 1905 to one hundred and eighty-five million Haikwan taels in 1913. Her percentage of the foreign trade of China increased from 14 per cent. to nearly 19 per cent., while during the same period the percentage of the trade of

the United Kingdom and Hong Kong fell from 48 per cent. to less than 41 per cent....

Some Japanese publicists are quite candid in regard to Japan's ambitions. They state that Japan is sufficiently powerful to compel the European and American merchant to surrender the China market to exclusive Japanese exploitation. Japan professed belief in the open door policy as long as she thought it was advantageous for her to do so, but the time, they declare, has come when Japan can disclose her real policy, that of exclusion....

Japan has revived the policy of Spheres of Influence in China.... Is it in the interest of the world that Japan should be allowed to establish a political and commercial hegemony over Asia? The answer is obvious. (*Far Eastern Review* May, 1915, pp. 487—491).

"As an illustration of the effect of the spheres of influence policy, the recent experience of an American attempt to invest money and give assistance to the Chinese government serves admirably as a case in point.

"Several years ago, tentative arrangements were made between the Chinese government and the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, whereby the latter was to loan the former approximately $ 20,000,000 and to assist in the construction of a dockyard and naval base. Now it happens that Fukien Province is opposite and about a hundred miles distant from the island of Formosa; that Formosa is Japanese territory (taken from China in 1895); and that Japan never lets it be forgotten that she looks upon Fukien as one of her spheres of influence. As soon as it became known that negotiations were under way between an American company and the Chinese for the perfecting of a naval base on the Fukien coast, the Japanese press began to disseminate the impression that the American government was interested in the project and was seeking to establish a base for itself in Chinese waters. The confusion of this conclusion has not been without its effect upon the reasoning of certain American publicists.

"The Japanese government knew very well that the United States had no such design, but it was at the same time by no means minded

to allow American financial interests to gain a foothold in this heretofore little developed sphere of Japanese influence. Consequently the Japanese Minister at Washington adressed Mr. Bryan, as Secretary of State, to the effect that his government would consider it an unfriendly act if American capital should be loaned to China for the construction of dockyards in Fukien Province. We have not as yet the documentary evidence, but we have the statements of the Japanese to the effect that Mr. Bryan accepted the Japanese representations in the matter, recognizing the precedence of Japan's claims with regard to Fukien, and let it be understood that his government would not countenance the loan. The Chinese government thereupon diplomatically announced that it had no thought of applying the loan in question to the building of a dockyard in Fukien; and the Japanese announced, also diplomatically and through the proper diplomatic Channels, that they were glad to have this assurance. With this the matter might have been considered settled—the project for a Chinese dockyard built by an American firm on the Fukien coast was "off." But no, this was not enough. Japan must have assurances for the future, and she must emphasize again as a warning to poachers—especially to the innocently ignorant—the fact that Fukien is to be considered a Japanese preserve. Hence, the insertion—among the recent demands—of Article 6 of Group V:—'If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbor-works (including dock-yards) in the Province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.' China subsequently undertook, among the recent agreements, not to seek any foreign capital for developments in that province.

"First, by diplomatic pressure an American enterprise had been warned away from Fukien. Then the province was hermetically sealed against *any* foreign enterprise. Yet the Japanese government has declared over and over that its policies in no way interfere with the principles of equality of opportunity, and, after the American notes to China and Japan had been delivered, Baron Kato declared in the Japanese Diet: 'They [the demands] include no item which is incompatible with the principle of territorial integrity, equal opportunities and the open door, which the Imperial Government have in the interest of China declared from time to time.'"

VII.

JAPAN AND GERMANY.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

Japan and Germany.

The seat of the animosity and the origin of the hostility of England for Germany lies in the Far East. We are aware that this idea is not in accord with most notions about the origin of the war and England's participation therein, for, indeed, all references to the Far East as the real powder magazine of this war have been carefully and, one might almost say, systematically avoided by the Allies. Moreover, President Wilson under the influence of his French friends and his study of such well thought out theses as Professor Morris Jastrow's work on "The War and the Bagdad Railway," has lifted the Bagdad Railway project into the forefront of the reasons leading to hostilities among the two groups of nations, and still more recently the President and such leading Jingoes as Senator Lodge and ex-Senator Root have been induced to accept the proposition advanced by a fanatical French publicist, Andre Cheradame, that the Central Powers are only to be overcome by the creation in Central Europe of a block of states hostile to the spread of German influence, and standing both geographically and morally directly athwart their path. These notions are all to be ascribed to French influence, and the acceptance of them led the English and Americans into such adventures as the landing on the Murman coast and at Archangel, and the expedition in company with the Japanese, into the Maritime Province of Russian Siberia.

The champions of the Bagdad Railway theory overlook the fact that England sanctioned the building of the line, and had withdrawn all objections to its completion to the Persian Gulf, before the war broke out. The strategical significance of the line could be rendered null by the construction of a parallel line running through Persia and along the shores of the Persian Gulf, moreover its value as an adjunct to operations against Suez has been greatly exaggerated.

A brief examination of the strategic geography of the Near East will reveal the truth of the situation. As long as the leading naval Power of modern times has its home in the Atlantic with great responsibilities in the Pacific, Asia Minor, overlooking as it does the line of communication between those two oceans, must exercise a controlling influence on all strategical war-like dispositions between East and West. A hostile Power in Asia Minor is a menace to Suez; without Suez, England cannot quickly move her naval squadrons to the Pacific, so that her colonies and outposts there, would be practically defenceless. The position of authority hitherto possessed by the British Navy in Eastern waters would at once disappear, and, with it, the standing of the United States in the Pacific. The question therefore is how great a menace to the Suez canal does the projection of the Bagdad Railway offer?

The Suez Canal is completely protected on the one side by Egypt. Egypt is and always has been protected from any invasion from the African side because her rear is flanked in all directions by the Sahara, and any intruders endeavoring to enter by descending the river are stopped by the cataracts of the Nile. The same desert which protects Egypt in Africa sweeps far over into Asia, enfolds Egypt also on the Asiatic side, including the Isthmus of Suez and throws more than a hundred miles of desert between the Nile delta and southern

Palestine. This hundred or more miles of desert is and always will be a more or less insurmountable obstacle to the invasion of Egypt on the Asiatic side. But the desert does not end here. From southern Palestine it spreads out to the east and the north almost entirely across western regions of Asia bordering on Africa, leaving only a narrow strip of arable land along the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Suez is therefore safe from attack from any quarter whatsoever except one, and that is the north, along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. An army advancing upon Suez must come from the north for five hundred miles along a narrow fringe of land between the desert and the sea. The northern inlet of this land tunnel is between Aleppo and the coast and every army moving against Suez must enter this inlet at the place named, and remain within this narrow land corridor for five hundred miles to its southern exit. The difficulties and obstacles to be overcome are as follows. Only a single line of railway traverses this route—the Hedjaz route to Damascus and Aleppo. This line was described before the war in an American Railway magazine as "the worst run, and the worst run-down railway in the world." Most of its engines it is said, are on the scrap heap—their boilers eaten out by alkali water—and the rest are on the way there. A real attack on Suez would involve many months preparation, including not only the laying of light railways across the desert—a project that the presence of English forces in this region would render inoperative—and the double tracking of the Hedjaz line to Aleppo and the main trunk of the Bagdad Railway from Aleppo through Asia Minor to the Bosporus. Accordingly, as the situation unfolds itself, with the enemy in front, deserts to the south and east, and Palestine and Syria, through which the attacking army are passing, hardly able to feed their own population, an army moving on Suez would have to be fed from Asia Minor and munitioned from Europe.

It would be impossible to imagine that all these difficulties can be overcome by an army marching against hostile forces who, under present scouting conditions, are kept fully informed at all times of the movements of the enemy, and who are able, acting from Egypt as a base, to advance troops across the new English-built railway connecting the Nile delta with southern Palestine, to any point on the line of advance of the approaching foe.

From the foregoing outline we perceive how greatly the strategical value of the Bagdad Railway has been overestimated. Indeed from every point of view has its importance been exaggerated. It is not even the shortest route from the European continent to India. Moreover, the possibility of the construction of a railway from the Suez section across the Arabian desert to the Persian Gulf has been considered by the English and would no doubt be carried out if the Bagdad Railway should ever prove in practice the formidable economic factor that has hitherto been claimed for it.

With the assumption that we have laid the ghost of the Bagdad Railway conclusively to rest, let us now move forward to the consideration of our original proposition that the world conflagration was kindled in the *Far East* and not in the Near East.

At the outset, it has to be remembered that up to the close of the Chino-Japanese war in 1895, England was the undisputed master of affairs in the Far East. Her paramount position in the Pacific was recognized and unchallenged. The Pacific squadron of the British Navy patrolled the eastern seas, formidable and invincible in its superior strength, stood guard over British possessions in Australia, New Zealand and Canada, successfully resisted the aggressive designs of her chief rival, Russia, against China and Japan, protected the British spheres of influence in China, supported the enormously developing

commercial and industrial interests of the British Empire along the water channels of international trade in these regions, and in general raised and magnified the prestige of the British name and power throughout the East.

Soon after the close of the Chino-Japanese war, Japan began to develop a great fleet, and Germany likewise began to lay the foundations of her Imperial Navy (1898). England now had two courses open to her. Either she must annihilate Japan as a naval power and thus secure for herself the uninterrupted supremacy in the Pacific which could then be exercised with a comparatively light naval force, or, she must make an ally of Japan, withdraw her Eastern Squadron to Western waters, there to safeguard British interests against the growing might and aggressive tactics of her neighbor in the North Sea, and leaving to her Japanese ally the protection of British interests in the Pacific. England chose the latter alternative, but she did it with a wry face and with many misgivings. She knew that it was a step that carried in its train far-reaching and important consequences. British prestige, the protection of her island and continental possessions, her paramount commercial position, the bonds that united her to her colonies were all at a stroke placed in jeopardy, and she owed it all to two new world factors—the Japanese and the German navies.

How deeply the colonies felt the change may be gathered from the steps soon after taken to establish navies of their own. In the course of a message to the *Standard* newspaper, in connection with New Zealand's presentation of a *Dreadnought* to the Mother Country, Sir Joseph Ward, the Premier of the Colony, gave expression to the following remarkable utterance:—"The command of the Pacific, so vital to us, and so doubtful since Great Britain parted with Samoa, may one day needs be settled by her ships of war. The East threatens problems that may demand the same grim solution, and against

these dangers and all foreign aggression we feel the British navy is our final palladium. Our obligations to the Homeland are in proportion to the protection she throws around our lives, liberties, and property, and no crisis was needed to rouse us to a recognition of the fact that, with her present wealth and developments, New Zealand ought to bear an increased share of the burden of Imperial Defence." In another speech, Sir Joseph Ward, in welcoming the American fleet, at that time (1908) making a tour from the Atlantic to the Pacific, said that it was coming to Australasia not as that of a foreign country, but as that of a nation which was kith and kin of the Anglo-Saxon race. There would some day, he added, be a fight to decide whether white men or Orientals were to govern Australasia and the Pacific Islands, and the American fleet would then fight shoulder to shoulder with the Old World. The Press of New Zealand frankly declared that in the future Great Britain and America would be called upon to compete with Japan for the command of the Pacific, and urged with remarkable unanimity that the two great Anglo-Saxon countries should shape their policy in unison. At Sydney over half a million people awaited the arrival of the fleet. Several newspapers urged that Australia should cooperate with America in protecting their mutual interests, even if by so doing her relations with Japan should be strained. The Americans on their side were not slow to appreciate the significance of the visit of the fleet to Australasia. As soon as the invitations were received, the New-York *Tribune*, one of the most conservative organs of public opinion in America, commented as follows:—

"There are, however, two other motives, not unworthy nor unnatural, which we must suppose to be potent in the case. One is suggested by the remembrance that the British Navy has so reduced its strength in the Pacific as no longer to

have its old time predominance there. It would scarcely be unfair to say that it has voluntarily abdicated its supremacy in the Pacific in favor of its Japanese ally. Nor can there be offence in recalling that the Japanese alliance is not regarded with enthusiastic favor in Australia, or in suspecting that the statesmen and people of the Commonwealth, who are so earnestly intent upon making it and keeping it, in their own familiar phrase, a 'white Australia', are especially gratified at the advent in Pacific waters of an American fleet somewhat more powerful than any under the flag of the Rising Sun. That is to be said without the least thought of anything like the probability of a clash between the two chief Pacific Powers. It is simply a recognition of the undisguisable fact that racial feelings are uncommonly strong in Australia, and that the Australians would rather have an Anglo-Saxon fleet, American if not British, dominant in Pacific waters, than any other."

These citations show that already ten years ago, public opinion in America and the Pacific Islands was being stirred by the question whether England had adopted the right course in weakening herself in the East in order that she might strengthen herself in the West for her coming struggle with Germany. Whether or not England chose the right course can only be decided in the present war, for, if she succeeds in her purpose of destroying Germany, she will then be entirely free to turn her attention to Japan. If, on the other hand, Germany comes out of the struggle, still possessed of her strong army and navy and her territorial integrity untouched, Japan may rest in security. But that the continuance of Japan as a Great Power depends on the conflict being won by her present enemies, is, paradoxical as it may sound, a fact that is almost beyond question.

Japan is already in a strong position in the Pacific. The naval forces of no other Power are a match for her there.

In the Eastern Hemisphere she alone of all the nations possesses, not a squadron, but a navy, a navy moreover that can boast a fighting line of fifteen battleships, eight battle cruisers, nine first-class and twelve second-class cruisers, including no less than four ships of super- *Dreadnought* armament. This is the mighty power that will oppose itself to the restoration of British, or, perhaps, (in view of the possibilities of the Anglo-Saxon alliance) of British-American prestige and influence in the Pacific, unless the issue is decided by a resort to force, and the annihilation of the Japanese fleet by the combined navies of England and America. Other important issues that will expedite the day of reckoning are the question of the Open Door in China, and the Immigration problem as it affects the British Colonies and the Pacific slope of the United States.

The most important of these issues—that of the Open Door in China has already reached a critical stage in the midst of this war. The Open Door has been converted into a Closed Door, save under conditions that Japan alone has the right to impose. China's sovereign rights, her territorial integrity, the principle of equal opportunity in China for all nations, have all been trampled in the dust. British and American commercial, financial and industrial interests have fallen prey to Japan's new position of superiority in China. The Japanese Navy, in the role of protector of British interests, has seized the German islands in the Pacific, and is converting them into Japanese naval bases. Japan has swallowed up the Shantung Peninsula and seized a part of the railroad to Peking, strategically the most important railroad in China. Her possession likewise of the Liaotung Peninsula opposite Shantung completes her control of the Pechili Gulf and its approaches, and places Peking and its environs entirely within her grasp. One glance at the map will show how complete is the chain of fetters that Japan has forged about China. Far to the south, and opposite the rich

province of Fukien lies the island of Formosa, long and narrow, with an extreme length of nearly three hundred miles. Running northeast from Formosa, a chain of small Japanese islands, the Luchu Islands, attach Formosa to Japan proper by links that strategically are mere stepping stones from one to the other. The circle is completed by Japan's possession of Korea, and she is now engaged in forging new links by establishing herself in Russia's Maritime Province, and extending her spheres of influence to upper Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. By these means, Japan has managed to surround China by a connected series of outposts, so linked up to one another as to strategically command the approaches to every important sea-port in China. Furthermore, taking advantage of the preoccupation of the Powers with the European war, Japan has developed her mercantile marine to the point where her great steamship lines have crowded out all competitors, and even the United States, sees herself reduced to the necessity of employing Japanese steamship lines in her carrying trade with her Pacific possessions.

Keeping these considerations in mind, the presence of the United States on the European continent in a war against Germany, is explained. The Anglo-Saxon alliance, in other words, has determined to bring about the destruction of Germany. When that has been accomplished, there will no longer be any balance of power in the world. The Anglo-Saxon combination will have but one great competitor who still keeps the field—Japan, and Japan's claws can be cut by annihilating her fleet—an easy job for the British and American navies combined.

In the presentation of the facts in this book, the writer is guilty of the betrayal of no secrets. They are facts that are well understood in Japan and are being weighed by her statesmen and diplomatists who have no superiors anywhere in the world for cleverness and astuteness. Japan is well aware

that she can only save herself by preserving the balance of power through a strong Germany and a strong Russia, and her entry into the Russian Maritime Province is not inconsistent with this aim, as has been pointed out elsewhere. Japan knows how to veil her purposes. Her future existence is at stake and she knows it. She is setting about to save herself in her own way, pursuing her aims silently, persistently, relentlessly, and however dark her methods may be at times, it is impossible to withhold our admiration for a nation that always knows what it wants, and gets it.

NOTE.

Extract from "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," a work written by Stanley K. Hornbeck, Assistant Professor of Political Science in the University of Wisconsin, U. S. A. Published in 1916 (D. Appleton & Co.)

"When Japan ousted the Germans, every one had a right to suppose, inasmuch as Count Okuma had already declared that Japan had no thought of taking from any third country anything which it already possessed, that Japan would at most expect to succeed to rights and privileges in Shantung not greater than those which the Germans had possessed. There had also been the intimation that Japan contemplated the restoration of Kiaochow to China. At any rate, from the legal point of view she had no right to anything more than the substitution of "Japan" and "Japanese" for "Germany" and "Germans" in the treaties and agreements. The German officials of the Chinese Customs staff at Tsingtao having of course been removed from their posts, the Chinese government, through the Inspector General of the Chinese Customs, nominated the Commissioner then at Mukden 'a British subject,' for the commissionership at Tsingtao. The Japanese objected. China then proposed a Japanese who was at the time Commissioner at Soochow, with a British subject as Deputy Commissioner. Again Japan objected. China then proposed to have a Japanese Commissioner, with a staff half Japanese and half British, and nominated a Japanese, then Commissioner at Darien. Still Japan

objected. The Japanese contended that the only satisfactory solution would be for the Japanese government to appoint a Japanese commissioner and a full Japanese staff. To understand the significance of this it must be remembered that the Chinese customs revenue is hypothecated to the service of the Boxer indemnity—which is a debt to the powers; that Kiaochow, though in German occupation, has been Chinese territory; that the customs revenue from there went—after deducting twenty per cent. for local purposes—into the Chinese treasury; that the Chinese Customs service is internationally recruited; and that positions in the customs service have been held by a regular process of entrance and promotion.

"Hence the Japanese demands meant either the establishing of a separate Japanese Customs régime on Chinese soil, with the subtraction of the Tsingtao revenues from the Chinese revenues—thus involving an invasion of Chinese sovereignty and a detriment of the financial rights of the powers; or an infraction, in favor of Japanese subjects, of the rules and systems of the Chinese Customs service, placing Japanese by appointment, and without the authority of the Inspector-General, over the heads of other foreigners who, being already in the service, had precedent rights to promotion.

"The Inspector-General, a subject of Japan's ally, of course resisted these Japanese pretensions. Finally the Japanese proposed that all the posts in the staff at Tsingtao should be filled by Japanese already in the Chinese Customs service and the places vacated by the latter be filled by newly appointed Japanese. The Inspector-General took the position that this course could be followed only in part; that any Japanese who came newly into the Chinese Customs service must enter the lowest ranks, as do all other foreigners, and gain promotion according to the rules of the service.

"For several months the settlement of this question was deferred while the negotiations over the twenty-one demands of January, 1915, were in progress. In July it was taken up again, and finally on August 5, 1915, an agreement was signed between the Inspector-General and the Japanese Minister. The new situation and various considerations had in the interval effected a modification in Japan's attitude . . .

"A brief account of Germany's holdings in Shantung and of what she had made of her opportunity will serve both as an inventory of what Japan has acquired there and as a commentary upon the justification which the Japanese offer for the eviction of the Germans.

"The territory leased to Germany in March, 1898, including the Bay of Kiaochow and its immediate environment, some 400 square miles in all, to be held and administered by Germany for 99 years. In the immediate hinterland a neutral zone involving some 2,500 square miles was established. Germany was given the right to build two lines of railway in the province and to open mines along the lines; also a guaranty that German capital, assistance, and materials should be sought first in case the Chinese chose to develop the province with foreign aid.

"Within a few months the German government declared the Leased Territory a free port, open on equal terms to the trade of all nations; and a few months later, by agreement, a station of the Chinese Maritime Customs was opened at Tsingtao (the port) to collect duties on goods passing to or from the hinterland.

"Intent upon making Tsingtao both a commercial and a naval base, the lessees set about the equipping of a first-class harbor. The bay offered magnificent anchorage, and Tsingtao was a natural port. Before long a substantial breakwater, granite docks—with complete equipment—and a floating dock capable of handling vessels of 16,000 tons displacement had been installed. At Tsingtao there soon appeared a modern German city, carefully planned, artistically and substantially built. Forts, shops, military departments, and well equipped barracks gave the character of a fortified base; but Kioschow was never given the military equipment of a Port Arthur or a Vladivostock—as the comparative ease with which it was recently taken shows.

"German-Chinese companies were organized and authorized by the German government to build the railway lines and to prospect for minerals and petroleum; and the first line of railway was built to Tsinanfu, the capital, reaching that city, two hundred and fifty-six miles inland, in 1904. An agreement was made with British interests concerned, whereby the Germans were to construct for the Chinese government that portion of the great north and south Tien-tsin-Pukow

Line which would cross Shantung. Though constructed by British and German firms, the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway is a Chinese government line, not British or German property.

"At first the Germans appeared bent upon asserting themselves politically in Shantung. Practically everything in connection with the railway was kept in German hands. German guards were installed for the "protection" of the railway. A German post-office was established. Germany seemed to be following a policy similar to that which Russia had pursued in Manchuria. But at the end of 1905 they began to withdraw their troops; they handed over their post-offices to the Chinese; they made an agreement whereby the Chinese Customs administration was to function at Tsingtao much as elsewhere in China—with special provision that twenty per cent. of the duties collected be contributed toward the expenses of the local Tsingtao administration; and they began to employ Chinese in various capacities.

"The Chinese government voluntarily opened areas at Tsinanfu, Weihsien and Choutsun as commercial posts. At Tsinanfu they laid out and built roads, drains, etc.—and undertook policing. Other public works were instrusted to and have been looked after by a combined Chinese and foreign commission. Before long the Tsinanfu settlement had become an important and attractive commercial and residential center wherein the Chinese and foreigners, the latter mostly German business men, have gotten on most agreeably and to mutual profit.

"At Tsingtao and in its environs more than 60,000 meters of excellent roads were built. Systematic afforestation was undertaken both there and in the hinterland, schools of all sorts were established, including a German High School with well equipped laboratories and library, and several faculties. For the support of the last mentioned, the German and the Chinese governments agreed to contribute together and equally, while China was given a share in the administration, this being the first instance in which there has been such a combination for the support and administration of an educational institution in China.

"The population was, in 1913: at Tsingtao 60,500; and in the Leased Territory 192,000; in the Zone 1,200,000. Of these only 4,470 were Europeans, 3,806 being Germans—this figure including both civilians and soldiers.

"It was declared in Berlin in 1903 that the government had already spent 50,000,000 marks on the new colony; and the expenditure seems to have averaged in the neighborhood of 14,000,000 marks per year ever since, an increasing proportion—but never more than half—of this being paid from the local revenues.

"Although the railway proved a reasonably paying investment, the Mining Company did not. In 1912 the latter was turning out 600,000 tons of coal and had in its employ 60 Germans and 7,000 Chinese, but it had never paid a dividend. Its interests were bought by the Railway Company, and in 1914 it was decided to build an iron and steel works near Tsingtao.

"In December, 1913, the Germans signed an agreement with the Chinese for the building of two new German-Chinese lines, one entirely and the other partly in Shantung, the latter to extend west beyond the borders of the province to join the Peking-Hankow line. Both were to be financed by German capital but to be Chinese owned. In having previously given up railway building rights which they possessed under the agreement of 1898, and in the terms they now made China, the Germans gave evidence of having relinquished the last vestiges of an actively aggressive political policy, in favor of commercial cooperation.

"Since the original seizure of Kiaochow the Germans had made no additional attempt to extend their territorial holdings or special privileges in China. They had not undertaken to extend their *administration* over Shantung—or even over the Railway Zone. The Shantung Railway Company had never attempted to assume a political status and perform political functions. The German government had not sought to stretch the terms of the Convention of 1898. There had been no creating of issues and demanding of immediate settlement such as has characterized the progress of the Japanese in Manchuria. German subjects had not exceeded their plainly stipulated rights; they had not invaded the interior; they had not become engaged in personal and police conflicts with the Chinese.

"There was in the later years of German presence in Shantung little of which from the point of view of the open door policy, complaint could be made. For ten years past the Germans had done

practically nothing calculated to complicate the politics of the Far East, and, except commercially. they disturbed no peace in the Far East but the peace of mind of Japanese expansionists. Judged upon the basis of substantial accomplishment, successful and just administration, and real contribution to the economic and social welfare of the people who fell within the range of their influence, none of the powers holding bases on the China coast can offer better justification for its presence than could the Germans.

"If it was necessary for Japan to drive the Germans out in order to "restore the peace of the Far East," to aid China, and to remove a menace to her own security, it follows in logic that she will have to drive out the English, the French, and the Russian—for the same ends and in due course. If she proceeds with such a program, what sort of a countenance will the "Peace of the Far East" present during the process? Should she succeed, it is to be presumed that she would, as she has already done with Russian and German holdings, constitute herself legal successor to the tenants whom she evicts. Thus established and entrenched, she would be in a position without question to dominate China, and, dominating China, to control the whole Far East. Then at least we should have peace! There are those who think that a *Pax Japonica* extending over East Asia and the Western Pacific would be a real peace. But would it? Established only by and at the cost of a succession of wars with individual Western powers, such a peace would probably be but the prelude to a greater war of the East against the West.

"Japan's success in the Russo-Japanese War did not insure the peace of the Far East; now ten years later Japan has attacked and defeated the Germans in order to insure that peace. But no sooner has she defeated the Germans than she finds it necessary to fall upon the Chinese, likewise to "insure peace." The process is cumulative. The peace of the Far East will, it would appear, only be assured when there is no one left to disturb Japan's peace of mind; that is, when all of Japan's rivals for commercial and political influence have been eliminated. And then, when the peace of the Far East has been established to Japan's satisfaction—what about the peace of the world?

VIII.

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER EIGHT.

The Position of the United States.

The following chapter is quoted verbatim from Professor Roland Usher's work on Pan-Germanism, first published in 1913 and reprinted in several editions in 1914 after the opening of the European war. Professor Usher is Associate Professor of History in Washington University, St. Louis, and like his friend and former associate, Professor John Bassett Moore, of Columbia University, New York, has often been consulted by the State Department in Washington upon matters involving foreign relations. It is not saying too much if we assert that few men in America possess as perfect a knowledge of international questons affecting the United States, as these two men. Professor Usher, it is true, has thus far acted only in an advisory capacity, whereas Professor Moore was Counselor of the State Department during the Spanish American war in 1898 and is credited with a large share of the work in the negotiations between the United States and Spain determining the peace conditions; he was later representative of the United to the Peace Tribunal at the Hague, and in 1914-15 was Assistant Secretary of State during Bryan's Secretaryship. These facts are mentioned as they throw light on the value of Professor Usher's utterances, who like Professor Moore has had excellent opportunity to inform himself from authoritative sources with respect to the position of the United States in relation to her foreign affairs, and has profited by the know-

ledge and advice of his friend in the writing of his work on Pan-Germanism, an extract from which in the succeeding pages, throws considerable light on the position of the United States viewed from an international standpoint.

Once the magnitude of Pan-Germanism dawned on the English and French diplomats, once they became aware of the lengths to which Germany was willing to go, they realized the necessity of strengthening their position, and therefore made overtures to the United States, which resulted, probably before the summer of the year 1897, in an understanding between the three countries. There seems to be no doubt whatever that no papers of any sort were signed, and that no pledges were given which circumstances would not justify any one of the contracting parties in denying or possibly repudiating. Nevertheless, an understanding was reached that in case of a war begun by Germany or Austria for the purpose of executing Pan-Germanism, the United States would promptly declare in favour of England and France and would do her utmost to assist them. The mere fact that no open acknowledgment of this agreement was then made need not lessen its importance and significance. The alliance, for it was nothing less, was based upon infinitely firmer ground than written words and sheets of parchment, than the promises of individuals at that moment in office in any one of the three countries; it found its efficient cause as well as the efficient reason for its continuance in the situation, geographical, economic, and political, of the contracting nations which made such an agreement mutually advantageous to them all. So long as this situation remains unchanged, there is little likelihood that the agreement will be altered, and there is no possibility whatever of its entire rejection by one of the three parties, least of all by the United States.

The United States occupies a strategic position defensively strong, but offensively weak. She is beyond question invulnerable to the assaults of foreign fleets and armies. To be sure, her seacoast is vast in extent and for the most part unprotected. It has been truly pointed out that the Japanese might successfully land an army upon the Pacific Coast, or the Germans land an army in New York or Boston practically without opposition. *Sed cui bono?* The strategical and geographical conditions of the country on either coast are such that a foreign army would occupy the ground it stood on and no more. The British discovered in the revolutionary War that the occupation of New-York, Boston, and Philadelphia put them no nearer the military possession of the continent than they were before, and that marching through provinces was not subduing them. However seriously the capture of New York might cripple our commercial and railway interests, the difficulty, even at its worst, could be easely overcome by shifting the centre of business for the time being to Chicago, and the possession of New York would certainly not permit a foreign army to conquer the country, even if it were possible for any nation to maintain an army so far from its real base of supplies in Europe. The possibility of invasion is made of no consequence by the simple fact that no foreign nation possesses any inducement for attempting so eminently hazardous an enterprise. The United States possesses literally nothing which any foreign nation wants that force would be necessary to obtain, while, by making war upon the United States, she would certainly expose herself to annihilation at the hands of her enemies in Europe, who have patiently waited for decades in the hope that some one of them would commit so capital a blunder. But this very invulnerability of the United States prevents her from becoming a dominant or even an important factor in European politics. If European nations cannot menace her

with armed reprisal or with wars for conquest, she is equally incapable of menacing them. The fact, which has been from her own standpoint heretofore an unmixed blessing, which has allowed her people to beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks, becomes her greatest weakness, once she is filled with an ambition to play a part in the affairs of the world.

Unpalatable as the fact may be, the international situation, the close balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente rather than the position of the United States has made her a factor in international politics. Indeed, if we would be truly accurate, we must admit that the inter-relation of the various parts of the European situation, more even than its delicate balance, makes the United States a factor; for the complexity of the problems of no one group of states, whether in Europe, in the Middle East, or in the Far East, could possibly allow the United States to play a prominent part. In each, the natural antipathies counteract each other. Only the fact that every nation is anxious to maintain or win power or wealth in Europe and Africa and Asia makes the United States of any value to any of them. Indeed, it is only as European questions become themselves factors in the larger problems of India, Morocco, and the Mediterranean that they can concern the United States at all. As soon as European politics became world politics and Asiatic and African problems became European, the United States began to be a factor in their solution. She has, to be sure, no vital stake in any one of these fields. She cannot, even if she would, risk in war the same stake European nations do, her indepedence; the Atlantic on the one side, the Pacific on the other, defend her more completely than could fleets and coalitions. Nothing short of the creation of world politics by other nations could make the position of the United States of consequence at all.

The most vital fact, however, about the European situation is that no nation possesses the same natural allies in all parts of the world. England and France are one in opposing the extension of German authority in Europe; but nothing short of their extreme danger in the Mediterranean at the time of the Crimean War and the perils to which they have been exposed in Europe since the Franco-Prussian War has buried the enmity resulting from deadly strife in America and, especially, in India. Russia is the firm ally of both England and France in Europe; she is their deadliest foe in the Black Sea, in Persia, India, and China; yet, to oppose Germany, we see Russia and England amicably enough uniting in the Near East. Germany must secure French and English aid to defend herself permanently against Russia on the east, but finds her natural allies against Russia her greatest competitors in trade, and the most determined opponents to her expansion on the west. Nevertheless, at the very moment that we find Germany and England ready to spring at each other's throats in Europe, we see them guarding the railway to Pekin together and acting in concert about the Chinese loans.

The variety of the interests of these nations makes it impossible for them permanently or entirely to trust or distrust each other. England, who needs Russia's aid in Europe in the Near East, cannot act too determinedly in opposition to Russian advance in Afghanistan and Manchuria. Germany, whose quarrels with Hapsburg and the Pope fill the history of the Middle Ages, must have their assistance to protect herself in Europe. In all this the United States has unquestionably no part. Not her strategic position, not her military strength but her economic position makes her an ally particularly indispensable to England and France. Not their economic position but her desire for colonies, her ambition to play a part in the politics of the world, makes an alliance with England and

France indispensable to the United States. But she can enter world politics only with the consent of European nations.

The economic position of the United States in the modern world is commanding. Her area is so vast and its productivity so great, her natural resources so nearly unlimited and so great in variety, that scarcely a country in the world, one had almost said no continent in the world, can hope to rival her. While her population is not yet numerous enough to make her dangerous, it is none the less amply sufficient to render her in potential military strength one of the greatest of civilized countries. She possesses, in fact, precisely what England and France lack—almost inexhaustible natural resources; arable land almost without limit; food sufficient to feed all Europe; great deposits of gold, copper, iron, silver, coal; great supplies of cotton sufficient for the Lancashire cotton mills; in short, she possesses the very resources needed to make the economic position of England and France fairly impregnable. Allied with her they could not be starved into submission nor bankrupted by the lack of materials to keep their looms running. In addition, she possesses the second greatest steel manufactory in the world, which owns the patents and secret processes upon which Bessemer steel depends, a product surpassed for war materials only by the Krupp steel. The width of the Atlantic effectively prevents any interference by European Powers with the continuance in time of war of her agricultural and industrial activities. Whatever happens in Europe, she can continue to produce the raw materials and finished products they need, and, what is more important, she will furnish them in time of war a huge market for the sale of such manufactured goods as they can continue to make.

The United States, furthermore, is the third financial power in the world. Nor only is her wealth vast, not only is her surplus capital considerable, but the organization of business

has, most fortunately from the point of view of international politics, concentrated the control of the available capital for investment in the hands of comparatively few men. The trusts, the banks, and the insurance companies have made available for investment huge sums, only less in size than those controlled in London and Paris. It is highly essential that Germany should not be allowed to establish relations with any such capital. It would provide her with precisely that financial backing which she needs. At all costs the United States and Germany must be kept apart. England, too, is anxious to turn this capital into her own colonies, and is willing and anxious to invest her capital in the United States, for both would gain from this mutual dependence, and each would furnish the other fields for investment on whose reliability they could both depend. The English are naturally anxious to shift their investments from Germany to some country where they will not be exposed to destruction by war or to confiscation based upon war as an excuse.

Fortunately for England and France, the United States, whose economic assistance is positively imperative for them, finds their assistance equally imperative. In the first place, the United States depends upon the English merchant marine to carry her huge volume of exports, and, should she not be able to use it, would suffer seriously, even if the inability to export continued only a few weeks. Again, a market as certain and as large as that of England and France for her raw materials and food is absolutely essential to her, and the outbreak of a war, which might close those markets to her, would precipitate unquestionably a financial crisis, whose results could not fail to equal in destructiveness the effect upon private individuals of a great war. The United States has come to realize, as have other nations, that there are many ways in which a modern country can be forced to suffer which are

as deadly and, in many cases, more deadly than invasion. Furthermore, she needs a market in England and France for her own manufactured goods, and has grown to depend upon receiving from them in return many varieties of manufactured goods. She simply cannot afford to take any chances of losing her markets in those two countries, nor has she ceased to hope for privileges of some sort in the English and French dependencies, which other nations do not have, and which, should worst come to worst, she could undoubtedly obtain from them as the price of her continued assistance. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the prosperity of the United States so much depends upon the preservation of her relations with England and France that in time of war only an alliance with them would save her from almost certain bankruptcy.

England and France, however, expect to retain the alliance by permitting her to fulfil her ambitions for control of the Gulf of Mexico. Ever since the days when Louisiana was first purchased, the men of the Mississippi Valley have dreamed of the extension of the sway of the United States over Central America and the Gulf. Aaron Burr's expedition aimed probably at the creation of an empire out of the Mississippi Valley and Mexico. The Mexican War was certainly fought in the expectation that valuable territory in the Gulf might be acquired into which slaves might profitably be carried. When the war failed, a filibustering expedition led by Walker, with connivance of the authorities at Washington was intended to secure for the United States possession of one or more of the Central American countries. There was also the scheme, in whose existence the North believed previous to the war, for the conquest of the whole Gulf of Mexico and the creation there of a slaveocracy whose wealth and independence could easily be assured by the production of cotton, sugar, and tobacco. All these schemes met a determined resistance and

interference from England and France which invariably proved decisive. Nor could the United States hope to take possession of lands separated from her coast by water, with which she could communicate only by sea, so long as the English fleet controlled the seas and she herself possessed no fleet at all. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was intended to prevent the acquisition of influence in Central America by the United States without England's consent, and mention was specifically made of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. The interference of Germany in Venezuela, the evident fact that the concentration of the English fleet in the Channel would make it impossible to keep a sizable fleet in the Gulf of Mexico, the absolute necessity from many points of view of preventing the acquisition by Germany of land in South or Central America, removed the objections England and France had hitherto possessed to the extension of the influence of the United States in the Western hemisphere. There was, furthermore, a likelihood that Germany would in some way attempt the annexation of the oldest of European colonial empires, held at this time by one of the weakest and most decadent of European states. The Spanish colonies in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Philippine Islands possessed not only commercial but strategic importance. The wealth of Cuba and Porto Rico was proverbial, the products of the Philippines considerable, and, though not altogether suitable for colonization, they would afford Germany undeniable opportunity for expansion. Moreover, Cuba in the hands of Germany would rob Jamaica of all naval importance and might actually permit Germany to overrun the whole Gulf. The Philippines as a matter of fact controlled one whole side of the China Sea and contained valuable seaports, where a naval base could be established, safe from assault by the Chinese or European nations. The islands were thus ideally fitted to become Germany's base of

operations in the Far East. To allow such places fo fall into her hands might entail consequences whose far-reaching effect no statesman could possibly imagine. Nor was there the slightest guarantee that by an unprovoked assault Germany would not attempt to take possession. At the same time the general European situation and the position of Spain in the Mediterranean made it impossible for England or France to undertake a war with her, without setting fire to a train of circumstances whose eventual results might be even more fatal than those they were attempting to prevent. The colonial aspirations of the United States her anxiety to share in the opening of China to European enterprise, her traditional hope of securing control of Cuba, all pointed to her as the natural guardian of the interests of the coalition in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Far East. Whether or not it is true, as some assert,—a view to which certain events lend probability,—that the Spanish-American War was created in order to permit the United States to take possession of Spain's colonial dominion, certainly such was the result of that war, To be sure, the relations between Spain and United States were already strained; popular sentiment was aroused by the conditions in Cuba, and, if the war was "created", it was not a difficult task. Certainly, Germany and her Allies suspected that such was the purpose of the war, and attempted to secure a general agreement in Europe to interfere in Spain's favour.

England, however, whether because she saw its advantage now the war was in existence, or because she had caused it to be begun, decisively vetoed the suggestion of interference, and her control of the sea made action without her co-operaton impossible. The results of the war were all that could have been hoped for. The Triple Entente saw the Gulf of Mexico fall into friendly hands and the establishment in the Far East of a friendly power in the strategic point of greatest conse-

quence. From Germany's point of view, the results of the alliance between England, France, and the United States were exceedingly discouraging, and the aftermath of the war proved even more decisive than the war itself. The United States promptly undertook the peaceful penetration of Mexico and Central America. Large loans were made to the governments and secured by a lien on the revenues; American capital rushed thither, and the number of enterprises financed or owned by Americans increased so rapidly that at the present day the United States, or its citizens, owns practically everything of importance in the Gulf, and is waiting only for a favourable opportunity to foreclose its mortgages. The possibility of German interference has been reduced to nothing. The United States also proceeded, not improbably by agreement, to create a fleet large enough to maintain control of the Gulf of Mexico, and, what was of more consequence, to maintain control of the Atlantic highway between Europe and America in case of European war. The English had come to realize the improbability that enough of their fleet could be spared to patrol the seas in the event of a attack upon their forces in the Channel or in the Mediterranean. Above all, the United States undertook to create in the Philippines a naval base of sufficient size and importance to permit the maintenance there of a fleet large enough to be a factor in the Pacific. England and France obviously could not spare enough ships to maintain a fleet in the Far East; Japan would not tolerate the presence of a Russian fleet in those waters; the United States was the only member of the coalition who could, consistent with her own safety or that of other nations, undertake the creation and maintenance of such a fleet in the Far East. She became, in fact, the offensive arm of the coalition in the Pacific, and promptly strengthened her position by annexing the islands between her shores and Asia available for settlement or coaling-

stations. She must not only prepare the way for the further extension of the coalition's power in the Far East, but she must prevent the acquisition by Germany of colonies, whose location or development would interfere with the control of Eastern commerce by herself and her Allies.

One more thing the United States undertook, which England and France had hitherto denied her permission to do, the digging of the Panama Canal. The canal would furnish the United States with a new waterway to the East, shorter than the route she had hitherto been forced to employ via Suez, and with a route which would literally put New York in actual number of miles nearer China, Australia, and New Zealand than was London. Thus to admit the United States to the trade of the Far East by a waterway exclusively in its control, England had not hitherto considered expedient. The creation of Pan-Germanism, the fear of an attack on the English route through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, the possibility of the closing of that route temporarily or permanently by some naval disaster, reconciled England to the creation of the Panama Canal, because she saw in that waterway a new military road which she could use to her own possessions in the Far East, and which the Atlantic Ocean would effectually keep out of the hands of Germany. To be sure, it would not be as short a road to India as that through the Mediterranean and Suez; but so far as Australia and New Zealand were concerned it would not be longer; and all such objections inevitably were reduced to insignificance by its incomparable safety, so long as the English fleet could hold the seas at all. So long as the United States and England combined could maintain control of the Gulf of Mexico and of the islands in the Pacific, so long would this waterway be absolutely safe. If, then, Germany should succeed in executing the whole of her stupendous plan, England and her allies might still be able by

means of the Panama Canal to contest with her the possession of the trade of the East. Especially would this be true if the United States should be able to maintain herself in the Philippines. Nor have the English lost sight of the incomparable importance of the Philippines for keeping Germany out of the Celebes. If Germany should move upon Holland, the coalition expects to take possession of the Celebes without further ceremony, and will then hold a position controlling the trade routes leading from India to China and Japan and to Europe in general, which would be as nearly impregnable as anything of the kind ever yet known in the world. The issues, therefore, with which the United States is actively concerned are vast; the importance of her adhesion to the side of England and France cannot be overestimated, and her possible part in the movements of the next two decades is certainly one which ought to satisfy the most ambitious. She holds in the East already a position second only to that of England, and should the European nations succeed in their plans of final interference in China, the United States, as the offensive arm of the coalition, might be called upon for prompt action of the most aggressive sort. At the same time, after all has been said it must be admitted that the United States is as yet only a potential factor in the international situation. Unless further aggression should be attempted in the Orient, or it should become necessary or expedient to change the nominal control over Mexico and Central America to actual possession, the United States will take no important share in hostilities, but will confine her efforts to the exceedingly important work, both to her allies and to herself, of keeping open the Atlantic highway and of protecting the merchant marine of England. Nor need one underestimate the importance of this task, for, should she fail to do her share, destruction might result for all concerned.

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

The author's purpose in reproducing Professor Usher's declaration of the international position of the United States, written in 1913, is to show that already, before the outbreak of the war, one of America's leading publicists and a recognized interpreter of her foreign policies, was able to disclose to the American people for the first time, not only the fact of the existence of an alliance between the United States, England and France, but likewise the reasons which, from the American standpoint, made such an alliance necessary. Prof. Usher, with an acute understanding of the psychology of the American people, places the subject before his readers in such a manner as to suggest the practical benefits that will accrue to the country from the alliance in question. The absolute dependence of England and France on the economic and financial support of the United States, in the event of a European war, Prof. Usher offsets by reference to the dependence of the United States on England and France to furnish markets for her goods and ships to carry them. There remain America's ambitions as a Colonial Power, her aspirations to play a part in world politics, her purpose to secure for herself the unchallenged hegemony of the Western Hemisphere, free from any European or Asiatic interference with respect to the extension of her special sphere of influence over the Caribbean area, Mexico and Central America—all these are touched upon by Prof. Usher and indicated as constituting a sufficient pretext for the participation of America on the side of England and France in the future war with Germany which Prof. Usher foreshadows in 1913 with such prophetic insight. Moreover, in order to reassure the people of the United States with respect to any possible financial distresses arising out of America's new partnership obligations, he suggests that a sort

of international, interlocking banking directorship had already (1913) been called into being, between the financial magnates of England and America, whereby in exchange for British capital withdrawn from Germany and invested in America, American capital—nearly all of it agglomerated in the hands of a few banks, trust and insurance companies—is to be employed in the British Colonies. Germany is to be boycotted by both countries to their own mutual advantage. Result? The laming of a formidable trade competitor and the enrichment of Anglo-American enterprise at German expense. Prof. Usher is careful to point out (and his words published in 1913 would seem to anticipate an attack on Germany so overwhelming that she would be unable to resist the invasion of her territory) that England would regard capital invested in Germany as "exposed to destruction by war or to confiscation based upon war as an excuse."

To those short-sighted persons who have asserted that the United States went to war to save herself from the financial losses that might ensue as a result of the defeat of the Allies, or that she held back, for nearly three years, from declaring war and was finally forced into it by the intensified submarine campaign, it must be clear that, aside from the folly of embarking on a course that would entail the expenditure of a possible 20 or 30 billions of dollars to save a possible loss of 2 or 3 billions, and, aside from the consideration of the sufficiency of the submarine occurrences as a pretext for war, the United States had such compelling reasons for taking sides with England and France that, already one year before the war began, it was deemed necessary by the real rulers of America to prepare the American public to digest the fact when it came, and to be reconciled to America's participation in view of the great practical benefits that would accrue therefrom to the American nation.

Studying Professor Usher's exposition a little more closely, we are unable to forego the opinion that he knows a great deal more about the existence and actual details of the alliance or 'gentleman's agreement' between England, France and the United States than he feels himself privileged to reveal in expressed terms, but he furnishes us with sufficient clues so that we are justified in establishing the terms of the alliance, in its general outlines, about as follows:—

America's Obligations to England and France.

As a member of the alliance, America's share in the conflict, under the provisions of the alleged treaty, are:

1. To supply her allies from her great stores of natural resources with gold, silver, iron, coal, cotton, steel and agricultural products. In a word, to furnish her allies with raw materials and finished products they need.

2. To furnish her allies, in time of war, a huge market for the sale of such manufactured goods as they can continue to make.

3. To prevent Germany from securing financial backing in the United States.

4. To lend financial support to her allies.

5. To guard the interests of the coalition in the Gulf of Mexico and the Far East.

6. To maintain control of the Atlantic highway between Europe and America during the war.

7. To create in the Philippines a naval base of sufficient size and importance to permit the maintenance there of a fleet large enough to be a factor in the Pacific.

8. To prepare the way for the further extension of the coalition's power and influence in the Far East.

9. To prevent the acquisition by Germany of colonies whose location would interfere with the control of Eastern commerce by America and her allies.

10. To prevent the acquisition by Germany of land in South or Central America.

From the foregoing analysis of Prof. Usher's exposition, it is clear enough what aid America had agreed to furnish her allies in case of a European war. It is important now to consider what *quid pro quo*, America stipulated to receive in return. According to Prof. Usher's rendering of the terms of the treaty, it was to be as follows:—

AMERICA'S REWARDS AS A MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE.

1. England to shift her financial investments from Germany to the United States.

2. United States capital to be given special trade privileges, and special favouritism for investments in the English and French dependencies.

3. The guaranty of retaining the markets of England and France for her raw materials and agricultural products.

4. The United States to control the Gulf of Mexico.

5. The United States to have a free hand in Central America and Mexico.

6. The United States to control Cuba, Porto Rico, Hayti, and the Philippines.

7. The United States to share in the opening of China.

8. The annexation of the island of Guam, the Hawaiian Islands, and the island of Tutuila, to be used as coaling stations in the Pacific.

9. Permission to dig and control the Panama Canal.

It will be noted that in the foregoing outline of the treaty provisions, no mention is as yet made of a participation of the United States in actual hostilities. Prof. Usher points out at the outset that the United States, by reason of its isolated position, separated as it is from the European and Asiatic continents by immense intervening spaces of water, is invulnerable to attack from abroad, and is equally incapable of menacing Europe. The fact that subsequent events have disproven this latter supposition of Prof. Usher's does not detract from the force of his logic or his reasoning, for he himself provides us with the key when he indicates at the close of the chapter, that despite America's isolated position, she might be compelled to take a hand in the conflict if "further aggression should be attempted in the Orient, or it should become necessary or expedient to change the nominal control over Mexico and Central America to actual possession."

We know that at least one of these contingencies, namely, the aggressive designs of Japan in China, has come to pass. The other contingency, namely, the necessity or expediency of exchanging nominal

for actual control of Mexico and Central America has no doubt been an equally forceful factor, but it is a factor that still remains an invisible one, the consummation of which will await the close of present hostilities.

The author feels sure that he need say no more in the direction of pointing out the importance of Prof. Usher's far-reaching utterances. He has apparently been the chosen spokesman of America's guiding spirits to initiate the American people into the new responsibilities they are to assume as a world power. A pretext for the assumption of these new responsibilities was necessary to be found, and it was found in Pan-Germanism. Here is a treaty that Prof. Usher alleges to have been entered into as long ago as 1897, in which every phase of activity and participation in future events by England, France and the United States is provided for, including the conquest of the Spanish dependencies, control over Mexico and Central America, the opening of China, and the annexation of coaling stations. And all these measures Prof. Usher wishes us to believe were taken to defend the world against Pan-Germanism. It is unnecessary to remind Prof. Usher or any body else for that matter, that Pan-Germanism, if we go so far as to assume that such a thing actually exists, had certainly never been heard of in 1897, at which time Germany had not yet adopted her programme for naval construction on a large scale, the same having been bruited for the first time in 1898. If, therefore, it is true that England, France and the United States harboured the mutual designs imputed to them by Prof. Usher, and entered into an alliance to accomplish them, it will scarcely do to attribute the conception of the idea and the stimulus to its consummation to so feeble a pretext as as the rise of a Pan-Germanism.

IX.

THE UNITED *STATES* AND THE MONROE *DOCTRINE.*

CHAPTER NINE.

The United States and the Monroe Doctrine.

It would be impossible to confer a perfect understanding of the position of the United States in the world war and towards other nations without giving an account of the attitude assumed by the Government and people of the United States toward the Monroe Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine is an announcement to the world, a promise to Latin America that the United States will resist any European or Asiatic Power which may attempt to invade any part of the Western Hemisphere—Canada included.

This statement of policy is one that can only be defended by force of arms; a willingness to meet the cost and sacrifice of war. How then are we to explain American participation in the European war which, superficially considered at any rate, has apparently no connection with any threat or menace involving the inviolability of the Doctrine? The question has been asked, why does not the United States restrict itself to the ultimate right of self-defence, and treat the Monroe Doctrine as unnecessary and obsolete?

The answer is that the United States does not cherish the Monroe Doctrine for the sake of other countries, but for her own welfare. Giving up the Monroe Doctrine would not relieve the United States from the dangers and hostilities which would result from new European settlements in any position which gave command of United States coasts or of the approaches

to the Panama Canal. Great Britain has possession of many strong strategical points in those waters, but danger to the United States from this source is practically out of the question. Much greater is the likelihood that the Bermudas, the Bahamas. Jamaica, and the Lesser Antilles will eventually be amicably transferred to the United States.

From the very fact of their proximity to the United States and the Panama Canal, the United States must always be strongly interested in the Caribbean area, Central America, and the northern part of South America. Control of the Gulf of Mexico and its approaches is more than a question of simple desirability. The position of the United States in those waters must be unassailable. Complete control is vital, so that even the remote possibility of an alliance between Mexico or Latin-American Powers with European or Asiatic Powers may be guarded against.

No abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine would dispose of the three geographic facts that the United States occupies a central position in the Americas, owns the Panama Canal, and controls three large West Indian islands and at least two Central American States. So long as the United States holds the canal it behooves her to be the master of Central America, and to attain that end, the American Republic has shown that it will not lag behind any European state even to the point of applying force where self-interest or 'manifest destiny' is the chief consideration, and the security of the nation is at stake.

If, therefore our premises are correct, and the United States in view of her responsibilities on the Western Hemisphere, may become involved in hostilities, with or without a Doctrine, we are in a position to judge more reasonably of the motives governing the American state when it jettisoned its traditional policies of non-interference in European affairs and military

unpreparedness and adopted in their place a totally new course of conduct involving militarism on a large scale based on European models, together with an active participation in the determination of problems of world-wide significance both in Europe and in Asia.

Such a thorough-going change in the American attitude could not have been effected in the United States without some advance preparation and education of the public with respect to America's new interests as a world Power and the alteration in her position, by reason of her great growth and development, from one of isolation, to a position *in medias res*, touching on all sides the interests of other states in a multitude of ways. Success in transforming American sentiment was made the more easy by reason of the inherent national love of an ideal or moral principle, and for the American people to be told that the time had come for them to take up the championship of the Monroe Doctrine and the defence of the small nations of America against foreign aggression, was to evoke a high degree of patriotic sentiment throughout the length and breadth of the land.

And aside from the necessity of defending an ideal or moral principle, it was not difficult to convince the American people that it was dangerous to the security of the Republic for a nation so rich in material resources to be lulled into tranquillity by the undisputed enjoyment of peace. Indeed the feeling gained ground rapidly that the United States could no longer afford to regard itself as isolated, and that there was great danger of an impairment of the moral fibre of a nation that continued to exist in fancied security, excluding all conflicts with nations of their own strength and thereby avoiding great political tensions which alone make possible the development of a people's character.

Accompanying the moral appeal to American sentiment

arguments were presented that carried the suggestion to the people of the presence of adversaries who were secretly preparing an attack that should test either the vulnerability of the Monroe Doctrine, or America's ability and readiness to defend herself and her interests in the Americas. In the consideration of the direction from which danger threatened, it was suggested that by the extension of her interests in the West Indies and Central America necessary for protecting the approaches to the canal, and by reason of her possession of the Philippines, the United States had rendered herself vulnerable to attack on two sides, because each of these protected areas must be defended or abandoned in case of war. Accordingly the attack might conceivably be made simultaneously from both sides by a European Power acting in unison, under the terms of an alliance, with an Asiatic Power.

In the light of these considerations the American people were asked to make the following deductions from the facts and from the general conditions of the world:

1. European and Asiatic nations have been drawn more and more into the sphere of American policies by reason of the enormous development of industry and commerce, by the emigration of their people to South America, and by the civil wars and dissensions that have arisen there.

2. The effect of the European war is to encourage the principle of the survival of the fittest, meaning thereby the physically fit. Accordingly if America fails to arm herself, to discipline her youth, and develop their bodies by exercise and training, as is being done with the youth of Europe, America will degenerate into a weak, flabby conglomeration of disunited elements calling themselves a nation but unable from physical weakness to resist the aggressions of even much smaller states. The likelihood of an invasion of America would under such circumstances be greater than ever before.

3. The spirit of adventure encouraged by the European war may at least result in some future aggression undertaken in South or Central America. Should a foreign power get a strong foothold in these regions, such a change in the status of things in the South would be threatening and ultimately dangerous to the United States.

4. The growth of militarism all over the world makes it more than likely that the present war, far from introducing an era of good will and international understandings, will on the contrary lead to future wars, and that, under given conditions, the Monroe Doctrine might be put to the test by some ambitious military power.

5. The United States must in view of the foregoing circumstances either face the responsibility which it assumes and prepare itself to meet it or it must give up the Doctrine.

6. As European or Asiatic settlements in America can be made only by war upon American countries, the United States would inevitably be involved, with or without a Doctrine.

Thus much in regard to Monroe's Doctrine, which when all is said and done, is neither Monroe's nor a Doctrine. The Doctrine, so-called, originated in the fertile brain of George Canning, British Minister of Foreign Affairs (1822-27), and was transplanted to America through the medium of John Quincy Adams, American Minister at the Court of St. James during the Canning regime. The pronouncement of the Doctrine was made by President Monroe in 1823 on the initiative of Great Britain as stated, and was intended as a challenge to the designs of the Holy Alliance (Paris 1815), and particularly to the colonial pretensions of Spain and France, in South America. The Doctrine was launched by President Monroe with the full understanding that the United States could rely for support with respect to its maintenance, upon the might and forces of the British Navy, and down to quite recent,

times, whatever weight or authority the Doctrine possessed, has rested on a British fleet basis. With the new and very broad development of the American Army, Navy, and Mercantile Marine, America's reliance on English support will, in all likelihood be founded on a broader basis, embracing a field of much wider scope, in which America's contribution and participation will perhaps be both of an offensive and defensive character.

The Monroe Doctrine is not a doctrine. It is a fact. If it exists at all, it does not exist in theory, but in fact, nor need there be any real question as to its meaning. It has more than once passed through the fires of trial, and all experiments made to test its actuality have demonstrated that it possesses life, health, and force behind it, and in one instance at least, in President Cleveland's administration, it has even been known to make faces at its own mother.

In what has gone before, we have attempted to furnish the reader with an outline of the policies and situation of the United States with respect to other nations, with special reference to the necessity of taking military measures in a defensive sense only. American policies had shaped themselves in such a way that no possible doubt could remain in the nation with respect to the probable sources from which danger of attack was to be expected. That danger pointed, first of all, in the direction of Japan. Germany was often spoken of in the same connection, but the majority of thinking people regarded this as a part of the Allied propaganda campaign to engage the sympathies of the United States to a still greater extent on the side of the Allies. After the breaking off of relations with Germany in 1917 the campaign of words which sought to represent Germany as a future invader of the American continent, gained new vigor under the official championship of Ex-Ambassador Gerard. The upholding of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine now took on a new significance in

view of the newly accepted belief in the danger of menace from two Great Powers—Japan and Germany. Accordingly, immediate advantage was taken of that fact to rouse the nation to arms to resist the alleged aggressive designs of Japan and Germany against America, involving a violation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. England's vast possessions in the Western Hemisphere had made her, equally with America, a champion of the Monroe Doctrine, and with such interests in common, it is not strange that the bond between the two great English speaking countries which had heretofore existed only in an implied form, and for defensive purposes only, should now, under stress of circumstances, take on a more permanent and less shadowy configuration, in which not only defensive but offensive aims should bear a part. Germany was England's most formidable rival; Japan, on the other hand, disputed with America the position of foremost nation in the Pacific. If these two rivals could be eliminated from the field, the way was open to a complete and unchallenged Anglo-Saxon hegemony of the world. To be sure, such a course involved the acceptance by the United States of a policy of aggression and foreign conquest, and in a country in which public opinion plays so great a part, it would be necessary to overcome any possible opposition on the part of the American people.

The process of overcoming the opposition of the American people to a policy of aggression and conquest underwent a rapid development. In this, the press played, of course, a leading part. The Americans are a nation of newspaper readers, and accordingly with a united press striving for a single aim—the conversion of the American public to militaristic measures, public opinion was soon kneeded and moulded to the proper mood leading to the acceptance of the new line of policy. The military ardor of the nation, dormant in normal times, was aroused by a concurrence of events which deeply stirred

the feelings of the people. The intensified submarine campaign and the effort of the German Foreign Minister, Zimmermann, to procure Mexico as an ally, in the event of a declaration of war by the United States, threw the country into an uproar. There followed the declaration of war, and the swift adoption of militarism with all its European adjuncts.

The effect of the introduction of militarism into the United States was precisely what its authors expected it to be. There was added a new and powerful element in support of the new policy of aggression and conquest leading to the Anglo-Saxon hegemony of the world. The youth of the nation flocked to the standards, ambitious for the new career. Countless otherwise quite harmless citizens embraced the opportunity that opened to them the possibility of attaining important military commands by quick promotion in an army that would number its millions. In America every common soldier "carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack." All of these eager and ambitous young officers in the making, are now supporters of war—and one might almost say in view of the new spirit of adventure aroused—of war for war's sake.

Shielded, by reason of her remoteness, from a knowledge of the real horrors of war, and not having to endure the denials, sacrifices and even real want and misery that European nations, in close proximity to the war, have had to feel, America's attitude is quite detached from truth and reality. Her people see more of the glamour and less of the naked actuality. 'Moving pictures' do not supply this deficiency of knowledge and realization. It is a nation of enthusiasts. Their military ardor so easily aroused, will with more difficulty be allayed. Multitudes of Americans love 'soldiering'. It opens for them new and promising careers. The Government pays them well, and after the war it offers the assurance of a substantial pension to each disabled or partially disabled soldier,

for the rest of his life, to say nothing of the pension his widow will receive after his death. Not that these are the primary considerations that lead the American soldier to war, but that he is assured thereby of his country's lasting gratitude. Furthermore success in a military career has always opened to Americans the promise of easy preferment in politics when the war drums have ceased to beat and the usages of peace have resumed their vocation.

Still another element in the situation upholding the war spirit has to be considered—the labouring classes. If there is any class in the community—and this applies to all the belligerents—to whom war, as such, is less of a burden and more of a benefit, it is the labouring classes—particularly those who have been trained to employments from which, in the general interest, they cannot be spared for service in the army. Particularly in America, with its great population, permitting of wider latitude in the selection of army units, war has been made popular with the labouring classes. Taxation does not fall heavily upon them, and their wages have been raised. Accustomed to a high standard of living due to their high wages, short working hours, and the abundance of food and clothing in America at reasonable prices, the labouring classes have been won over to the support of war, not only by these arguments of a material nature, but likewise by the arguments of those who have represented to them that an Anglo-Saxon victory is necessary for upholding, in the future, the standard of living to which they are now accustomed.

In the light of such considerations as these, the American people have been led to sanction an aggressive war, a war of conquest. When President Wilson first announced that the war should end in a 'peace without victory', he was reflecting the sober sense of a people not yet infected with the war germ. The war psychosis, however, grew fat by what it fed

on, and with each new crisis of the war fever, President Wilson set himself a new programme. After 'peace without victory', he declared for 'an honourable peace' as the new goal; after an 'honourable peace' had served its turn, President Wilson made known his new terms of peace, set forth in fourteen categories, the acceptance of which it is probable he did not expect, so long as the German armies were still in the field; and finally, last development of all, President Wilson declared, on July 4th last, that there could be no peace by negotiation until after a complete victory of the Allied arms.

Here we have it then—the announcement of a policy that involves the conquest of a foreign nation, and its enthusiastic reception by the American people. By well marked but rapid stages, they had arrived at a goal which in the first instance they had never set out to reach. From a consideration of purely defensive measures, to be taken for the single purpose of upholding the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, the American people have arrived at the adoption of measures in which are involved the future destinies of Germany and Japan.

X.

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.

CHAPTER TEN.

The United States and Japan.

There remains now for our consideration the question of what special causes of conflict have arisen between Japan and the United States that give rise to a situation of extreme danger to the future peaceful relations of the two nations.

About the time when the Russo-Japanese war was beginning to enter upon its final stages, in the spring of 1905, the first signs of trouble brewing between Americans and Japanese appeared in connection with a suggestion of the San Francisco Board of Education with respect to the segregation of Japanese school children.

In the Pacific coast states of the Union, from various causes, feeling against the Japanese had gradually developed into a bitter hatred. The school question, involving as it did a slight put upon a nation whose subjects had by treaty been guaranteed the right to enter, travel or reside in any part of the United States and to enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property to the same extent as the subjects of the most favoured nation, was symptomatic and a mere incident in the situation. The same may with truth be said of the Immigration question, although that question gave rise to more serious causes of friction that were only partially laid to rest by the despatch of a large battleship fleet to the Pacific by President Roosevelt in 1907-8.

In the acute stages of the discussion of the Immigration question, many popular outbursts against the Japanese on the

Pacific coast had led to the introduction of laws in the legislatures of various Western states having for their object to prohibit the Japanese from holding land in these states, to compel them to live apart in certain designated areas, to segregate Japanese school children, and to render it unlawful for any Japanese to be a director in a joint stock corporation. The legislature of the State of Nevada unanimously passed resolutions demanding the maintenance of a war fleet in the Pacific, and referring to the Japanese as a menace to America's peace.

Under pressure by the national Government all of these state measures were held in abeyance, particularly as many of these provisions were in violation of Japanese Treaty rights. At the same time an understanding was arrived at with the Japanese on the following basis: That the Tokio Government should voluntarily restrict emigration to Hawaii, from whence the majority of the Japanese coolies had found their way to California and that no permit should be given for the emigration of labour to the United States. The Washington Government thereupon passed a measure providing for the exclusion of all Asiatic coolies coming from the insular possessions of America. When, however, after this apparently satisfactory settlement of the Immigration question, new troubles broke out in San Francisco, developing into an out and out racial feud, the Japanese nation gave renewed voice to their resentment against restrictive measures which tended to discriminate them from the civilized communities of the world. Count Okuma sent the following telegraphic communication to the *New York World:*— "I greatly regret that anti-Japanese outrages are being repeated at San Francisco. We as a nation were not satisfied with the settlement of the recent school incident or with the unjust discrimination exercised against our emigrants and their actual exclusion. We patiently hoped

that the principles enunciated in the enlightened statement of President Roosevelt to Congress last December would prevail, and that every unjust discrimination against the Japanese would be stopped. Any repetition of the injustices against the Japanese will seriously impair our warm feelings towards America, and our traditional friendship will be weakened thereby. Fair and just treatment is essential to maintain friendship. Repeated outrageous acts will not only damage American interests, but also disgrace American civilization. For the sake of justice and humanity I sincerely appeal to the American people to stop the Boxer-like outrages and unfair discrimination against the Japanese, and I pray that Washington's Farewell Address will not be forgotten by the American-people." In a further contribution Count Okuma committed himself to the following remarkable statement: "America has no enemy at present, and it will be a thoughtless policy if America purposely makes an enemy by inflaming public opinion against Japan. The United States is the wealthiest country in the world, but it has not sufficient defence in the Pacific if the two nations are to come to hostilities. There is nothing more dreadful than crazy persons. The Japanese are a crazy nation in fighting and will display their madness as in the late war. The Japanese are always ready to throw away their lives for the nation; they regard their lives as lightly as they do the weather. On the other hand Americans and Europeans attach the chief importance to money. Those who love money love their lives. Suppose the two nations, whose ideas towards death are fundamentally different, should fight. The final result is easily seen, and the understanding of this fact seems to be the cause of America trying to expand the navy on a great scale."

Other views of Japanese privately expressed were not without significance as they showed that the nation realized the gravity of the situation, and that though the time was not opportune

for obtaining satisfactory redress, the incidents of 1906-07 would be stored up in the memory as against a day when Japan felt sufficiently strong to assume an uncompromising attitude.

This agitation of the public in the two countries over the questions of Japanese school segregation and immigration was merely symptomatic of something deeper down that was stirring in the popular depths of consciousness in the two peoples. These matters were but incidents in the situation. The real situation embraced the problems of the Pacific as a whole. Leaving these minor questions out of consideration, the Federal Government at Washington knew that the Japanese system of espionage in American territories was elaborate, and that the Japanese policy in the Far East was inconsistent with the principles first definitely expounded by an American Secretary of State, Mr. John Hay—the principles of the maintenance of the Open Door and the preservation of the integrity of China. Reports of Japanese intentions concerning Manchuria created wide spread alarm as constituting a menace to American interests in the Far East and a violation of the oft repeated Japanese assurance of the right to equal opportunities in China for all nations. The press of America became aroused by the alleged infamy of Japan's course, and published inflammatory articles. It was alleged that Japan was hampering American trade in South Manchuria, and that she was not only favouring the Russian proposal to maintain control over large tracts of land adjacent to the railroad in Northern Manchuria, but that she was prepared to follow a similar course in districts where her influence was predominant.

But neither Japan nor America was prepared for war; consequently neither was willing to go to war. The Pacific coast, the Philippines lay open to attack. The Panama Canal was not yet completed. Japan, on her side, had not recovered from the shock of the Russian war. She needed a period of

rest to restore her national strength and vigor, and besides she was doing business on an empty treasury. Accordingly an understanding was reached between the two governments by means of an exchange of notes (November 1908) between the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, Baron Takahira and Mr. Root, the American Secretary of State. These notes reaffirmed the policy of the Open Door, and the principle of the maintenance of the integrity of China. For the time being, at any rate, war was avoided.

Anti-Japanese demonstrations still continued, however, in the Western states, and several new attempts were made to introduce strong anti-Japanese measures in the legislature of California, and so far at least as that state is concerned the Japanese problem cannot be said to have found a solution. Nor can it be said that the country as a whole have taken a much different attitude than the Californians. The San Francisco school incident, the Immigration question, the Magdalena Bay incident and the California land legislation aroused public sentiment throughout the Union to a feeling of unrest and disquietude, all the more as the conviction of the people grew in strength that sooner or later Japan would demand a reckoning with the United States. When the United States entered into the European contest, it was the Western states that received the news with greatest satisfaction because they saw in it the realization of their much longed for defensive programme of preparedness against Japanese aggression. Mr. Roosevelt's popularity in the West had been largely due to the fact that he was the first of American Presidents to urge preparedness as a means of keeping out Oriental—and more especially Japanese—immigration. In May 1909, he published in *The Outlook* an article on Japanese immigration in which he said: "We have the right to say, for instance, what immigrants shall come to our own shores, but we are

powerless to enforce this right against any nation that chooses to disregard our wishes unless we build up and maintain a first-class navy."

Other publicists of less prominence have taken up Mr. Roosevelt's idea and have given it wide-spread currency so that today, no matter what may be thought of Germany, Japan is undoubtedly thought of as a menace to America's future.

Japan, all this time is watching and waiting. She has not been indifferent to what is going on in America and puts her own construction upon it. That Japan sees in the American programme of military and naval expansion other designs than mere self-defence is clear in view of the prominence given by Japanese newspapers to the following words published in the official organ of the Navy League in Washington:—"There should be no doubt that even with all possible moral refinements, it is the absolute right of a nation to live in its fullest intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means, such as armed conquest. Such expansion as an aim is an inalienable right, and in the case of the United States, it is a particular duty."

Of all the questions between Japan and the United States, the greatest danger lies in the Chinese question, if America, relying upon her newly acquired military strength and the augmentation of her naval power, determines to enforce her will in the affairs of the Far East. Here, Japan will show herself unyielding. In China, Japan will pursue her own course, with or without the consent of the United States, and of this she has already given ample demonstration. To recall but one instance. Before hostilities were declared in the period during which Japan's ultimatum to Germany as regards Kiaochao was being considered in Washington, the United States formally recorded itself in a note to Japan as expecting "to be consulted" in all matters affecting the territorial integrity of

China and in such efforts as Japan might desire to institute to quell revolutionary outbreaks in China proper. Japan, on her part, promised eventually to restore Kiaochao to China. After the siege, and the evacuation of Kiaochao by the Germans, Count Okuma, the Japanese Premier, calmly announced that these promises had been nullified because Germany did not comply with the terms of the ultimatum, necessitating a long siege of Tsingtau and many sacrifices. Whereupon, *without* consulting the United States Japan, proceded to take full possession not only of Tsingtau and Kiaochao but of the whole Shantung Peninsula and appurtenances.

XI.

THE BRITISH COLONIES AND JAPAN. THE IMMIGRATION QUESTION.

CHAPTER ELEVEN.

The British Colonies and Japan. The Immigration Question.

We have seen that in the United States the Immigration Question was but an incident in the general situation that gave rise to the anti-Japanese agitation. In the British Colonies, however, objections to the Japanese were entirely centred in the Immigration Question.

For a better understanding of the matter, it is necessary to examine the foundations upon which these objections rested. Addressing a meeting of the Victoria Liberal Association, Mr. Templeman, Minister of Inland Revenue, said "that he had always maintained the opinion that immigration into Canada should be of races which would become permanent citizens of the country. They should be of those types that would settle on the land and become citizens in the fullest sense of the term. They should be in character such as would assimilate, marry, and intermarry with our own people, so that in future we should have from ocean to ocean in Canada one great homogeneous people."

The foregoing extract from the speech of a Minister of the Dominion shows clearly enough that the prevailing sentiment of the country was in favor of preserving the exploitation of the land to the white man, and to the white man alone. This sentiment, common to all British possessions in the Pacific is not limited to the Japanese; it extends to all Asiatics, but against none of the Asiatic races have the objections of the

white native population been so severe as against the Japanese. As colonists they are looked upon as comparing unfavorably with the Chinese. The latter are held to be more law-abiding, less arrogant, more honest, and less given to practice evil vices that exercise a baleful influence on their surroundings.

Indeed, the objection to the Japanese is based both on social and economic grounds. The Japanese will not assimilate, nor is it desirable, in the opinion of leading ethnologists, that they should assimilate. Viewed from the social aspect, it is asserted that the Japanese have an altogether different moral standard from that which is accepted in Western nations. Many well informed students of Japanese social life, object to their treatment of women. A system of concubinage is still practiced in Japan. Marriage obligations are very lightly regarded, and divorce is as easy as crossing the street. B. H. Chamberlain, who is perhaps the most impartial of all Japan's admirers frankly refers to the lot of Japanese women as "this state of slavery." In Japan, the laws that govern the relations between man and woman are still those of an Oriental country. From a Western point of view, they are still essentially barbaric. It is not that vice does not exist in the West. The point is, that in the East, they not only practice vice, but give to vice a legal recognition. In the great centres of population large areas are set apart where vice is licensed with the authority of the State, and where, in effect, vice is practiced under the patronage of the state. Taxes derived from the proceeds of vice are devoted to the general purposes of the community. It is, however, only fair to Japan to say that as she advances along the road of Western enlightenment, there will be a corresponding improvement in her social outlook.

Thus we see, one of the fundamental objections to the Japanese is, that he brings with him into a Western community, an Oriental code of morals that is sharply opposed to the Western

viewpoint. But the principal objection to the Japanese is based upon economic grounds. The economic menace lies in the admitted fact that the average Japanese supports himself on twenty per cent. or less, of his earnings. The remainder he either sends home or else amasses until he becomes himself a capitalist engaging in serious business in competition with the native element, and crowding the latter out if he is permitted to carry on without interference. His thrifty manner of life, eschewing the luxury of the Occidentals, his energy, industry and ability all give him an advantage over his Western competitor. In California, for example, the Japanese control many important agricultural industries; several Japanese have become millionaires by growing fruit; others have become rich by organizing companies of labourers who are hired out to the white owners of orchards and vineyards. The Japanese cobblers of San Francisco, by banding together for mutual benefit, have obtained complete control of that industry there. A large proportion of the flowers sold in San Francisco are raised by Japanese, whose methods, perfected in their own country in hundreds of years, have proved far superior to the most skilful American methods. Japanese companies supply labour for the great railroads, nearly all the railroad construction in California being done by Japanese. The raising of strawberries and of potatoes, in this State, is almost entirely in the hands of Japanese, whose superior methods have eliminated white competition.

British Columbia is one of the richest provinces in the British Empire. It possesses a salubrious climate, incalculable natural resources consisting of forest and woodland, an enormous acreage of wheat land, coal mines greater than the coal fields of Pennsylvania, extensive deposits of iron ore, gold, and other minerals, and very lucrative fisheries. It is apparent, therefore, that here lies one of the fairest fields for immigration in the whole world, and yet Britsh Columbia with an area very nearly

twice as great as France or Germany has a white population of only 260,000. Of Asiatics, there are 25,000, nearly all male adults. The province is suffering seriously, according to the Victoria Board of Trade, owing to the scarcity of domestic servants and labourers to undertake work that Europeans will not do. The Boards of Trade in British Columbia have declared that the scarcity of labour is retarding the development of the province, and that the continuance of the famine in this respect is altogether unsound from the economic point of view. And yet with this vast colony so lightly inhabited and so meagrely developed, the cry goes out for a white Canada, and the exclusion of the Asiatic. Similar conditions prevail in Australia and New Zealand. These territories, in proportion to their area, are lightly populated, and yet they too clamour for the exclusion of the Asiatic.

The attitude of the Asiatic towards this dog in the manger policy may be likened to that of the poor labouring man who sees himself and his large family forced to starve because his little patch of ground is not large enough to raise sufficient for their needs, whereas over the fence, in his rich neighbor's yard, the provisions are not only over-abundant but in danger of going to seed for the want of attention and the fruits rotting on the ground for the lack of some one to harvest them. And not even a watch-dog to guard such precious treasures! Under such circumstances would it be at all surprising if our poor labouring man climbed the fence some dark night and helped himself? That is the problem of the Pacific.

From the strictly logical point of view, it is difficult to understand the attitude of the Western nations towards the Japanese. They have been taken up in the comity of nations as the equals of the white nations. They have been guaranteed by treaty the same rights and privileges accorded to any other nation. It is the white man who compelled, by the thunder

of his guns, the yellow races to open up their countries to him, and to abandon their centuries long policy of peaceful retirement from the world; it is the white man who stirred up all these quiescent races who did not want him. So long as he could wring concessions from them and compel them to trade at the point of the bayonet, he heeded not the warnings of those who told him that in the end they would prove his formidable competitors. This is voiced most clearly in a letter written by the late Bishop Awdry, who was at the time the head of the Church of England in Japan. "I would suggest," he said, "to those who are making difficulties for Japan, that there is a very great danger ahead if the policy of exclusiveness is carried far enough really to stir the nation. With Japan already powerful and China likely rapidly to become so, those who insist on a policy of mutual exclusion, whether on the ground of race or otherwise—Australia for the Australians, America for the white races, and the like—are certain to make effective the cry of 'The Far East for the Far Eastern', and as the Far Eastern nations advance, and develop the resources of their own countries, the old idea that 'we white men may penetrate you, but you may not penetrate us', will be too palpably immoral to be tolerated."

The Constitution of the United States provides, "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." (Article VI).

In the case of the British Empire, the Colonies are not necessarily made parties to a treaty, unless they signify their adhesion. But the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which the British Government concluded with Japan in 1894, was

subsequently in 1900 ratified by Canada, and thereupon became the supreme law of the land to which the Province of British Columbia was obliged to adhere as completely as California was subject to the supreme treaty making power of the Government at Washington. In both countries, therefore, the fundamental law of the land guarantees equal rights and privileges to the Japanese. Both countries insist on their rights to trade with and settle in both China and Japan. The principle of the Open Door and of equal apportunity for all nations is a cardinal feature of their policy toward China. Both nations gave material support to Japan in her war with Russia, and both were foremost in elevating Japan to a position of equality among the nations. In 1900 England and the United States joined other Western nations in calling upon Japan to head an expedition to put down the Boxer Rebellion and rescue the beleaguered legations in China. They have demanded from Japan her constant adherence to the principle of the Open Door in China. And yet both of these countries have closed their own portals to Japanese immigrants.

The question now arises, what is going to be the solution of the difficulty? A partial remedy has been found by the magnanimons stand taken by the Japanese Goverument itself. While declining to become a party to immigration treaties, she herself voluntarily offered to pass the necessary laws to restrict emigration from Japan. Such restrictions were accordingly put into force, and for a time the difficulty was in consequence overcome. The trouble is, however that these restrictions are, in practice, evaded by emigrants, and in spite of additional measures taken by the Japanese Government, many Japanese succeed in smuggling themselves into the forbidden territories. Accordingly, in spite of all official assurances, the problem has not been solved, nor will it ever be, by peaceful methods, so long as the restrictions take the form of

racial discrimination. Some day Japan will lead the way in demanding of the white races an equality of treatment for the peoples of Asia. It is possible that a solution may be found in case England and the United States are willing to accept Japan as the foremost nation in the Pacific with predominating interests in the Far East, and a free hand in China. In other words Asiatic emigration will be stopped as the result of a bargain or it will be insisted on at the point of the sword.

XII.

AMERICA ABANDONS THE 'OPEN DOOR'.

CHAPTER TWELVE.

America Abandons the 'Open Door'.

To follow the development of the anti-Japanese sentiment in the Union since 1909 is to perceive the growth of an antagonism to Japan based no longer solely on economic or social grounds, but far more on political grounds that had arisen out of the conflicting attitudes of the two countries in the consideration of Far Eastern questions.

Going back to the declaration of the 'Open Door' policy by Secretary John Hay in 1899, we see America standing forth as the champion of a defenceless China against the aggressions of the European Powers and Japan which had nearly led to the partition of China. America's truly unselfish policy—she had not yet become a nation in arms—had made of China a warm and grateful friend. When later, in 1905, on President Roosevelt's initiative, China's integrity and sovereignty were made the subject matter of a declaration, in the Portsmouth Treaty, by her chief adversaries—Japan and Russia—to the effect that these nations unconditionally agreed to acknowledge and respect the same, the feeling of friendship and gratitude on the part of China towards the United States was still further augmented. The Japanese, who were already beginning to show signs of resentment at each new interference of America in Asiatic affairs, accepted the situation, but with ill grace, and each new step taken by America in China was felt as an act of an unfriendly character directed against their

country. Suddenly and quite unexpectedly there was launched a new act of unfriendliness to Japanese interests that touched the island Empire in its very vitals. In January 1910, the American Secretary of State Knox made a proposal which was nothing less than that the whole railway system, both Russian and Japanese, in Manchuria, should be neutralized. In identical notes addressed to Japan and Russia, he suggested that these Powers should sell the railways to China, who was to be financed for the purpose by Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, Japan and Russia, of course, retaining an interest. It was urged that acceptance of the scheme would remove a constant source of friction between Russia, Japan, and other Powers, that it would safeguard the doctrine of equal opportunity in China, and, by closing the line to the transport of troops and munitions of war, would relieve Russia's anxiety respecting a possible Japanese attack on the heart of Siberia.

In diplomatic language, but quite firmly, Japan replied to the United States through Marquis Komura, her Foreign Minister, declaring her inability to accept the American proposal, and the incident was officially consigned to the diplomatic graveyard.

American sympathy for the leaders of the revolution in China in 1911, leading to the establishment of the Chinese Republic, was as unwelcome in Japan as it was welcome in China, and seemed a new proof to the Japanese of America's unjustifiable interference in Asiatic affairs. Each attempt of the United States to establish closer relations with China had been received in Japan as designed to prejudice her own interests, and the Knox proposal seemed to the Japanese to cap the climax of impertinence. The question was, how to meet these acts of aggression on the part of the Washington Government.

It will be recalled that the anti-Japanese legislation in the Western States of America had been made inoperative largely

through the interference of President Roosevelt, who foresaw clearly enough that these acts might lead to eventual conflict. A "Gentlemans Agreement," had been concluded between the two countries under which Japan volunteered to solve the Immigration Problem by restricting her own emigrants from seeking a home in the United States. In 1913, however, apparently in the very face of the "Gentleman's Agreement," the California legislature passed a new bill, known as the "California Anti-Alien Land Ownership Law," which embodied provisions of the same objectionable character in point of its application to the Japanese, as those which had heretofore come under the condemnation of President Roosevelt. President Wilson's earnest protests against the measure were entirely unavailing. The Californians had decided to be masters in their own house, regardless of the imperiling of the national interests which, as they were informed, such an act might bring in its train. Some vigorous notes were exchanged between Washington and Tokio over the matter. President Wilson declared himself incompetent to interfere in the local State legislation of the individual states; the Japanese Government, he said, must be satisfied with the fact that the act had been passed against his protest, whereupon in January 1914, the Japanese Foreign Minister made a speech in the Diet in which he declared that the American answer to Japanese representations was unsatisfactory, and that the Imperial Government would therefore feel itself compelled to consider the question of *another* solution of the conflict of rights. For a time the air was charged with reports and rumours that foreshadowed impending hostilities, but apparently the wiser heads in Japan did not regard the moment as quite opportune. Japan had not as yet assured herself of her security as against the danger of isolation and the cutting off of her commerce at sea in case of a conflict with America. She still required an under-

standing with Russia, not only to protect her rear flank but also to insure the continuance of communications with the outside world, overland by way of Siberia, in case her communications were cut at sea. Moreover Japan, despite the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, had good reason to suspect that should hostilities break out with America, England would abandon the Japanese alliance and take sides with her own kith and kin, all the more, in view of the fact that her own Colonies championed the American position on the Immigration question. For all these reasons, Japan stumbled in her course, a ministerial crisis ensued, and, soon thereafter, the outbreak of the European War turned Japan's thoughts away from California for the time being, to things nearer home.

If Japan needed a reason for taking part in the European war on the side of the Allies, she needed to go no further than these questions of difference with America. Wherever she sought an extension of her power and influence, wherever she came in contact with him, the American placed obstacles in her way, and even treated her nationals with contemptuous arrogance. The European war, accordingly, was Japan's opportunity to square accounts with America. With all the Great Powers of Europe preoccupied in a World War, she had only an absolutely unprepared and militarily helpless America to deal with, and interference from that source could now be regarded with supreme indifference. The Allies needed her help, and in return for it she could bargain for the free hand in the East that had so long been the keystone of her foreign policy. Moreover, the anti-Japanese sentiment in America was actually playing into her hands. America's indefensible position towards her nationals made it possible for Japan to bargain for concessions in Asia in return for her restrant toward America on the Immigration Question. Furthermore, President Wilson was not showing himself the strong man in his attitude on

the Immigration Question that his predecessor Roosevelt had been. In spite of his opposition, the matter even became the subject of legislation in Congress. In 1916, there was introduced in Congress the Burnett Immigration Bill, which, without mentioning the word 'Japanese', in reality was directed as much against them as against other Asiatics. The United States Senate passed the bill on the 7th of February 1917, notwithstanding the protest of Japan through her Ambassador. The bill passed the Senate at a critical time for America. President Wilson was at the very moment considering the breaking off of relations with Germany, and he, of course, at once saw the danger of the new Japanese complications in its relation to his determination to make war on Germany. It was necessary for America to come to terms with Japan. Japan's hour had arrived. America had been manoeuvred into a position where she had no other choice than to concede the Japanese demands, and this meant the end of the 'Open Door' policy in China, and an acknowledgement of Japan's paramount position in Asia. The statesmanship of John Hay and Philander C. Knox had been dynamited into oblivion.

Not long after the fulfillment of this master stroke of Japanese diplomatic policy, a Japanese Mission visited the United States, headed by Baron Ishii. At a banquet given in his honor in New York City, he declared to his American hosts comprising most of the American captains of industry in the commercial, industrial and financial fields, that Japan was prepared to announce and defend from thenceforth the Monroe Doctrine of the East, "Asia for the Asiatics." Thus did the little Japanese diplomat beard the American lion in his den. This was his country's answer to the Monroe Doctrine of the West, to the anti-Japanese land and immigration legislation, as well as to the Hay, Root and Knox policies of the 'Open Door' and equal opportunity to all nations in China.

NOTE.

Extract from an Article, "Getting Rid of the United States in the "Far East," by Frederick Mc Cormick. New York Times, May 16, 1915. Mr. Mc Cormick is the well known newspaper correspondent and author of "The Flowery Republic," a work that deals with the recent revolutionary period in China.

"After the Treaty of Portsmouth, when Secretary Root let go the reins of power which Secretary Hay had held in East Asia, allowing Komura to seize them, and turned his attention to Latin America, the idea of a "Monroe Doctrine" for East Asia was invented in Japan. The idea was grotesque and its merits rested solely in its appeal to the vanity and credulity of the great English-speaking people of America. To carry out Komura's plan of state for unrestricted and indefinite expansion upon the continent, Japan had to eliminate us—the open door country. It was a kind of swallowing act, ludicrous, and showing that the champions of national policy were rather hard put in order to name Komura's plan of state before the world.

"The attempt of turning the open door into a "Monroe Doctrine" had its awkward side. Monroeism in the Western Hemisphere is a guardianship of the weak in their right of unhampered self-development. Japan's needs—she had everything to ask—which are the soul of her polity, were the exact negative of this. Komura in the beginning declared before the Diet the policy of relieving the overcrowding at home in Japan by free immigration into Korea and South Manchuria as a part of the new plan of state. Not long after this began, Korea was annexed! In five years Japan's immigration had expanded beyond her concessions in South Manchuria, and she has now forced upon China, land and industrial rights for Japanese, not only throughout South Manchuria but Eastern Mongolia.

"In Latin America there is no such thing as extra-territoriality, or any division of sovereignty, or any interference of any outsiders in the foreign affairs of its countries. Backed by military force, Japan not only exercises but extends in China all of these, to which she adds control of all commerce, industry, and development in the line of her expansion. Lacking everything which China has to give, Japan, there-

fore, in the guise of the "Monroe Doctrine" for East Asia is a veritable wolf in sheep's clothing. The absurdities of the adventure have prevented any authoritative enunciation of it in Japan, and its most intelligent champions grasped the nettle at the outset by admitting that from the point of view of the Japanese a "Monroe Doctrine" in East Asia would mean the control of China by Japan to the exclusion of all other States. Between the "wolf in sheep's clothing" and the "dog in the manger" thus offered to her, the "Monroe Doctrine" of East Asia holds out no tenable position."

Extract from a letter by Prof. Jeremiah W. Jenks and published in the New York Times, December 10, 1915.

"With regard to the alleged analogy between China's position toward Japan and Mexico's position in relation to the United States, I should like to say just this:—What is frequently referred to as the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, if it were for the protection and not the molestation of China, would not be, I think, unacceptable to Americans who desire to help maintain a lasting peace in Asia. Such a doctrine was, in fact, prescribed and promoted by Mr. Hay and by Mr. Root. But the trouble is that certain Japanese who are now advocating what they call a Japanese Monroe Doctrine regarding China, inject into their arguments and policies, arguments and policies which Americans have never applied nor would they now apply toward our Latin-American neighbors. China is not assisted toward an acceptance of Japanese intervention by Japan's record in Korea and Southern Manchuria. Any extension of political influence of this sort is naturally regarded in China as an assault, deliberately intended, upon China's sovereignty."

XIII.

THE NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN.

The Netherlands and Japan.

In spite of everything that has been said to the contrary, the feeling has progressively gained ground that the Japanese are not to be turned away from the conquest of the Dutch East Indies. Since the outbreak of the European war, and particularly in the last two years when the Netherlands have been practically cut off from their colonies, the Dutch have begun to find out something of what is meant to be accomplished by the energies devoted by the Japanese to the spread of their Expansionist and Imperialistic policies. The Japanese flag may now be seen fluttering in Dutch harbors from almost every masthead that comes and goes, where formerly were seen the flags of all nations, and Japanese capital has been poured through many channels, into the Dutch islands, thereby establishing the foundation of many important Japanese interests and creating for the future a fruitful field for the sowing of pretexts leading to armed invasion, such as always sprout from a soil sown with the seeds of what is known as 'peaceful penetration.' The Dutch islands are rich in such products as tobacco, rubber, coffee, copra, sugar, and petroleum. The islands likewise produce iron ore. It is true that the Japanese have financed large undertakings in the island Formosa for the production of sugar, and likewise that they have some important petroleum fields of their own in the northwestern part of their islands, but such supplies of these articles as she can obtain from such sources will not suffice when Japan has arrived

at the point where she can put into effect her plans for monopolizing the almost unlimited requirements of the markets of China. Furthermore Japan's growing prosperity is having the effect of gradually elevating the standard of living of the masses of her people with the result that each year now sees an increase in the demand for such tropical products as the East Indies can afford.

Industrially, were it not for Government support through subsidies, rebates and other methods of financial assistance, Japanese industries could not compete with their European competitors, and this, in spite of the advantages of cheap labor, and proximity to the markets of the East. The Japanese recognize fully enough that such a method of fostering home industries adds an additional burden to the already heavily tax-ridden masses of the people, and they are therefore yearning for the time to come when they will be in a position to control their own markets, instead of having to climb the protective walls that shut them out of European markets by methods of such doubtful economic value as those above referred to. The value to the Japanese of China, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Australia would lie in just this fact that it would give them markets in which their goods would receive preferential treatment. Hard as it is for Japanese industry to compete with European, the future is not apt to bring any betterment in the conditions of competition because with each new forward step, some advance is also made in the standard of living of the workers, wages must be raised, and, in view of Japan's rapid increase in population, the cost of living in a country where the possibility of increased agricultural development is exceding small, must likewise be reckoned with as a factor which will hamper the production of manufactured goods at prices that will hold foreign markets against European and American competition.

The Japanese industrialist knows and reckons with the following disadvantages in competition with the European or American. He is a comparative newcomer in the industrial world and his experience has, like the gaining of all knowledge, cost him dear. Unused to machinery, the Japanese have had to pay dearly for their inexperience and their industries have had to charge great losses to this account alone. The Japanese workman produces less than the European. The monotony of carrying out the same processes day after day is trying to the Japanese temperament. Individually the Japanese workman is of finer grain than the European. He has not as yet been thoroughly materialised. It takes centuries of labour in the mines and in the factory to toughen the fibre of the emotions and to deaden the imaginative impulses. Again, the Japanese men of industry have had to haul their raw materials over long distances, and must therefore add to the already high cost of their raw products, the cost of transportation. In Japan, interest charges are high. The cost of money to the Japanese manufacturer must make itself felt in the prices paid by the consumer of his product.

With all these handicaps, it is not to be wondered at that Japanese industry required a great deal of fostering and protecting to compete with European, and it also explains in very large measure the anxiety with which the Japanese regard the possible acquisition of such free markets as China and the Dutch East Indies where, so to speak, they can be masters in their own house.

As a possible source from which to draw raw materials, the Dutch East Indies will be of undoubted value to Japan. The fact that Japan can obtain such raw materials as iron ore more near at hand in China is beside the point. The conduct of Japanese politics sways between two schools of Expansionists—between the Naval School which favors Expansion exclusively

in the islands of the Pacific—the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and Australia, and the Army school which favors expansion on the Asiatic continent. The Navy school liken Japan to England. She is an island Empire and her successes like England's must follow the sea. She must not seek to become a land power. Her future, say they, lies on the water. With a powerful and efficient navy Japan is invulnerable to attack, but with continental possessions she will awaken the greed and rivalry of continental powers, and particularly China which is potentially the greatest power in the world and one whom the Japanese would make a fatal error to antagonize. The Military School on the other hand point to the fact, taking England as an example, that had England established herself as a strong continental power on the mainland of Europe, she might have saved herself the present war. In the same way, say they, if Japan extends her conquests to distant islands in the South Seas, she will like England have vital arteries that an enemy may strike at and sever at a blow, setting at naught Japan's entire defensive programme.

Now, as between these two schools, the decision has not yet fallen. Much depends on the outcome of the present war. It is more likely, however, that neither school will prevail to carry through its programme in its entirety. Indeed, the nation growing stronger all the time in its chauvinistic nationalism, may demand the fulfillment of both programmes, particularly as it accords with the new Monroe Doctrine of the East, "Asia for the Asiatics."

In any event the question of whether or not Japan may do without the raw materials to be obtained in the Dutch East Indies has not been determined, but certain it is that such East Indian products as rubber, sugar, petroleum, coffee, copra, and tobacco possess trading possibilities which the Japanese will know how to esteem at their true value when

it comes time to consider the question in all its bearings.

There can be no doubt, that unless England and America give Japan an absolutely free hand in the East, they are threatened with an alliance between Japan, Russia and Germany. To meet an attack from either England or the United States, possession of the Dutch East Indies is an absolute essential as they command the most important sea routes to the East. If the United States should give up the Philippines, or grant autonomy to the islanders, they must eventually fall into the lap of Japan. Or, if the United States continues to hold them, Japan, in the event of war, will naturally want to seize them at the very outset, as they command an approach to Hong Kong, England's chief naval base in the East. With the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies in her possession, Japan will have completed a chain of fetters about China that will hold that country firmly in her grasp. On the other hand, to permit the Dutch East Indies to fall into the hands of her enemies, would immediately place Japan at a great disadvantage in her operations at sea. Her commerce would soon be swept from the seas, and the offensive movements of her fleet greatly circumscribed. The possession by Japan of the Dutch Indies will bring her nearer to British India, a proximity that will work greatly to her advantage in a country that is already very sympathetic to her aims. The British Colonies in the Pacific are, one and all, antagonistic to the Japanese. They are strenuously demanding a change of front on the part of the motherland and a return to her policy of protecting British interests in British spheres of influence wherever they may exist. They point out that England is surrendering her position in the East and weakening the position of her colonies there, by tamely submitting to Japanese leadership in the Pacific. If Japan's strength is permitted to grow at the present rate, it is only a question of time when she will insist on the

right of her emigrants to receive fair and equal treatment in British Columbia, Australia, and New Zealand. As Japan continues to grow in power and prestige she will bitterly resent every stigma put upon the yellow race by any of the white nations. She wishes to rally all the yellow races of the East around her standard, and nothing can work to her purpose with greater effect than the attitude assumed towards her colonists by Europe and America. Indeed, in the Dutch East Indies, it is one of the circumstances that may lead to the conquest of the islands by the Japanese, that a violent feeling of antipathy has arisen between the white and yellow elements. In their treatment of the Japanese who come to the islands the Dutch are not always able to discriminate between the low caste Japanese and the Japanese of superior station and education. The reason for this lies in the fact that to the inexpert European eye, one Japanese looks precisely like another. Accordingly very often distinguished Japanese visitors are subjected to indignities that are especially wounding to this susceptible race and thus are sown new seeds of hostility that may easily grow into serious proportions. Nor must the attitude of the islanders themselves towards their Dutch rulers be overlooked. According to those who have lived among them the longest, the feeling is that of bitter race hatred. Expression is rarely given to the sentiment and it is for the most part successfully concealed. But to those who have gained the full confidence of the Eastern races it has been revealed. "East is East and West is West."

Herein lies the great danger from Japan's new slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics." This cry has the full sympathy of every Oriental from the Suez Canal to Kamchatka. The Eastern peoples are not grateful to their white rulers for such blessings as order in civil affairs, better hygiene and education. These things are to them non-essentials. What embitters the Oriental,

is the Western's assumption of superiority, his pre-supposition of a right to rule, his arrogance, his unconcealed contempt of the yellow man as an inferior social being. Moreover he condemns the cynical materialism of the white races, and the white man's, in his eyes, unnatural and hypocritical assumption of moral excellence. Japan's exhibition of what an Oriental nation can do in a struggle with Western civilization has awakened new interests and ambitions in every Eastern people and they are willing to accept her as their champion, if, thereby they can succeed in throwing off the yoke of their Western rulers. If, therefore, Japan should ever decide to strike, she will have as one of her most powerful weapons in the Dutch East Indies, the sympathy of the masses of the native population.

The Japanese, more than any other nation, have the spirit which fosters desire of foreign conquest. It is the spirit of ultra-nationalism, and, with the Japanese, takes the place of religion in their national life. The Japanese are not a religious people, in the Western sense. From the cradle they are grounded in the principles of Shintoism, or ancestry worship. This teaches every form of human self-sacrifice for the upholding and glorification of the highest power on earth, the divinely descended, heaven-born Emperor, who is revered and loved by all the people as the source from which all blessings to his subjects shall come. This sentiment imbues the Japanese with a remarkable patriotism, and their pride and vanity are fed by every new success or development that may add to the glory and power of their supremely beloved ruler. Aside, therefore, from any considerations of a material nature, the Japanese have the feeling for conquest very strongly developed in their natures, and this, too, constitutes a danger that has to be reckoned with in any consideration of Japanese aims in the East.

The opinion has been expressed by high Dutch authority,

that England and America will not consent to the granting of a free hand to Japan in the Far East to be followed by the extension of her suzerainty over the Dutch East Indies. This opinion is entitled to be received with great respect, but it seems to the writer a trifle too optimistic. That England and America propose to do their utmost to curb Japan's pretensions in the Pacific is a conclusion we have already come to in a former chapter. But this conclusion is based upon the assumption that the Western Allies shall have completely disposed of Germany and that Russia, too, will be impotent to oppose her strength to Anglo-Saxon domination in the Far East. Germany does not yearn for an alliance with Japan, and would consider such a proposition seriously only in the event that she is driven to it in self-defence and as a measure of necessity. True safety for Dutch interests in the East can only be assured by a peace that lays the foundation for a *rapprochement* between England, Germany and the United States. Such a combination would insure peace not only in the Far East, but in the whole world for ages to come. Any other peace, whether negotiated or dictated, will simply contain the germs of future war, and the probability that the conflagration would burst forth almost immediately in the Far East.

Japan entered the war against Germany, principally, because she thus had the means of eliminating one of her competitors in the Pacific without too much risk to herself. This accomplished, she set herself the task of eliminating her other chief competitors in the same sphere—England and America. Both of these countries have in reality lost as much in the Far East as has Germany, since the outbreak of the war. Consequently none of them—neither England, nor America, nor Germany have any reason to love Japan for the part she has played in this war, England least of all because Japan was her ally, and she expected her ally to respect the provisions of the Anglo-

Japanese alliance. Of the three, Japan has least to fear from Germany, because the Far East is only a side issue in German politics, whereas in the case of the other two countries who have very important interests in the Pacific that clash at many points with Japanese interests, there is every probability that the Far Eastern question will engage their attention, at the end of the European war, to the very uttermost degree. With the Anglo-Saxon combination against her, Japan will be isolated unless she can rest on Russia and Germany. How then can any thinking person suppose that Japan will still continue to maintain a hostile attitude toward Germany? Japanese statesmen are altogether too astute for that. On the one hand Japan's only chance of resisting the Anglo-Saxon combination is to ally herself with Germany. On the other hand, an alliance with an unconquered Germany is just as necessary to England and America, if they hope for any success in their efforts to curb Japanese pretensions in the Pacific.

The misdirection of English policies in this war is due to the fact that her destinies are being controlled and directed by a man or men, be it Lloyd George, Lord Northcliffe, Lord Milner or Lord Curzon, one or all of them, who are men of one idea. Win the war is their cry—never mind what comes after. Such devotion to a single idea is only possible in such conflicts as that between the North and the South in the American Civil War of 1861-1865, or the recent Boer War. That is to say in a war between two antagonists. These men overlook the fact that it is possible, in the great clash and diversity of interests that mark the present association of Allies against the Central Powers, to both win the war and lose it at the same time. Will it be winning the war for England to drive Germany to such lengths that she may join hands with Japan or Russia for the conquest of India? Will it be winning the war if a German-Turkish army descend upon

Egypt through Syria and Palestine, destroy the Suez Canal and reconquer Egypt for the Turk? Will it be winning the war to compel a hard pressed enemy to make an ally of the Chinese, to furnish them with arms and ammunition and a disciplined soldiery wherewith they may in the future adopt Western tactics and enter upon a career of invasion and conquest? Let the men of one idea once seriously consider these possibilities and we shall see whether or not they may not become imbued with a new sense of their responsibilities.

XIV.

THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN.
JAPAN'S REAL RULERS.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN.

The Constitution of Japan. Japans Real Rulers.

The problem of establishing a Constitution for Japan was the problem of providing a fundamental law for a nation that had for twenty centuries drunk freely of the civilizations of Korea, China, and India in which the word Constitution or its equivalent would not be found, or if found, would not be understood. For twenty centuries and more the nation remained politically unaltered under one Imperial House and Sovereign that has descended in an unbroken line for a length of time absolutely unexampled in the world. Having for ages been guided in their actions by a sense of duties to ancestors, rulers, and superiors, having no consciousness of the rights of the individual, and no clear ideas about personality, the Japanese were presented, with scarcely any preparation for the event, with a Constitution guaranteeing every kind of right and liberty except political rights, and with codes civil and commercial, as well as other carefully evolved laws. The spirit of blind obedience and involuntary submission that was carefully taught and fostered under the feudal regime and by Confucian ethics, was now to give way before the new spirit of legal enactment and Constitutional Government.

If it is true, as has often been stated, that every nation receives the sort of government it deserves, it is no less true that every nation receives the sort of Constitution it deserves. Accordingly, as we shall see from our examination of the

Constitution granted to the Japanese, a nation that was, and still for the largest part is, unprepared to receive political rights, had a Constitution bestowed upon it, in which few, if any, political rights have been granted.

It was in the year 1881 that the Emperor gave notice of the approaching inauguration of the constitutional regime. He allotted nine years for the preparation. This length of time was to serve as a preliminary political interlude during which the people were to prepare themselves for the coming active participation in the political life of their country, and likewise as a time of preparation for the administrative organs of State in which they should bring the central administration in harmony with modern ideas of a constitutional State conducted according to the fundamental law.

Political parties as yet existed in no organized form. The first attempt at the formation of a party arose in 1874, when under the leadership of Itagaki, a memorial was presented to the government for the establishment of a popularly elected legislative assembly. But with the issuance of the Imperial decree in 1881 promising the grant of a Constitution and the establishment of a Diet in 1890, political parties reached the stage of organized bodies owing most of their success to the political activities of Count Itagaki and Count Okuma. They were subjected to severe Government persecution and it was only after the Constitution had become a fact and a Diet fully established, that political parties received any formal recognition on the part of the Government. It was in the sixth Diet—from May to June 1894—that for the first time an Opposition party held a majority, necessitating the dissolution of the Lower House after a session of eighteen days. This was the entering wedge which opened the way for complete recognition, for soon thereafter came the war with China, and at the extraordinary session of the Seventh Diet—from the 18th to the

21st of October—domestic quarrels were forgotten in the face of foreign war.

In 1895 after the signing of peace, Mutsu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at this time took a leading part in forever setting at rest the feud between the Government and the political parties. The *Jiyuto* party, formerly in Opposition showed signs of an inclination to approach the Government. Mutsu, accordingly planned a coalition between that party and the Government, which was accomplished and announced in November 1895. As still another Opposition party—the *Kokumin Kyokai*—also allied itself with the Government in the Ninth Diet—from December 1895 to March 1896—the Ministry commanded a majority for the first time in the Lower House against the combined Opposition. Soon thereafter Count Itagaki, President of the Jiyuto was given a place in the Ito Ministry as Minister of the Interior, and upon the fall of this Ministry, and the formation of the new Ministry under the premiership of Count Matsugata, Count Okuma who, as has been stated, had taken a foremost part together with Count Itagaki in the fight for the establishment of political parties, was now taken up as Minister of Foreign Affairs. With the appointment of leaders of the Opposition to positions in successive ministries, it appeared that the political parties had achieved the ideals cherished by them for more than twenty years.

It must be remembered however that thus far in Japanese history no single political party has succeeded in taking upon itself the full responsibility of government. Count Okuma and Count Itagaki had tried it in 1898 and Marquis Ito in 1900, and had failed, owing to a lack of internal unity in the parties joined to form a Cabinet, and to their lack of political training and confidence. Accordingly the Government has remained, for the most part, in the hands of Satsuma ond Choshu clan statesmen who are unconnected with political parties.

We have given this brief outline of the origin and establishment of political parties in Japan, because is it to these parties that credit is due for whatever semblance of Constitutional government (as understood by Western democracies) Japan has received. It was the political parties who first created the public demand for the establishment of a national assembly and hastened the enactment of the Constitution, and later commanding a majority in the Diet, forced the Government to recognize parties organized to take an effective part in Government. But we must not be deceived into thinking that these manifestations of party power are indicative of true representative government, or that they mean a wide-spread participation of the people in political affairs. The truth is that the people of Japan are as yet politically uneducated. What party government there has been, has been exercised by a small body of intelligent men who have as yet not succeeded in deepening and broadening the foundations of political thinking among the people. The suffrage is as yet greatly restricted, public opinion is as yet uninformed, and the masses not yet trained to understand the nature of the topics of the day. But the greatest hindrance to the enlightenment of the masses, and to their participation in the affairs of State lies within the provisions of the Constitution itself. A Constitution so rigid as this one, contains none of the elements which make for the continued development of constitutional institutions, and for autonomy by the people.

It was in the year 1882 that the Emperor of Japan entrusted to Marquis Ito the work of drafting a Constitution to be submitted to his approval. In the performance of his task, Marquis Ito made extended visits to various constitutional countries to make a thorough study of the actual workings of different systems of constitutional governments, of their various provisions, as well as of the theories and opinions actually

entertained by influential persons on constitutional subjects.

As Marquis Ito has himself explained in the elaborate commentaries which accompany his draft of the Constitution, he was prevented from adopting mere imitations of foreign models, out of consideration for the historical peculiarities of his own country. Of no other country in the world could it be said that the Crown played so great a part in history or was so deeply rooted in the national sentiment. In Japan, the Crown constituting the very essence of a once theocratic state, it became Marquis Ito's chief task to draft a constitution which should preserve in their full vitality and actuality, the prerogatives of the Crown, and exclude restrictions and limitations on the sovereign rights of the monarch which should derogate from his supreme authority. How far he succeeded is evident from a study of the Constitution itself.

The first three sections of the Constitution give expression to the sacred regard and reverence in which the monarchical institution is held, and the regard that should be paid for its perpetuation in an unbroken line of descendants. Article III. of the Constitution reads, "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable," and Marquis Ito's comment on this runs as follows: "The sacred Throne was established at a time when the heavens and the earth became separated. The Emperor is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; he is pre-eminent above all his subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. He has indeed to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold him accountable to it. Not only there shall be no irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall he not be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion."

Articles V. and VI. provide respectively that "the Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet," and that "the Emperor gives sanction to laws, and

orders them to be promulgated and executed." In commenting upon these provisions Ito makes it clear that the intention is to provide the Monarch with the most extensive legislative and executive powers of the State. Without his sanction no law can be promulgated. Without his direction no measures may be taken for their execution. A Diet exists, and a Cabinet likewise. The former may initiate projects of law, and the latter may cause drafts of law to be made under the Emperor's direction. But no project can become law even with the consent of the Diet without the Emperor's sanction. "The use of the Diet," says Ito, "is to enable the Head of the State to perform his functions... while the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent." It is the Emperor's sanction that makes the law.

In ordinary times of peace, and in the absence of extraordinary circumstances of calamity, a law requires the consent of the Diet. But in time of war, or other national calamity, the Emperor may, "in the interest of public safety," legislate without the consent of the Diet by means of Imperial Ordinances. The Emperor, having the power under Article VII to dissolve the Diet, it is therefore competent for him to carry on the government of the country by Imperial Ordinance until such time as he may deem necessary to convoke it again. These Imperial Ordinances, Ito divides into two classes, to wit, "emergency ordinances" and "administrative ordinances". The former are employed only in the abnormal circumstances of war or to avert public calamities, in the interest of the public safety. The "administrative ordinances", however, are effective in normal circumstances, and are not called forth by any temporary exigency. These "administrative ordinances" serve a two-fold purpose. They are employed (1) when it is required to regulate measures and details for the carrying out of any particular law; (2) when it is required to meet the necessity

of maintaining the public peace and order and of promoting the welfare of subjects.

The practical effect of all these ordinance provisions is to provide the Mikado with the means for retaining in his own hands, at all times, in time of war and in time of peace, the supreme legislative power of the State. He may, in time of war or other period of national stress, legislate by means of his "emergency ordinances," without the consent of the Diet; and in ordinary times, he has the power, by means of his "administrative ordinances," to nullify a statute already enacted with his consent, by regulating the details of its execution, or by suspending its operation "in the interest of public order" or "to promote the public welfare."

It is true that all "Such Imperial ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future." But this provision would seem to be of little value as it has no retroactive effect and applies only to the future. That is to say, in effect, that the emergency, which called forth the application of an Imperial Ordinance, having passed away, the Diet is then permitted to say that it shall have no future application.

The supreme authority in military and naval affairs is vested in the Emperor, and he likewise determines the organization and the peace standing of the army and navy. These powers are all attributes of the sovereign power of the Emperor, and the right to interfere in their exercise nowhere exists.

By the 13th Article, declarations of war, conclusions of peace and of treaties are the exclusive prerogatives of the Sovereign with respect to which no consent of the Diet is required. According to the Japanese practice, this article is so interpreted that the conduct of diplomatic affairs, like the conduct of military and naval affairs, forms a part of the Imperial prerogative and

lies entirely outside the rights of the Imperial Diet. If the execution of a diplomatic act calls for something which, according to the Constitution, can be done only by force of law, such a law will be submitted to the deliberation of the Diet as law, but the diplomatic act itself never requires the assent of the Legislature for its validity. Similarly the resolution of the Diet regarding diplomatic questions has no binding effect, and can at best take the form of an address to the Emperor or memorandum to the Government. Interpellations regarding foreign policies are generally met by the answer that the matter in question is beyond the power of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to answer.

While it is true that the appropriation for the Foreign Office has to be voted by the Diet, as also those of all the Ministerial Departments, nevertheless the system of forcing the Foreign Secretary to state his policy regarding pending diplomatic questions as in England and other countries on the occasion of Budget deliberations, can not be introduced in Japan owing to the provision of the Constitution already referred to. Moreover there is precious little control on the part of the Diet over its own Budgets, in view of the provisions of another Article of the Constitution (Art. LXVII.) which prevents either House to strike out or decrease, without the consent of the Government *fixed* expenses, to wit, expenses once voted in the last Budget for the exercise of the Imperial prerogatives, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government or that may have arisen by the effect of law.

Of course, under ordinary circumstances, the Sovereign does not exercise his absolute power in diplomatic affairs, but commits them to the care of his Cabinet Council, and only in rare, exceptional cases does the Emperor directly commission his Minister of Foreign Affairs to conduct a special diplomatic affair without reference to the Council. But, as we have seen

the Emperor possesses exclusive jurisdiction in these matters and may exercise it to whatever extent he sees fit.

It must be tolerably clear from the foregoing account of the method of handling diplomatic affairs, how little voice any one but the Emperor and his immediate advisers has in their determination. Indeed the most important steps may be taken in international diplomacy, steps involving the question of war or peace, and the nation placed face to face with a *fait accompli*, by the single voice and mandate of the Sovereign, unrestrained by any necessity of consulting the will of the people. The effect of the system, moreover, is to entomb all diplomatic discussions and exchanges as well as the final results of diplomatic deliberations, within the four walls of the Foreign Office in Tokio. Not only are all pending negotiations kept secret, but secret they remain till the end of time, unless revealed in some fortuitous way, usually through publication in foreign Government reports or official organs. Every year, many weighty diplomatic questions arise and find official solutions, without, however, the people in general ever dreaming that they exist at all.

Nothing could furnish a better illustration of the manner in which the Government of Japan is conducted than this—the profound secrecy maintained in the conduct of its foreign relations, and its contemptuous disregard of the voice or sentiment of the people, in matters of the most vital moment and of such far reaching effect as to involve the future welfare of an entire nation. Such disregard of public opinion could only be possible in a nation that lacks all the essentials of democratic government, as understood by the democracies of the West—and such a nation is Japan.

Article XV. declares that the "Emperor confer titles of nobility, rank, orders and and other marks of honour." The Emperor is, therefore, as Ito says, the fountain of honour, and

it belongs to his sovereign power to reward merit, to require services, to mark distinguished conduct and praiseworthy undertakings, and to confer conspicuous titular distinctions and other marks of honour and special favors.

The right of pardon for offences against the law reposes solely in the Emperor, who may employ his beneficent power to give relief where there is no hope of it to be looked for from the law. He likewise has the sole power to grant amnesty in certain special cases, commutations of sentences, and 'rehabilitation' or restoration of public rights that have been forfeited.

The thirteen articles of the Constitution (Article IV. to XVI.), in which the sovereign powers of the Emperor are enumerated, have now been considered. But these sovereign powers do not depend for their existence upon the fact that they are expressed. All other sovereign powers, not expressed, says Ito, such as the right of coining money, or of fixing weights and measures, are meant to be included within the sovereign power of the Emperor.

The rights and duties of subjects are clearly defined in fifteen articles, the most important of which (Article XXVIII.) provides that "Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief." Article XIX., which admits all Japanese subjects, irrespective of class, to employment as civil or military officers and in other public positions, was looked upon by the nation as one of the most liberal concessions in the Constitution, because it finally abolished the system of hereditary employment which had hitherto proved an insuperable obstacle to the advancement of the lower orders of society. Article XXIII., stipulating that no Japanese subject should be arrested, detained, tried, or punished unless according to law, was also popular inasmuch as it defined the duties of the police authorities, who previously

had not hesitated on occasions to resort to methods of persecution, and, sometimes, even of torture.

The provisions of the Constitution appertaining to the Imperial Diet are contained in twenty-two Articles. Ito defines its functions as follows: To deliberate upon laws, but not determine them; to receive petitions, to address the Emperor, to put questions to the Government and demand explanations. Representations to the Government which are rejected cannot be made again during the same session. Ministers of State and delegates of the Government may at any time take seats and speak in either House.

In commenting upon the establishment of two Houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives, Ito declares that if the House of Peers fulfills its functions it will serve in a remarkable degree to preserve an equilibrium between political powers; to restrain the undue influences of political parties; to check the evil tendencies of irresponsible discussions; to secure the stability of the Constitution; to be an instrument for maintaining harmony between the governing and the governed; and permanently to sustain the prosperity of the country and the happiness of the people. Furthermore, he explained that the object in having a House of Peers was not merely the admittance of the higher class to some share in the deliberations upon legislative matters, but also representation of the prudence, experience, and perseverance of the people, by assembling together men who had rendered signal service to the State, men of erudition and men of great wealth. That the President and Vice-President, one third of the members and the orders of nobility, together constituting an overwhelming majority of the House of Peers, are all chosen by the Emperor, was probably a consideration that weighed greatly with Ito, as an additional support and safeguard for the perpetuation of the monarchy against popular assault.

Article LV. provides that "the respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it." With respect to this Article, Ito declares the intention to be that the Ministers should be directly responsible to the Emperor and indirectly so to the people, and that the degree of responsibility of the Minister for such advice should be decided by the Sovereign in virtue of his supreme power over the land. He further points out that the Minister-President and other Ministers of State, being alike personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of control over the posts occupied by other Ministers while the latter ought not to be dependent on the former. He did not approve of the idea of the Ministry being regarded as a corporate body, on the ground "that the evil of such a system is that the power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme power of the sovereign."

Finance is the subject of eleven Articles, one of the most important of which has already been referred to (Article LXVII.) Other important provisions are Article LXX., which provides that when the Diet cannot be convoked, owing to the external or internal conditions of the country, the Government may take all necessary financial measures by means of an Imperial Ordinance, and Article LXXI., which provides for a refusal to vote estimates, or the rejection of budgets, by declaring that in such contingencies it shall be competent for the Government to carry out the budget of the preceding year.

We now come to the consideration of one of the most remarkable provisions in the Constitution. It is the provision which places the power of amendment of the Constitution entirely in the hands of the Emperor. In order that we may understand the full nature and force of this provision (Article

LXXIII.) it is necessary for us to consider the conditions and circumstances under which the Constitution was promulgated and presented to the people. In theory, at least, the Constitution is presumed to be the work of the Emperor. In practice, it was the work of Marquis Ito, who began his great task in 1884 and completed it four years later. When completed, the draft was presented to a Privy Council which had been inaugurated to consider and discuss the new provisions of the proposed fundamental law of the State. Ito assures us that the Emperor was constantly present at the deliberations of this assembly, and in no small measure influenced its decisions. "And as often as I was received in audience," says Ito "His Majesty asked questions concerning the Constitution while holding the draft in his hand. Thus our Constitution was formulated under the strict supervision of the Emperor." On Februari 11, 1889, the Constitution was promulgated in the following terms: "Having by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favoured with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors; and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support, we hereby promulgate, in pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript of the 14th day of the 10th month of the 14th year of Meiji, a fundamental law of State, to exhibit the principles, by which we are to be guided in Our conduct, and to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform.

"The rights of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in future fail to wield

them in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby granted.

"We now declare to respect and protect the security of the rights and of the property of Our people, and to secure to them the complete enjoyment of the same, within the extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and of the law.

"The Imperial Diet shall first be convoked for the twenty-third year of Meiji, and the time of its opening shall be the date when the present Constitution comes into force.

"When in the future it may become necessary to amend any of the provisions of the present Constitution, We or Our successors shall assume the initiative right, and submit a project for the same to the Imperial Diet. The Imperial Diet shall pass its vote upon it according to the conditions imposed by the present Constitution, and in no otherwise shall Our descendants or Our subjects be permitted to attempt any alteration thereof.

"Our Ministers of State, on Our behalf, shall be held responsible for the carrying out of the present Constitution, and Our present and future subjects shall forever assume the duty of allegiance to the present Constitution."

Article LXXV. of the Constitution gives us a still further demonstration of the intent of the authors of the Constitution to safeguard and preserve undiminished the power that had been vested in the Throne for centuries, and to maintain the principle that the right of making amendments must belong to the Emperor himself, as sole author of the Constitution. It reads as follows: "No modification can be introduced into the Constitution, or into the Imperial House Law, during the time of a Regency." The institution of a regent is fixed by the Imperial House Law, and not by the Constitution. The Imperial House Law contains all those provisions of law, declared

to be non-revocable and non-amendable except by consent of the Emperor, which appertain to such matters as succession to the throne, accession and coronation, the time of coming of age of the Emperor and of the Emperor's eldest son and grandson who are to be his successors to the throne, the regency, the Imperial Governor during the minority of the Emperor, the Imperial Family, the expenditures of the Imperial House etc. etc.

The foregoing brief sketch of the most important provisions of the Constitution and the interpretation thereof as expounded by its author must make it clear to the reader that however much, in form, Japan may be said to belong in the ranks of democratically governed states, in reality it is not democratically governed at all. The infallibility and sanctity of the Sovereign are the ground principles and foundation of the whole structure upon which constitutional government in Japan was reared. The ideal of the union of the throne and the nation set forth in the revolution of 1868 has never been realized. Japan is still, in essentials, a feudal state ruled by a bureaucracy. In spite of Constitutions, diets and 'gifts' of the Emperor, the men of the sword still rule in Nippon. The feudal system, exemplified in the landholding classes is re-instated and its organ of government is the bureaucracy. The doctrine that the supreme power of the Emperor is heaven-descended and unalterable retains its strength unimpaired throughout the masses of the Mikado's subjects. As Ito puts it, "from the nature of the original polity of this country, it follows that there ought to be one, and only one, source of sovereign power of State, just as there is one dominant will that calls into motion each and every distinct part of the human body. The use of the Diet is to enable the head of the State to perform his functions and to keep the will of the State in a well-disciplined, strong, and healthy condition." Clan politics, bureau-

cracy and militarism are the absolutely triumphant factors, and their spirit has simply been re-baptized "Imperialism." For thirty years Count Okuma and Count Itagaki fought the Satsuma-Choshu-Tosa clan combination, and tried repeatedly to form a coalition ministry, but they were compelled to realize that the power of person over principle was too strongly entrenched to be uprooted. Accordingly when Okuma became Premier in 1914, following an appalling revelation of graft in the governmental finances, he was compelled to subordinate his own will to the will of the bureaucrats and the war party, the anomaly of his position being, in a Constitutionally governed state, that he owed his position not to the strength of a party or a coalition of parties, but solely to the power exercised by the Emperor on the advice of the Genro, or Elder Statesmen. The bureaucrats and the war party wanted not only to eliminate Germany from the East, but to humble China and compromise her sovereignty. When Count Okuma failed to proceed along these lines with sufficient vigor, he was brought to his fall in October 1916. To carry matters with a high hand at Peking, this is what was demanded of the Government by the real rulers of Japan. Count Okuma's hesitation was attributed as weakness, and when his Foreign Minister, Baron Kato, showed, by his friendship for England and his insistence on respecting the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, that he, too, lacked the stern and uncompromising character that was now being demanded of the men at the helm, the Okuma Ministry could no longer retain its mandate.

The new premier Count Terauchi, like the late Premier, Prince Katsura, is looked upon as a disciple of Prince Yamagata, who is one of the great powers in politics behind the throne, and probably the most unconvinced opponent of constitutional government in the Empire. Count Terauchi is a bureaucrat with a military training and outlook, and though he spent years

in close application to military and administrative problems in Berlin, he will, whatever his private sentiments may be, carry out the will of the war-like Elder Statesmen, so long as he remains in office.

XV.

JAPAN PRESENTS HER BILL.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN.

Japan Presents Her Bill.

To understand clearly the strength of Japan's present international position with respect to her allies, and the added weight that has been newly given to her situation as a nation among nations, a correct appreciation is necessary of the part played by Japan in the present war as an actual participant in the conflict. There is no doubt that while Japan was especially invited to cooperate in the war by the reduction of Tsingtau, she would have managed, even if not invited, to crowd her way into it. Only actual participants could hope to benefit, and Japan was in the happy position of being able to participate without much risk and at small cost, and to prescribe, very much according to her own ideas, the measure of remuneration she was to receive for her services. Accordingly, when invited to take part, she not only undertook to reduce Tsingtau, but voluntarily offered to police the Pacific east of Singapore, and to annex the few islands in the Pacific that were held by Germany. This part of the work she carried out, and although, apart from Tsingtau, she sustained no loss of life or damage to her navy, while her only outlay was in the consumption of coal and ammunition, she speedily showed that she expected more than the mere reversionary interest in Germany's Far Eastern possessions. Barely four months had passed after the outbreak of the war when Japan put forward the suggestion that she would abandon to Australia all the islands south of

the Equator, in consideration of being allowed to retain those to the north. This would of course give her the possession of the Marshall Islands and the Carolines, but would mean the abandonment of Samoa. To this the United States is understood to have objected, so Japan retained and still retains control of all of them. For the present the matter is still awaiting settlement at the final peace conference.

As has heretofore been pointed out, Japan is not at the present moment supporting the Anglo-Japanese Alliance from love of England; what Japan really hopes for, upon the conclusion of the war and the opening of peace negotiations, is a counterbalancing of forces—the Anglo-Saxon combination poised against the Russo-Germanic. Such an even balance of power between these two groups would place Japan in the position of being able to choose her future partners in accordance with the needs of her newly created *Welt Politik*. Accordingly if the Philippine question, the Pacific Islands question, the California question and the British Colonial Immigration question are to form a part of Japan's future policies, Germany will in that event be Japan's most useful ally, England, on the contrary, her most active enemy.

The question now remains, will the Anglo-Saxon combination wish to retain the friendship of Japan at the price they will necessarily have to pay for it. Will they be willing to give Japan a free hand in China, the German Islands in the Pacific, Russia's Martime Province in Siberia with the port of Vladivostock and a few other far-reaching claims that Japan is prepared to demand of them as a reward for her support in the present war? Just what Japanese support has been worth to the Allied cause will be pointed out to them about as follows:—Had Japan remained neutral, Russia would have been compelled to keep a million men in Siberia, France would have been obliged to garrison

her Indo-Chinese possession with several army corps, and Great Britain would have been forced to maintain in the Indian and Pacific Oceans for the protection of India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, a fleet at least equal to that of Japan, while the ability to draw on the Indian Army would be greatly restricted. Japan took from Germany her naval base in the Far East at Tsingtau, and performed great services to the Allies by immobilizing, by the siege, the ships of the enemy in the harbor, which otherwise might easily have raided and wrought serious damage on such centres as Hong Kong and Singapore. Japan's fleet was active in the Indian and Pacific Oceans protecting the commerce of the Allies, and she deprived Germany of her naval bases in the Marshall and Caroline Islands, as well as in the Ladrones. In the first year of the conflict Japanese warships protected the coasts of Australia, New Zealand and British Columbia at a time when German cruisers were still in the Pacific. Troops from Australia and New Zealand have been conveyed to Suez with the assistance of Japanese cruisers, not once, but continually. According to a statement made by Admiral Yashiro, Minister of Marine, the strength of the Japanese squadrons constantly employed after the occupation of Tsingtau in cooperating with the British fleet was 225,000 tons or about the total strength of the navy of Japan in her war with Russia and double that of the British Eastern and Australian fleets prior to the war. Considerable though these items may be, Japan's greatest contribution to the cause of the Allies remains to be named—the munitioning of Russia. Japan armed two-thirds of Russia's millions. Japan's help to Russia included clothing, boots and practically everything in the way of equipment. In 1915, Japan furnished the Russian Army with 8,000,000 yards of cloth. She also sent rifles to Kitchener's armies, and provided guns for the British Navy. In addition to policing the Indian and Pacific Oceans Japan began in the

second year of the war to render effective help in the patrolling of the Mediterranean. At the present time Japan is leading an expedition into Siberia at the particular urgent instance of France and England. At the time of the uprising at Singapore, Japan landed troops at the critical moment and saved the British community there from extermination. Each battalion that went from Western Canada included fifty Japanese volunteers in 1914 and 1915 and three of these Japanese, in British Columbia regiments, won the Victoria Cross and many other lesser medals and mention in 1916. At the request of the Russian Government, Japanese artillery officers conducted a school of gunnery at Petrograd for two and one half years. The Japanese officers were asked by General Brusiloff to take charge of his artillery in his last great offensive, and it will be recalled that the artillery fire was the great feature of his advance.

These are the outstanding features of Japan's long bill of account which she is preparing to draw up for presentation to her allies in the present war. The justice of her claim to compensation is beyond dispute, and no doubt that fact will be conceded when the time comes to settle accounts. But it is equally clear that England and America are preparing to resist Japan's uttermost demands. America's participation in the European war is not understandable on any other theory than this, that her full strength must be thrown in the scale as a counterpoise to the Japanese demands. Had the United States taken no part in the conflict, Japan's influence at the peace councils, would have been an overwhelming one. Opposition to Japan is the meaning of Mr. Wilson's repeated, almost systematically repeated declarations, that America is in the war for entirely unselfish ends. America's *unselfish* participation will be set off against Japanese selfish designs to profit by the war. Japan's weight and influence at the Peace Conference will accordingly suffer, and in the end she will be obliged to

moderate or recede from some of her demands, and at least share primacy in the Pacific with the United States and England. Whatever else the United States may have in mind by her entrance into the war, there can be no doubt that one of her principal objects will have been attained when she sits down at the peace councils and opposes her will as a participant who has performed services equally valuable with Japan's in the war, and who therefore is entitled to an equal right to be consulted about the division of the spoils.

XVI.

THE GENRO, OR ELDER STATESMEN.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN.

The Genro, or Elder Statesmen.

The term *Genro*, or Elder Statesmen is a comprehensive term that embraces a small coterie of men who from the beginning of the 'Restoration' period have possessed the full confidence of the Emperor, and have constituted his chief and most intimate advisers. The *Genro* are an advisory council only, and possess no Constitutional prerogatives. They are, however, and from the beginning of the new era, always have been the real power behind the Throne, and chief directors of the nation's statecraft and policies. They may be likened, in the extent of their authority over the officially chosen Ministers of State who *ostensibly* possess the conduct of public affairs, to the Board of Directors of a large railroad corporation, who from time to time, as circumstances warrant, order changes to be made in the operating management of the road, a new president, a new general manager, a new treasurer and so on down the list of those who are held out to the world as the managers of the company.

Among the most prominent and influential of the Elder Statesmen in the past have been Ito, Inouye, Matsukata and Yamagata. These men steered the bark of state, from their unofficial positions behind the Throne, during Japan's most critical period, the Russo-Japanese War. Of the four, Prince Ito was most highly regarded, during his life time. He it was who drew the draft of Japan's Constitution, in which he laid

down those principles of monarchical absolutism that have guided the destinies of Japan to this day. And yet, despite his apparent devotion to the absolutist theories of monarchical government, Ito seems in his later years to have become a convert to government by the party system, and to have striven to modify the rigid character of the methods of government by an attempt to introduce more popular methods. That he failed in his attempt was no fault of his own. He had to contend with such insuperable obstacles as the indifference of his own people and the unbending opposition of such convinced and unshakeable devotees of monarchical absolutism as Prince Yamagata, who has been, and is to this day, the bitterest foe of party politics in Japan.

Inouye and Matsukata were both great financial experts, and held the financial portfolio in several cabinets. Prince Ito and Prince Yamagata have both held the post of premier, nevertheless in the exercise of real power, both of these men have acted more in their capacity as *Genro*, than as cabinet ministers clothed with the ostensible authority. Of the four men named, only Yamagata and Matsukata are still alive.

Other men who have in recent years played a part in the Councils of the Elder Statesmen are Marquis Katsura, thrice Premier, Admiral Count Yamamoto, the late Viscount Kodama, and Baron Shibusawa, Japan's leading merchant. The most recent additions to the list of Elder Statesmen are the former Premiers, Marquis Saionji and Marquis Okuma.

Of the Elder Statesmen named, Prince Yamagata is far and away the most influential and the cleverest. Bitterly opposed from the very outset to representative government in any form, Prince Yamagata has known how, successfully to combat every assault that has been made through press or parliament upon the absolutist prerogatives of an autocratically governed state. His acknowledged policy has been the repression of public

opinion, consistent and determined opposition to popular representation, the development to the uttermost limit of bureaucratic government, and control by the military party of the colonies. His influence is so overshadowing, by reason of the great Choshu clan interests behind him, and by his connection with a family clique, comprising men of great ability high in the service of the State, all of whom are devoted supporters of his policies. By marriages and inter-marriages the Yamagata clan influence controls the Army, the Colonial administration, the Home office, the Educational departments and the Privy Council of which Yamagata is President. Yamagata is the only great man among the elder statesmen who has never for long held a cabinet position. He prefers the role of a builder of cabinets without himself becoming a part of the structure. Prince Katsura, one of the strongest men Japan has produced, held the premiership three times. He also was a Choshu clansman and a 'Yamagata man.' Like Bismarck, whose great admirer he was, Katsura was a man of 'blood and iron.' A soldier from his earliest days, he learned the fundamentals of his profession in Berlin, where he spent several years of his life in the hardest work and study. The military organization, administration, drill and education of Japan's soldiery are largely the fruits of Katsura's studies in Germany. In his policies, both foreign and domestic, he adhered rigidly to the plans of the *Genro.* Under him the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded, and the Russo-Japanese war carried on to a successful conclusion. He was no constitutional statesman; under his direction the various parties of the Diet were guided to his purpose as an expert chess-player moves his counters about the board. "Government by a military oligarchy," is how his administration of the affairs of state was characterized by Carey Hall, former British Consul General at Yokohama. He demonstrated what effective use could be made of the Imperial Ordinances,

of which we have learned something in the preceding pages (Japan's Constitution). Opposition to his will was answered by Katsura by the application of any expedient, however drastic, that would suit his purpose, and in the carrying out of his high-handed measures, he could quote the Constitution, just as the devil is said to quote Scripture, to his purpose.

We have hitherto spoken only of the strong leadership in affairs taken by the *Choshu* clan with Yamagata as chief spokesman. What the Choshu clan is with respect to the Army, the Colonies, the Civil Service and Education, the Satsuma clan is to the Navy, Finance and Industries. The Iwazakis, the Krupps of Japan, are linked up with Satsuma clan interests. The families of the three founders of the Japanese Navy, Nire, Saigo, and Kabayama are of the Satsuma, and have brought within the orbit of their influence the two principal dockyard concerns, the Mitsu Bishi and the Kawasaki, besides possessing a controlling voice in many of the leading financial institutions. Whereas, on the one hand, Inouye, the founder of Japan's monetary system and the most trusted adviser of the Emperor Matsuhito on all matters connected with Finance, was a Choshu clansman, we find, on the other hand, that Matsukata, likewise an authority on finance and Minister of Finance in seven cabinets, was a clansman of Satsuma and like Yamagata owing something of his influence to numerous important family connections who have attained to prominence in finance and in the service of the State. Choshu and Satsuma, as indicated above, have been rivals in Finance and still are today.

One other leading Satsuma *Genro* remains to be mentioned. We refer to Admiral Count Yamamoto. Allied by marriage with the Nire, Saigo, and Kabayama families heretofore referred to as the founders of the Japanese Navy, Yamamoto exercises great influence in the Genro councils, and just as Yamagata represents the voice of the Army, so Yamamoto acts as spokes-

man for the Navy. The views of the two statesmen on foreign policy, each representing a different branch of the service, are widely different. This has been pointed out in a former chapter in a consideration of the question of Japan's future policy of expansion in the direction of the sea as against the policy of expansion landwards, on the Asiatic continent. Besides his qualifications as a naval strategist, Admiral Yamamoto has shown himself possessed of considerable political ability. It was he that engineered the fall of the third Katsura Ministry in 1913, and in the execution of this *coup* displayed unexpected qualities of political leadership which gained for him the increased devotion of his clan in whose interests he had overthrown a rival clansman and a leader of the political prowess of a Katsura. The Yamomoto Cabinet lasted only about one year and was succeeded by the Okuma ministry.

What we see in the political system of Japan is a division of power between the chieftains of two leading, all-powerful feudal clans. Party politics is played to get power for one or the other of the two clans. It is a perpetual race between Army and Navy as to which shall get a bigger slice of the estimates in the Budget, and Cabinets rise and fall over the financial contentions of the rival factions. This has been the situation since 1907. Previously, clan politics not having then developed to the line of open cleavage that has developed in the past decade, Army and Navy maintained a more harmonious and united front. What the future course of events will be as between the two elements, it is difficult to judge. At present, we see in the Premiership of Count Terauchi the temporary triumph of the militarists. No doubt a cabinet in which military influence predominates is best suited to the needs of war. But it is just the fact that Japan has engaged upon an adventure which partakes of the nature of a military invasion of the continent, that has evoked the most strenuous opposition in

Japan to the present Ministry. The Naval school of strategists as well as the business element who regard with misgivings a project that may eventually turn their huge war profits into a loss, are undoubtedly opposed to the continuance of the present Ministry. The Navy see troubles looming up at sea. They favor the augmentation of the fleet at all costs, and if the pendulum again swings to their side, we shall probably see a change of policy, domestic as well as foreign, that will have much to do with events of the immediate future.

Clouds are gathering over Japan, black with evil portent. Her *Genro* are growing old. They have guided Japan through a sea of troubles and their hands have held the helm steady in many a foundering trough. Thus far in Japanese history, clan rivalries have given way to single-minded patriotism in times of great stress and danger. But this has been due to a large extent to the towering influence of such men as Yamagata, Ito, Yamamoto, Inouye and Matsukata who have exerted their genius to the creation of a powerful and united nation. Whether or not when these great men have all passed away, (and only a few of them remain), there will be others of equal genius and equal patriotism to take their places, "lies on the knees of the gods."

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

The House of Peers.

The Constitution provides, Article XXXIV, "The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the Ordinance Concerning the House of Peers, be composed of the members of the Imperial Family, of the orders of nobility, and of those persons who have been nominated thereto by the Emperor."

As will be seen from what follows, the House of Peers is pre-eminently a conservative institution, and constitutes one of the chief props and bulwarks of the institution of absolute monarchy as it is perpetuated in the State by the provisions of the Constitution. There are many survivors of former generations who are still full of theocratic ideas, and who believe that any attempt to restrict the Imperial prerogative amounts to something like high treason, and these men are all bitterly opposed to any extension of Constitutional privileges. A majority of the House of Peers is made up of these reactionary hereditary nobles, together with additions made to the ranks of the nobility consisting of public servants rewarded for their fidelity and services to the Emperor and the State. Aside from such purely loyal elements as these, there are certain other members, about one-third of the House, who owe their positions to the Imperial recognition of meritorious services or erudition. Representatives of the principal taxpayers (one member elected for seven years from each city and prefecture by the fifteen highest taxpayers) cannot take their seats in the House without the Imperial nomination. The President and Vice-president of the House, holding office for seven years are appointees of the Emperor.

In the following table showing the composition of the House of Peers, the first three classes named sit by hereditary right:

Princes of the Blood	14
Princes	13
Marquises	30
Counts	17
Viscounts	70
Barons	56
Imperial Nominees	121
Representatives of Highest Taxpayers	43
Total	364

APPENDIX B.

The House of Representatives.

The House of Representatives which originally consisted of 300 members, has now been increased to 379. Elections take place normally every four years. The President and Vice-President are chosen by the Emperor from three names designated to him by the House. The Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the House of Peers and of the House of Representatives receive an annual allowance of 5000 yen (£ 500) and 3000 yen (£ 300) respectively. Members of both Houses, excepting the Hereditary Peers, receive 2000 yen annually, together with traveling expenses. One third of the members present constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business. Ordinarily a bill must be read three times before passing the Houses, but this rule may be suspended at the request of the Government, or by a two-thirds majority of members present, upon the request of ten members. Ministers of State and representatives of the Government may sit in the House and address its members, but are not permitted to vote unless they are themselves members.

A member is not allowed to put a question. He must seek his information through the medium of a submitted memorandum, to which at least thirty members lend their support, and this is laid before the responsible Minister for reply. Members are required to be present at sessions of the Diet, and leaves of absence are granted for not more than one week, and when an extension is required, the permission of the whole House must be first obtained.

APPENDIX C.

The Law of Elections.

Every male Japanese subject who has attained the age of twenty-five years and who has resided at a fixed address for one year is eligible to vote, providing that for at least one year previous to the making out of the electoral list he shall have paid direct national taxes of not less than 10 yen (£ 1). Every male Japanese who has attained thirty years (with the exception of teachers of religion) unless disqualified under the law by reason of the commission of a crime, is eligible for election to the Diet. Men in the army or navy cannot exercise the right to elect, nor can they be elected while on active service or in temporary retirement. Voting commences at 7 A. M. and closes 6 P. M. and is by open ballot. An election Committee, chosen by lot among the voters, watch the proceedings, and the counting takes place in their presence. When candidates receive an equal number of votes, the one senior in age is elected, and when they are of the same age a decision is arrived at by drawing lots.

There are two kinds of electoral divisions—the incorporated cities, which must contain not less than 30,000 inhabitants, but which in the case of larger cities, are privileged to return a plurality of representatives on the basis of one for every 130,000 persons; and the prefectural districts, which return one member for approximately every 130,000 residents. As the financial qualification is an exceedingly low one, some indication of the extreme poverty of the country may be derived from the fact that less than one-fiftieth of the population enjoy the franchise. It cannot be said that representative government is conspicuonsly successful in a country like Japan, where Members

of Parliament are elected with the low average of 2000 votes each. The rural constituencies possess an overwhelming majority of voters over the urban divisions, returning 304 members to the latter's 75. That in the matter of qualifying for the franchise they should have the advantage over the people who dwell in the centres of commerce, is not difficult to understand when it is borne in mind that the Land Tax constitutes a very large proportion of the direct national taxation, and that the great landowner is practically unknown in Japan. By placating the rural voters the Government is constantly able to secure support, and this is all the more readily given owing to the fact that the agricultural community is the last class in Japan to be affected by modern influences. They have little if any interest in the controversial questions of political life, and so long as they are left in peace to till their rice-fields they are content to subscribe an unquestioning loyalty to the bureaucratic administration which rules their destinies, believing that in this way they are best maintaining the supremacy of the Sovereign, and are doing all that is required of them in the fulfillment of the duties of true patriotism.—*From The Empires of the Far East by Lancelot Lawton.*

APPENDIX D.

The Shogunate.

In matters of arms and politics the Shogun was the actual head of the State, holding himself responsible to no one. The office of Shogun was inherited, but it needed the formal sanction of the Emperor for each succession. The Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867) had *de facto* the whole power of administration in its hands, both civil and military. The Tokugawa Shoguns enjoyed the title of Séii Taishogun (Commander-in-chief against Barbarians), and in addition were superintendents of the two learned institutions, Junna and Shokagu. Whenever a new Shogun came into office, a ceremony of installation took place, under the sanction of Imperial Ordinance. Thus, nominally the Shogun owed his title and appointment to Imperial favor. A new Shogun always renewed to each baron the trust or endowment of his fiefs, and this was intended to show by a sort of fiction that the new Shogun did not claim the title in his own right. Furthermore, the Shoguns neither conferred nor withdrew any title or rank without Imperial ratification.

APPENDIX E.

BUSHIDO.

The Japanese code of morals, born in her ancient life and nurtured in the period of civil war, as throughout the Tokugawa era, is the *Bushido*.

It was during the Nara period (the eighth century) that there began to develop among the warriors, by virtue of their competition for renown, that sense of self-sacrificing courage, which later, grew into a Knightly code of ethics called Bushido. During this era several Empresses succeeded to the Throne, and the influence of the Court was great. Peace and plenty reigned in the Imperial capital; Buddhism and literature were cultivated; music and dancing flourished; great feasts were held on occasions, public and private, and elegant costumes were elaborated, so that the literature and art of this period—especially the arts of spinning and weaving, and of sculpture and architecture—remain to this day models which have never been surpassed. During this time, the Government trained the soldiers of the 'Six Guards', levied from among the able bodied youth of the empire, as well as volunteers, and the members of the Imperial Family and of the nobility also maintained their own warriors, and made archery and hunting their pastime.

The ethics of the warrior of mediaeval Japan may be gathered from the following passage in an ancient chronicle:—"The warrior should conduct himself with the thought of his posterity in mind. He should not incur eternal ill-fame by sparing his own life, nor should he make himself an object of ridicule by unnecessarily losing his life. He should not be reckless, but should temper and train his mind at ordinary times. The advice given by one famous warrior to a disciple

that he should usually be timid, implied constant preparation for a final emergency."

Prince Ito writes, "The great ideals offered by philosophy and by historical examples of the golden ages of China and India, Japanicized in the form of a 'crust of customs', developed and sanctified by the continual usage of centuries under the comprehensive name of *Bushido*, offered us splendid standards of morality, rigorously enforced in every day life of the educated classes. The result, as everyone who is acquainted with Old Japan knows, was an education which aspired to the attainment of Stoic heroism, a rustic simplicity and a self sacrificing spirit unsurpassed in Sparta, and the aesthetic culture and intellectual refinement of Athens."

Bushido was beneficially affected by coming into contact with the Sung school of Confucianism and the Zen sect of Buddhism, both of which were introduced from China. Its influence has come down to this day, and is still holding its own in the minds of the people.—*Extracted from Fifty Years of New Japan by Count Okuma.*

APPENDIX F.

Précis of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, U. S. A. September 5, 1905.

ARTICLE 1. — Stipulates for the re-establishment of peace and friendship between the two countries.

ARTICLE 2. — Russia recognizes the preponderant interest, from political, military, and economic points of view, of Japan in the Empire of Korea, and stipulates that Russia will not oppose any measures for its government, protection, or control that Japan will deem necessary to take in Korea in conjunction with the Korean Government, but Russian subjects and Russian enterprises are to enjoy the same status as the subjects and enterprises of other countries. It was agreed also that in order to avoid all cause of misunderstanding, both countries will abstain, on the Russo-Korean frontier, from taking any military measures that may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

ARTICLE 3. — Japan and Russia mutually engage:—

(1) To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

(2) To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China, all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops with the exception of the territory above named.

The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any preferential or exclusive concession in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

ARTICLE 4. — Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

ARTICLE 5. — Russia engages to transfer and assign to Japan, without compensation, and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chun and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in the said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

ARTICLE 6. — The Manchurian Railway shall be worked jointly by Russia and Japan.

ARTICLE 7. — Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes. It is understood that restriction does not apply to the railways in the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

ARTICLE 8. — Is of minor importance.

ARTICLE 9. — Russia cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the Southern portion of the island of Saghalien, and all islands adjacent thereto, and all public works and properties thereon. The right of navigation is assured to Japan in the bays of La Perouse and Tartary. The fiftieth degree of latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory.

ARTICLE 10. — Deals with the situation of Russian subjects in South Saghalien.

ARTICLE 11. — Gives Japanese subjects the right to fish in Russian territorial waters.

ARTICLE 12. — The two parties engage to renew a commercial treaty.

ARTICLES 13 & 15. — Relate to exchange of prisoners and the ratification of the treaty.

ARTICLE 14. — Relates to the language to be used in the formal text of the treaty.

In a supplementary agreement each party reserved the right to keep fifteen soldiers per kilometre as an armed guard to patrol the railway lines.

APPENDIX G.

The Root-Takahira Agreement entered into between the Governments of Japan and the United States, November 30, 1908.

Washington, November 30, 1908.

SIR,—The exchange of views between us which has taken place at the several interviews which I have recently had the honour of holding with you has shown that, Japan and the United States of America holding important outlying insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, the Governments of the two countries are animated by a common aim, policy and intention in that region.

Believing that a frank avowal of that aim, policy, and intention would not only tend to strengthen the relations of friendship and good neighborhood which have immemorially existed between Japan and the United States, but would materially contribute to the preservation of the general peace, the Imperial Government have authorized me to present to you an outline of their understanding of that common aim, policy, and intention.

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean.

2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing *status quo* in the region above mentioned, and to the defence of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in China.

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in the said region.

4. They are also determined to preserve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting, by all pacific means at their disposal, the independence and integrity of China, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in that empire.

5. Should any event occur threatening the *status* as above described, or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it as useful to take.

If the foregoing outline accords with the view of the Government of the United States, I shall be gratified to receive your confirmation. I take this opportunity, etc. etc.

(Signed) TAKAHIRA.

Washington, November 30, 1908.

EXCELLENCY.—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, setting forth the result of the exchange of views between us in our recent interviews defining the understanding of the two Governments in regard to their policy in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

It is a pleasure to inform you that this expression of mutual understanding is welcome to the Government of the United States as appropriate to the happy relations of the two countries, and as the occasion for a concise mutual affirmation of that accordant policy respecting the Far East which the two Governments have so frequently declared in the past.

I am happy to be able to confirm to your Excellency, on behalf of the United States, the declaration of the two Governments embodied in the following words:—(Here follows a recapitulation of the terms as set forth in the Note tendered by Baron Takahira.)

Accept, your Excellency, etc. etc.

(Signed) ELIHU ROOT.

APPENDIX H.

The Constitution of the Empire of Japan.

Chapter I. — The Emperor.

Article I.

The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.

Article II.

The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

Article III.

The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.

Article IV.

The Emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution.

Article V.

The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article VI.

The Emperor gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and executed.

Article VII.

The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives.

Article VIII.

The Emperor in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial

Diet is not sitting, Imperial ordinances in the place of law. Such Imperial ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.

Article IX.

The Emperor issues or causes to be issued the ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws.

Article X.

The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and the salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions, especially provided for in the Constitution or in other laws shall be in accordance with the respective provisions bearing thereon.

Article XI.

The Emperor has supreme command of the army and navy.

Article XII.

The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the army and navy.

Article XIII.

The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties.

Article XIV.

The Emperor proclaims the law of siege. The conditions and effects of the law of siege shall be determined by law.

Article XV.

The Emperor confers titles of nobility, rank, orders, and other marks of honour.

Article XVI.

The Emperor orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments, and rehabilitation.

Article XVII.

A Regency shall be instituted in conformity with the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

The Regent shall exercise the powers appertaining to the Emperor in his name.

Chapter II. — Rights and Duties of Subjects.

Article XVIII.

The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be determined by law.

Article XIX.

Japanese subjects may, according to qualifications determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military offices equally, and may fill any other public offices.

Article XX.

Japanese subjects are amenable to service in the army or navy, according to the provisions of law.

Article XXI.

Japanese subjects are amenable to the duty of paying taxes, according to the provisions of law.

Article XXII.

Japanese subjects shall have the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits of law.

Article XXIII.

No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried, or punished, unless according to law.

Article XXIV.

No Japanese subject shall be deprived of his right of being tried by the Judges determined by law.

Article XXV.

Except in the cases provided for in the law, the house of no Japanese subject shal be entered or searched without his consent.

Article XXVI.

Except in the cases provided for in the law, the secrecy of the letters of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate.

Article XXVII.

The right of property of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate. Measures necessary to be taken for the public benefit shall be provided for by law.

Article XXVIII.

Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.

Article XXIX.

Japanese subjects shall within the limits of law enjoy liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings, and associations.

Article XXX.

Japanese subjects may present petitions, by observing the proper forms of respect and by complying with the rules specially provided for the same.

Article XXXI.

The provisions contained in the present chapter shall not effect the exercise of the powers appertaining to the Emperor, in times of war or in cases of a national emergency.

Article XXXII.

Each and every one of the provisions contained in the preceding articles of the present chapter that are not in conflict with the laws or the rules and discipline of the army and navy shall apply to the officers and men of the army and of the navy.

CHAPTER III. — THE IMPERIAL DIET.

Article XXXIII.

The Imperial Diet shall consist of two Houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives.

Article XXXIV.

The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the ordinance concerning the House of Peers, be composed of the members of the

Imperial Family, of the orders of nobility, and of those persons who have been nominated thereto by the Emperor.

Article XXXV.

The House of Representatives shall be composed of members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the law of election.

Article XXXVI.

No one can at one and the same time be a member of both Houses.

Article XXXVII

Every law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article XXXVIII.

Both Houses shall vote upon projects of law submitted to them by the Government, and may respectively initiate projects of law.

Article XXXIX.

A Bill which has been rejected by either the one or the other of the two Houses shall not be again brought in during the same session.

Article XL.

Both Houses can make representations to the Government as to laws, or upon any other subject. When, however, such representations are not accepted, they cannot be made a second time during the same session.

Article XLI.

The Imperial Diet shall be convoked every year.

Article XLII.

A session of the Imperial Diet shall last during three months. In case of necessity, the duration of a session may be prolonged by Imperial order.

Article XLIII.

When urgent necessity arises, an extraordinary session may be convoked, in addition to the ordinary one. The duration of an extraordinary session shall be determined by Imperial order.

Article XLIV.

The opening, closing, prolongation of session, and prorogation, of the Imperial Diet shall be effected simultaneously for both Houses.

In case the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, the House of Peers shall at the same time be prorogued.

Article XLV.

When the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve members shall be caused by Imperial order to be newly elected, and the new House shall be convoked within five months from the day of dissolution.

Article XLVI.

No debate can be opened, and no vote can be taken, in either House of the Imperial Diet, unless not less than one-third of the whole number of the members thereof be present.

Article XLVII.

Votes shall be taken in both Houses by absolute majority. In the case of a tie vote, the President shall have the casting vote.

Article XLVIII.

The deliberations of both Houses shall be held in public. The deliberations may, however, upon demand of the Government or by resolution of the House, be held in secret sitting.

Article XLIX.

Both Houses of the Imperial Diet may respectively present addresses to the Emperor.

Article L.

Both Houses may receive petitions presented by subjects.

Article LI.

Both Houses may enact, besides what is provided for in the present Constitution and in the Law of the Houses, rules necessary for the management of their internal affairs.

Article LII.

No member of either House shall be held responsible, outside the respective Houses, for any opinion uttered or for any vote given in the House. When, however, a member himself has given publicity to his opinions by public speech, by documents in print or in writting, or by any other similar means, he shall in the matter be amenable to the general law.

Article LIII.

The members of both Houses shall, during the session, be free from arrest, unless with the consent of the House, except in cases of *flagrante delicto* or of offences connected with a state of internal commotion or with a foreign trouble.

Article LIV.

The Ministers of State and the delegates of the Government may at any time take seats and speak in either House.

Chapter IV. — The Ministers of State and the Privy Council.

Article LV.

The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it.

All laws, Imperial ordinances, and Imperial rescripts, of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of State, require the countersignature of a Minister of State.

Article LVI.

The Privy Council shall, in accordance with the provisions for the organization of the Privy Council, deliberate upon important matters of State when they have been consulted by the Emperor.

Chapter V. — The Judicature.

Article LVII.

The Judicature shall be exercised by the courts of law according to law, in the name of the Emperor.

The organization of the courts of law shall be determined by law.

Article LVIII.

The Judges shall be appointed from among those who possess qualifications according to law.

No Judge shall be deprived of his position, unless by way of criminal sentence or disciplinary punishment.

Rules for disciplinary punishment shall be determined by law.

Article LIX.

Trials and judgments of a court shall be conducted publicly. When, however, there exists any fear that such publicity may be prejudicial to peace and order, or to the maintenance of public morality, the public trial may be suspended by provision of law or by the decision of the court of law.

Article LX.

All matters that fall within the competency of a special court shall be specially provided for by law.

Article LXI.

No suit at law which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the executive authorities, and which shall come within the competency of the Court of Administrative Litigation specially established by law, shall be taken cognizance of by a court of law.

CHAPTER VI. — FINANCE.

Article LXII.

The imposition of a new tax or the modification of the rates of an existing one shall be determined by law. However, all such administrative fees or other revenue having the nature of compensation shall not fall within the category of the above clause.

The raising of national loans and the contracting of other liabilities to the charge of the national Treasury, except those that are provided in the Budget, shall require the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article LXIII.

The taxes levied at present shall, in so far as they are not remodelled by new law, be collected according to the old system.

Article LXIV.

The expenditure and revenue of the State require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual Budget.

Any and all expenditures overpassing the appropriations set forth in the titles and paragraphs of the Budget, or that are not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently require the approbation of the Imperial Diet.

Article LXV.

The Budget shall be first laid before the House of Representatives.

Article LXVI.

The expenditures of the Imperial House shall be defrayed every year out of the National Treasury, according to the present fixed amount for the same, and shall not require the consent thereto of the Imperial Diet, except in case an increase thereof is found necessary.

Article LXVII.

Those already fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet without the concurrence of the Government.

Article LXVIII.

In order to meet special requirements, the Government may ask the consent of the Imperial Diet to a certain amount as a Continuing Expenditure Fund, for a previously fixed number of years.

Article LXIX

In order to supply deficiencies which are unavoidable in the Budget, and to meet requirements unprovided for in the same, a reserve fund shall be provided for in the Budget.

Article LXX.

When the Imperial Diet cannot be convoked owing to the external or internal condition of the country, in case of urgent need for the mantenance of public safety, the Government may take all necessary financial measures by means of an Imperial ordinance.

In the case mentioned in the preceding clause, the matter shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet at its next session, and its approbation shall be obtained thereto.

Article LXXI.

When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year.

Article LXXII.

The final account of the expenditures and revenue of the State shall be verified and confirmed by the Board of Audit, and it shall be submitted by the Government to the Imperial Diet, together with the report of verification of the said Board.

The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined separately.

CHAPTER VII. — SUPPLEMENTARY RULES.

Article LXXIII.

When it has become necessary in future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project to that effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial order.

In the above case, neither House can open the debate unless not less than two-thirds of the whole number of members are present; and no amendment can be passed unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present is obtained.

Article LXXIV.

No modifications of the House Law shall be required to be submitted to the deliberation of the Imperial Diet.

No provision of the present Constitution can be modified by the Imperial House Law.

Article LXXV.

No modifications can be introduced into the Constitution or into the Imperial House Law during the time of a Regency.

Article LXXVI.

Existing legal enactments, such as laws, regulations, ordinances, or by whatever names they may be called shall, so far as they do not conflict with the present Constitution, remain in force.

All existing contracts or orders that entail obligations upon the Government and that are connected with expenditure shall come within the scope of Articles LXVI. and LXVII.

APPENDIX I.

Convention Between Russia and Japan in Relation to Manchuria, Concluded on July 4th 1910.

The Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan being sincerely attached to the principles established by the Convention concluded between them on July 30, 1907, and being desirous of developing the effects of this Convention with a view to the consolidation of peace in the Far East, have agreed to complete the same arrangement in the following manner: —

(1) With the object of facilitating communications and developing the commerce of the nations, the two high contracting parties agree to extend to one another their friendly cooperation with a view to the improvement of their respective railway lines in Manchuria, and the perfecting of the connecting services of the said lines, and to abstain from all competition prejudicial to the realization of this object.

(2) Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to maintain the *status quo* in Manchuria resulting from all the treaties, conventions, and other arrangements concluded up to this date, either between Russia and Japan or between those two Powers and China. Copies of the said arrangements have been exchanged between Russia and Japan.

(3) In the event of anything arising of a nature to threaten the *status quo* mentioned above, the two high contracting parties shall enter each time into communication with each other with a view to coming to an understanding as to the measures they may think it necessary to take for the maintenance of the said *status quo*.

APPENDIX J.

Statement of Japan's Demands on China contained in a Document Handed to President Yuan-Shih-Kai by Mr. Hioki on January 18, 1915. The Demands Reviewed. The Revised Demands.

SECTION I.

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace of eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles:—

Article 1. The Chinese government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese government may hereafter agree with the German government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany now possesses in relation to the province of Shantung.

Article 2. The Chinese government engages that within the province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third power under any pretext whatever.

Article 3. The Chinese government consents to Japan's building a railway from Chefoo to Lungkow to join the Kiau-chau-Tsinanfu railway.

Article 4. The Chinese government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by itself, as soon as possible, certain important cities and towns in the province of Shantung as commercial ports. What places are to be opened are to be decided upon by the two governments by separate agreement.

Section II.

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, since the Chinese government has always recognized the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:—

Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, and the term of lease of the South Manchurian railway and the Antung-Mukden railway, shall be extended to the period of ninety-nine years.

Article 2. Japanese officials and common people in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

Article 3. Japanese officials and common people shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and éastern Mongolia, and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4. The Chinese government agrees to grant to Japanese officials and common people the mining rights of all mines in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia. What mines are to be opened shall be decided upon by the two governments jointly.

Article 5. The Chinese government agrees that in respect of the two cases mentioned herein below the consent of the Japanese government shall first be obtained before action shall be taken:—

(*a*) Whenever permission is granted to a subject of a third power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria or eastern inner Mongolia.

(*b*) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria or eastern inner Mongolia as security.

Article 6. The Chinese government agrees that if the Chinese government employs political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or eastern inner Mongolia the Japanese government shall first be consulted.

Article 7. The Chinese government agrees that the control and

management of the Kirin-Changchun railway shall be handed over to the Japanese government for a term of ninety-nine years, dating from the signing of this agreement.

SECTION III.

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping company have close relations with each other at present, and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:—

Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property, of whatsoever nature, of the said company nor cause the said company to dispose freely of the same.

Article 2. The Chinese government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company, and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said company, the consent of said company shall first be obtained.

SECTION IV.

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following articles:—

The Chinese government engages not to cede or lease to a third power any harbor, bay, or island along the coast of China.

SECTION V.

Article 1. The Chinese government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese government and the Chinese government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle, cases which have caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of the important places in China shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese, or that the Chinese police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese police service.

Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war, say 50 per cent. or more of what is needed by the Chinese government, or there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchou, and another between Nanchang and Chao-chou.

Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways, and construct harbor works, including dockyards, in the province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

Article 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right to propagate religious doctrines in China.

Remarks.

By the signing of treaties on May 25, 1915, the substance of Groups I and II of these demands underwent practically no changes. Certain modifications were made in Group III. Group IV was retained as it stood, and it was ultimately agreed that the discussion of Group V, with the exception of the provision regarding Fukien Province—which was retained—should be postponed.

The concession asked for in Group III together with the railways concessions of Group V are all in the very heart of the region that has hitherto been recognized as the British sphere of influence. The Hanyehping Company's interests include the Hanyang iron works, the

Linghsiang coal mines, and the Tayeh iron mines. The Company is Chinese.

Under Group I Japan secures greater rights in Shantung than Germany had possessed, both as regards the prohibition to lease territory on the coast of Shantung to a third power, and as regards the railway privileges demanded.

Under Group II the concessions amount, in effect, to the cession of South Manchuria to Japan.

Group IV requiring China "not to cede or lease to any third power any harbor or bay or island along the coast," is as plain an invasion of China's sovereignty as it is possible to conceive.

Group V comprise concessions which embody an ill-concealed attempt to impose a protectorate on China. The consideration of this Group, with the exception of the Fukien provision, has been postponed by Japan to a more opportune moment. The demand for a concession to construct a railway line connecting Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, and with the Nanchang-Hangchow railways was made in face of the fact that the railway construction referred to had already been promised to the British. Similarly the railway concessions demanded in Group I was in the face of China's settled policy to construct and own all her own railways, whether built with foreign capital or not, the same to remain Chinese lines. China has not wished to repeat her bitter experiences in Manchuria, where her railways in Russian and Japanese hands are made to serve political ends inconsistent with her exercise of complete sovereignty in that region.

The provisions in Section II to the effect that Japanese subjects are to be free to travel, reside, engage in business and in manufacture of any sort, lease or own land and erect buildings, and to open mines throughout the region referred to, involve the granting to the Japanese of special privileges not accorded to other nations. With the exception of missionaries, it has not heretofore been legal for foreigners to own land and buildings, reside and carry on business at places other than the treaty ports, where they are for the most part, outside the jurisdiction of the Chinese laws, and are protected in their rights and privileges by the extra-territoriality applied to all such foreigners. This exceedingly valuable privilege granted to foreigners by the Chinese,

Japan now proposed to infringe upon by these new demands. Her insistence on the granting of such special privileges to her nationals could only mean that Japan wished to put herself in the way of claiming superior rights in China, and a paramountcy of influence in her internal affairs. Moreover, the dangers of a military and political invasion arising out of this sort of 'peaceful penetration', are only too well known.

Of the demands in Group V the most indefensible are those regarding police and the purchase or manufacture of arms. To grant the first of these would be to submit to a monstrous violation of sovereign rights, and would be practically tantamount to abnegation of the ordinary functions of administration. To grant the second of these demands would be to throw overboard all remaining vestiges of the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity to all nations in China's markets, besides placing Japan in a position to ascertain and to regulate all of China's military preparations. Thus China could never again be master in her own house but would have to submit at all times to Japan's most far reaching demands. Indeed, it is inconceivable that such demands as these could have been made without the deliberate purpose to effect the complete subversion of China's autonomy.

Under the severest pressure, China was compelled to yield her consent to the granting of nearly all the demands. On February 12, the Chinese presented a formal statement assenting to twelve of the twenty-one items. On February 20 the Japanese Minister insisted upon the whole twenty-one items being made the basis of negotiation. On February 22 China requested a declaration from Japan as to her intentions with respect to Kiaochao and the Shantung Peninsula, and requested a restoration of Chinese sovereignty in that region in accordance with the assurances given at the time of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany. On February 25 and 28 the Chinese protested against the granting of exclusive privileges in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Early in March, China consented to an extension of the leases in South Manchuria. At the same time they consented, with some modifications to the demands regarding loans and mining rights and advisers in South Manchuria. Later in March the Chinese sub-

mitted, with certain modifications, to the demands with respect to Japanese subjects settling and owning land in the interior of Eastern Inner Mongolia and South Manchuria. China refused to enter into an 'agreement' with regard to the demand in Group IV that China should promise not to to alienate any island, port or harbor on the coast to any third power. On this point China's objections were directed, naturally, to pointing out the impossibility of thus bargaining away her sovereignty, as well as to the implied breach of the principle of equal opportunity to which Japan had so repeatedly pledged herself.

During April Japan pressed her demands with respect to the railway concessions already referred to, and likewise urged some of her demands contained in Group V. China continuing to show resistance, Japan began to push her military and naval preparatious, and actually went so far as to make a show of force by dispatching additional troops and warships to China. Up to this time the British and American governments had been kept pretty well in the dark as to Japan's intentions. The news had, however, finally managed to trickle through and there was an outburst of indignation in both countries. The fact that foreign sympathy was so entirely on the side of China, was not without its effect in Japan. Accordingly on April 26, the announcement was made that Japan had presented a revision of her terms comprising now twenty-four demands. It was declared that this was Japan's final word, and if China would consent to the whole group without revision Japan would restore Kiaochao to China *at an opportune time and subject to certain conditions.* In the revision several of the most objectionable items included in the former demands were retained, modified as to form, but in substance the same.

The Chinese replied on May 1, agreeing to nearly all that was asked in the revision, but rejecting one demand concerning Eastern Inner Mongolia, and the demand for railway concessions in South China. China also asked that Japan agree to the retrocession of Shantung and provide indemnification for the losses caused to Chinese subjects by the military campaign in that province; and that Japan recognize the right of China to participate in the negotiations between Japan and Germany with regard to Shantung. Japan's reply to these representations was to direct her Minister to withdraw the conditional

offer for the restoration of Shantung, and the Japanese government prepared an ultimatum which it put into its Minister's hands on May 6. The ultimatum was presented to China on the following day (May 7) and she was given forty-eight hours in which to accede to the demands. The ultimatum was accompanied by an explanatory note in which it was declared that the following demands were to be postponed for later consideration:—(*a*) the employment of advisers, (*b*) the establishment of schools and hospitals, (*c*) the railway concessions in South China, (*d*) the supply of arms and ammunition and the establishing of arsenals, and (*e*) the propagation of Buddhism. Upon the question of Kiaochao, the ultimatum stated that, "if the Chinese Government accepts all the articles as demanded in the ultimatum, the offer of Japanese Government to restore Kiaochao ... will still hold good."

The ultimatum contained little, except in phraseology, that differed from the original demands that had already been assented to by China, so that the necessity of putting the matter in so peremptory form at this stage of the negotiations savoured a little of Japanese 'play to the gallery.' In China's answer delivered on May 9, it was stated, "The Chinese Government, with a view to preserving the peace of the Far East, hereby accepts, with the exception of those five articles of Group V, postponed for later negotiation, all the articles of Groups I, II, III and IV and the exchange of Notes in connection with Fukien Province in Group V, as contained in the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April and in accordance with the Explanatory Note of seven articles accompanying the Ultimatum of the Japanese Government, with the hope that thereby all outstanding questions are settled, so that the cordial relationship between the two countries may be further consolidated.

Several conferences were now held for the purpose of drafting the necessary treaties, agreements exchanges of notes and declarations, the whole being finally completed on May 25, at which time the signatures of Ministers were affixed, and ratifications exchanged on June 8.

Japan's Revised Demands on China, Presented April 26, 1915.

GROUP I.

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles:—

Art. 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government, relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Art. 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes).

The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any Power under any pretext.

Art. 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsen line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

Art. 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes).

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

GROUP II.

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with a view to developing their economic relations in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:—

Art. 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that the term

of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be extended to 99 years.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes).

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South Manchurian Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchurian Railway Agreement that it may be redeemed by China after 36 years after the traffic is opened is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may lease or purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Art. 3*a*. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding two articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinances and tax regulations, which are approved by the Japanese consul. Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese consul; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese authorities. In either case an officer can be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations conjointly, in accordance with Chinese law and local usage. When the judicial system in the said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law courts.

Art. 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese subjects shall be permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect for and

open mines at the following places in South Manchuria, apart from those mining areas in which mines are being prospected for or worked; until the Mining Ordinance is definitely settled, methods at present in force shall be followed.

PROVINCE OF FENG-TIEN.

Locality	District	Mineral
Niu Hsin T'ai	Pen-hsi	Coal
Tien Shih Fu Kou	Pen-hsi	"
Sha Sung Kang	Hai-lung	"
T'ieh Ch'ang	T'ung-hua	"
Nuan Ti T'ang	Chin	"
An Shan Chan region	From Liao-yang to Pen-hsi	Iron

PROVINCE OE KIRIN (SOUTHERN PORTION).

Sha Sung Kang	Ho-lung	Coal and Iron
Kang Yao	Chi-lin (Kirin)	Coal
Chia P'i Kou	Hua-tien	Gold

Art. 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes).

The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter provide funds for building railways in South Manchuria; if foreign capital is required, the Chinese Government agrees to negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists first.

Art. 5*a*. (Changed to an exchange of notes).

The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of South Manchuria (not including customs and salt revenue on the security of which loans have already been made by the Central Government), it will negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists first.

Art. 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes).

The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese will be employed first.

Art. 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan agreements,

taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan agreements made heretofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in future, more advantageous terms than those in existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers, in connection with railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes.

All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Convention, remain in force.

1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of Eastern Inner Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese Government first.

2. The Japanese Government agrees that China will herself provide funds for building the railways in Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required, she must negotiate with the Japanese Government first.

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interests of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as Commercial Ports. The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake the agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission.

GROUP III.

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being very intimate, if those interested in the said Company come to an agreement with the Japanese capitalists for cooperation, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto. The Chinese Government further agrees that, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, China will not convert the Company into a state enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow or use foreign capital other than Japanese.

GROUP IV.

China to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with the following principle:—

No bay, harbor, or island along the coast of China may be ceded or leased to any Power.

NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED.

A.

As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, the Nanchang-Hangchow railway, and the Nanchang-Chaochow railway, if it clearly ascertained that other Powers have no objection, China shall grant the said right to Japan.

B.

As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang railway, a railway from Nanchang to Hangchow and another from Nanchang to Chaochow, the Chinese Government shall not grant the said right to any foreign Power before Japan comes to an understanding with the other Power which is heretofore interested therein.

C.

The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever is to be permitted to construct, on the coast of the Fukien Province, a dock-yard, a coaling station for military use, or a naval base; nor to be anthorized to set up any other military establishment. The Chinese Government further agrees not to use foreign capital for setting up the above-mentioned construction or establishment.

Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows:—

1. The Chinese Government shall, whenever, in future, it considers this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese advisers.

2. Whenever, in future. Japanese subjects desire to lease or purchase land in the interior of China for establishing schools or hospitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto.

3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future, the Chinese Government shall send military officers to Japan to negotiate with Japanese

military authorities the matter of purchasing arms or that of establishing a joint arsenal.

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister stated as follows:—

As relates to the question of the right of missionary propaganda, the same shall be taken up again for negotiation in future.

Documents Exchanged between the Japanese and Chinese Governments.

Treaty Respecting the Province of Shantung.

Article 1. The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsen line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

Article 3. The Chinese Government agrees in the interests of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports.

Article 4. The present treaty shall come into force on the day of its signature.

Exchange of Notes Respecting Shantung.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honour to make the following declaration to your Government:—"Within the Province of Shantung or along its coast no territory or island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any pretext.

I avail etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

[The foregoing and all subsequent notes duly acknowledged by the Minister to whom adressed].

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Opening of Ports in Shantung.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 3 of the Treaty respecting the Province of Shantung signed this day, will be selected and the regulations therefor will be drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which will be made after consulting the Minister of Japan.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Restoration of the Leased Territory of Kiaochow Bay.

Excellency,

In the name of my Government I have the honour to make the following declaration to the Chinese Government:—

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions:—

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a Commercial Port.

2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.

3. If the Powers desire it, an international concession may be established.

4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Hioki Eki.

Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Article 1. The two High Contracting Parties agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Man-

churia Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to 99 years.

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its permission.

Article 5. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding three articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation of China.

Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer may be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage.

When, in future the judicial system in the said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese Law Courts.

Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interests of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as Commercial Ports.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan agreements made heretofore between China and foreign financiers.

When in future, more advantageous terms than those in existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers in connection

with railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes.

Article 8. All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Treaty, remain in force.

Article 9. The present Treaty shall come into force on the date of its signature. The present Treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Tokyo as soon as possible.

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Terms of Lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the Terms of South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railways.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that, respecting the provisions contained in Article 1 of the Treaty relating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, signed this day, the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchurian Agreement providing that it may be redeemed by China after 36 years from the day on which traffic is opened is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Opening of Ports in E. I. Mongolia.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 6 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, will be selected, and the regulations therefor

will be drawn up by the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which will be made after consulting the Minister of Japan.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

SOUTH MANCHURIA.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that Japanese subjects shall, as soon as possible, investigate and select mines in the mining areas in South Manchuria specified hereinunder, except those being prospected for or worked, and the Chinese Government will then permit them to prospect or work the same; but before the mining regulations are definitely settled, the practice at present in force shall be followed.

PROVINCE OF FENGTIEN.

Locality	District	Mineral
Niu Hsin T'ai	Pen-hsi	Coal
Tien Shih Fu Kou	Pen-hsi	"
Sha Sung Kang	Hai-lung	"
T'ieh Ch'ang	Tung-hua	"
Nuan Ti T'ang	Chin	"
An Shan Chan region	From Liao-yang to Pen-hsi	Iron

PROVINCE OF KIRIN (SOUTHERN PORTION)

Sha Sung Kang	Ho-lung	Coal and Iron
Kang Yao	Chi-lin (Kirin)	Coal
Chia P'i Kou	Hua-tien	Gold

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

Exchange of Notes Respecting Railways and Taxes in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of my Government, I have the honour to make the following declaration to your Government:—

China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first: and further, the Chinese Government, when making a loan in future on the security of the taxes in the above mentioned places (excluding the salt and customs revenue which have already been pledged by the Chinese Central Government) may negotiate for it with Japanese capitalists first.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Employment of Advisers in South Manchuria.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the Chinese Government, I have the honour to make the following declaration to your Government:—

"Hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial military, or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first."

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Explanation of "Lease by Negotiation" in South Manchuria.

Excellency,

I have the honour to state that the term "lease by negotiation" contained in Article 2 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day shall be understood to imply a long-term lease of not more than thirty years and also the possibility of its unconditional renewal.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Hioki Eki.

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Arrangement for Police Laws and Ordinances and Taxation in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that the Chinese Authorities will notify the Japanese Consul of the police laws and ordinances and the taxation to which Japanese subjects shall submit according to Article 5 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day so as to come to an understanding with him before their enforcement.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

The Postponement of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that, inasmuch as preparations have to be made regarding Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, the Chinese Government proposes that the operation of the said Articles be postponed for a period of three months beginning from the date of the signing of the said Treaty.

I hope your Government will agree to this proposal.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

Exchange of Notes Respecting the matter of Hanyehping

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to state that if in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese capitalists agree upon cooperation, the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists,

to convert it inte a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Fukien Question.

Excellency,

A report has reached me to the effect that the Chinese Government has the intention of permitting foreign nations to establish, on the coast of Fukien Province, dockyards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments; and also of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establishments.

I have the honour to request that Your Excellency will be good enough to give me a reply stating whether or not the Chinese Government really entertains such an intention.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Hioki Eki.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of this day, which I have noted.

In reply I beg to inform you that the Chinese Government hereby declares that it has given no permission to foreign nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dockyards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments; nor does it entertain an intention of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above mentioned establishments.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.